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Abstract
Gays and lesbians have long struggled for their rights as citizens, yet only recently has
their struggle been truly politicized in a way that fosters mobilization. When and why social
movements coalesce despite the many obstacles to collective action are fundamental questions in
comparative politics. While examining social movements is worthwhile, it is important to
examine not only when and why a social movement forms, but also when and why a social
movement is successful. This dissertation tackles the latter of these objectives, focusing on when
and why social movements have success in terms of their duration from the time of their
formation until their desired policy output is produced.

Keywords: social movements, LGBT, survival analysis
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Chapter 1 Why Lesbian, Gay, and Bisexual Politics?
“It has often been noted that in the Western tradition homosexuality was first called the
sin of sodomy, then registered as the crime of buggery, next was considered the disease of
psychological inversion, but now has become like an ethnicity. And where sinners are
condemned, criminals are imprisoned and psychological inverts are hospitalized, members of
ethnic groups participate in politics” (Smith and Haider-Markel 2002, xv). Gays and lesbians
have long struggled for their rights as citizens, yet only recently has their struggle been truly
politicized in a way that fosters mobilization. When and why social movements coalesce despite
the many obstacles to collective action are fundamental questions in comparative politics. While
examining social movements is worthwhile, it is important to examine not only when and why a
social movement forms, but also when and why a social movement is successful. In the
following I will tackle the latter of these objectives, focusing on when and why social
movements have success in terms of their duration from the time of their formation until their
desired policy output is produced.
The gay and lesbian social movements in industrialized democracies, when viewed crossnationally, provide interesting cases for determining when a social movement is effective.1 Such
movements provide an opportunity to assess social movement success in which the inputs of the
social movement are constant in terms of demands on the state, while the state structures and
social context vary.2 Gays and lesbians are also interesting to examine because they are a current

1

I am measuring success in terms of policy adopted which LGB social organizations sought. I will address
measurement and the reasons for measuring success as policy when I discuss the research design.
2

There is an obvious assumption being made here that the LGB social movements across states place the same
demands on the state. This argument will be developed when the history of gay and lesbian politics is addressed.
Another important aspect to consider when examining policy is the feedback loop between policy changes and the
social and political context for LGB movements. Through the use of event history modeling and careful
categorization of policy variables, the feedback can be accounted for by the extent to which it changes the
opportunity structure.
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social movement that provides an in-process perspective on the impact of a social movement on
public policy. The study of the politics of gays and lesbians is still in its infancy. Much of the
research thus far in gay politics has consisted of historical accounts and comparisons to what the
ideal outcomes for gays and lesbians would be in the political and social spheres. Quantitative
analyses have narrowly focused on comparisons across US states or evaluations of the movement
and/or policy within a single country. Where cross national comparison occurs it is often limited
in its scope. This dissertation aims to contribute to the systematic study of this new social
phenomenon via expansion to a cross-national multi-policy analysis.
Resource mobilization and the political opportunity structure are fundamental to
understanding why a social movement may be successful in one context and not in another.
Resource mobilization postulates that collective action is the result of rational behavior in which
actors/social movement organizations coalesce or choose strategies based on the costs and
benefits of actions. When an organization possesses resources for mobilization and the costs of
mobilization are lower than the potential benefits, then actions are initiated (Tilly 1978). Political
opportunity structure, on the other hand, explains the action decisions made by a social
movement organization, its strategies, and its impact as a function of the features of the
institutions and political context (Van Der Heijden 2006). The political opportunity structure is
shaped by institutions as well as environment, and as such it is imperative to look at both
institutional as well as contextual factors to explain political success.
Social movements do not gain resources in a vacuum, thus it is expected that changes in
the institutional and/or social context impact the resources social movement organizations are
able to acquire. While this structure raises endogeneity questions, this research addresses
endogeneity by using event history modeling to study the impact of changes in political

2

opportunity structure that affect resources to be observed at subsequent times. These additional
resources may in turn generate further structural changes that will be reflected in later
observations.
The literature on the public policy process provides insight into why we should view
policy change as an iterative process that continually reassesses inputs into the political system.
Event history modeling captures the dynamic nature of the policy process. Furthermore, models
of the policy process are able to incorporate resource mobilization into the government inputs
that shape the subsequent policy outputs. The punctuated equilibrium model in particular offers
important insight into the policy process because it accounts for the periods of stasis as well as
rapid change that are observed in the development of gay rights policy. Punctuated equilibrium,
like other models of policy, has some important limitations that can be well informed by political
opportunity structure. The punctuated equilibrium model is a well-developed analytical theory,
but lacks the causal mechanisms to serve as an explanatory theory, and it is in this capacity that
resource mobilization and political opportunity structure help to fill in the theoretical gap. 3
Political opportunity structure provides a much needed causal mechanism as will be discussed in
the review of the literature and theoretical bases subsequently.
Policy diffusion provides an additional framework for understanding how policies spread
from state to state that informs the research here. The policy diffusion anticipates policy adoption
in one state to be related to the policy experiences in states that have already adopted the same or
similar policy. The extent and pattern of diffusion is related to proximity and thus policy
diffusion theory intersects with political opportunity structure insofar as structural similarity

3

Analytic theories are those theories that explain the nature of change or how something occurs, but does not
explain why or provide causal mechanisms. Explanatory theories, in contrast, provide casual mechanism and attempt
to developed predictable outcomes that can test the theory for validity. (Little 1991)

3

creates the proximity that encourages policy diffusion. Thus despite geographical distance
proximity in the form of formal structures of government exists between Australia and Canada
for example.
This research adds to the literature on gay politics by examining the development of gayfriendly policies, defined by those policy changes that LGB4 organizations seek. While both gay
politics and comparative politics have been combined with fundamentals of public policy, the
three have not simultaneously guided research. Nor has the use of event history modeling as a
more accurate analysis tool for examining policy change sought by LGB organization that
includes conceptually the iterative nature of public policy.
Through examination of advanced industrialized democracies, I allow for variation in
institutions and context while simultaneously holding constant the general form the social
movement has taken. For this reason I will briefly review LGB history as relevant to demonstrate
the validity of understanding the movement as transnational. The limitation of this research is
closely tied to the transnational nature’s limitation to predominantly the global North. Much of
the tactic sharing, cross national economic support and policy expansion has been limited to
industrialized democracies with existing development related ties.
There are several reasons why we can look at gay politics in industrialized democracies
as consistent in goals. Perhaps the most fundamental reason is that the modern gay rights
movement in the western world has a commonly accepted start point in the radicalized politics
and sexual revolution of the 1960s. Such politics culminated in many so-called game changing
events such as the Stonewall riots of 1969 in New York. Although the riots themselves were the

4

LGB is an acronym for Lesbian, Gay, and Bisexual.
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action of American LGBT5 persons, the impact and subsequent commemoration of the event has
spread across the industrialized world. Gay pride weekends worldwide have their foundations in
the Christopher Street Liberation parades held across the United States in 1970 to commemorate
the Stonewall riots (Duberman 1993). Documentaries about Stonewall played a significant role
in mobilizing gay youth on university campuses across Germany, further spreading the
movement across national boundaries (Adam 1995). In addition, the impact of the importance of
Stonewall can be seen in the names as well as the early tactics of gay rights groups worldwide,
notably in the importance of the British gay rights group which utilizes the name Stonewall or in
the tactics utilized by groups as near to the US as Canada and as far as Australia.
This research contributes to existing literature in several important ways. First, it will
connect the resource mobilization and political opportunity structure paradigms resultantly
allowing for better use and understanding of both in the comparative policy literature. Second, it
will acknowledge the causal mechanism deficiencies within the policy literature and attempt to
fill the void with resource mobilization and political opportunity structure to generate a more
comprehensive and explanatory model of the policy process. Finally, gay politics will be moved
from narrow research agendas into a more encompassing research design that seeks to
empirically test models of gay rights determinants across states rather than within in them.
History of Gay Politics
In order to understand the development of gay rights policy as a result of the social
movement, it is imperative to have an understanding of the movement and its development. In

5

LGBT is used as an acronym for gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgendered. While this paper focuses only on
lesbian, gay and bisexual rights, it is important note that transgendered activists played an important role in the
Stonewall riots and that transgendered persons are often allied with gay rights organizations. Please also note that I
use LGB except in instances in which I am referencing an organization, event or program that explicitly includes the
transgender community and gender identity rights.
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particular, it is vital for this research to establish the pervasive implication of the aftermath of the
sexual revolution, radicalization of politics, and the instigating nature of the Stonewall riots as
relevant to the pursuit of LGB rights throughout the industrialized world. The history LGBT
people extends back as far as all other history, but the modern gay rights movement is usually
marked as beginning in 1969 with the Stonewall riots. While it is not possible to chronicle all of
gay history here, it is important to establish a historical context for the development of the gay
rights movement. The end of the nineteenth century and early part of the twentieth century
proved very important in laying the foundations for the organizations that would later push for
the recognition of gays and lesbians by the state, thus this is where the history will begin. The
focus of this history, however, will be the time and events leading up to 1969 and the subsequent
development of the movement.
The end of the nineteenth century at first glance might seem to an unlikely place to begin
the history of gay politics, with the 1895 trial of Oscar Wilde effectively quelling gay
organizations in England. But outside of England it served as a catalyst for mobilization, Magnus
Hirschfeld founded the first organization to address the civil rights of gay people within two
years of the trial. Hirschfeld, along with several others, began the Scientific-Humanitarian
Committee (S-HC) in May of 1897 and it spawned additional gay organizations throughout
Germany until Nazi suppression in 1933. The S-HC focused on educating the public about
homosexuals and abolishing Paragraph 175 of the German legal code which outlawed
homosexual sex. The work of the S-HC would spread in the subsequent decade to the United
States, Sweden, the Netherlands, Russia, and many other countries (Adam 1995). This
demonstrates that from inception, organizations within the gay rights movement have routinely
sought to organize cross-nationally. As a result of this international focus, there has been a great

6

deal of goal coordination, information sharing, and policy learning throughout the industrialized
world among LGBT organizations.
Leaping forward in history to perhaps the most well-known event in gay rights history,
the Stonewall riots of 1969 in New York City is often marked as the inception of the modern
movement. Although bar raids had been routinely occurring all over the industrialized world for
years, in the pre-dawn raid of Stonewall on June 28, 1969, the LGB bar patrons fought back with
rioting that lasted well into the morning and transformed the public image of the homosexual.
The news of Stonewall spread quickly through the gay community and by the next morning a
rally was formed in New York. The rioting-turned-demonstration continued with demands for an
end to the discrimination against gays and lesbians and the nearly immediate formation of the
Gay Liberation Front (GLF). The following year the event was commemorated with the
Christopher Street Liberation Day parade in New York, Los Angeles and San Francisco as well
as major cities in outside the U.S. (Adam 1995, Duberman 1993).6 Stonewall became a rallying
cry that showed gays and lesbians worldwide that they could stand up for themselves and that in
numbers their message could not be quelled.
Young lesbians and gay men who had been active in other movements such as the civil
rights movement, the peace movement, or the feminist movement also came to realize that their
discrimination as homosexuals deserved the same kind of mobilization and attention. These
activists were able to draw from the tactical skills they had acquired in other social movements
and apply these methods to reform existing gay organizations and create new ones that focused
on public, loud, and forceful demands for equality. These organizations sprang up all over the

6

The Stonewall Riot is covered in exceptional detail by Duberman (1993) via personal accounts from rioters,
archival material from the GLF, and historical coverage of the event. He addresses the context that led up to the
Stonewall Riot, the riot itself, and the immediate aftermath in much greater detail than is possible here.
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Western world drawing from the cultural symbol of Stonewall and often in response to showings
of documentaries about the riots.7
From the early movement that began in Germany to the modern movement that was
instigated by Stonewall, gay organizations have connected LGB persons to their counterparts in
other countries sharing resources, strategies, and successes to build an international community.
Second, we can see a general pattern across states in movement goals and development. Initial
movement initiatives were focused on educating the public and providing services for gays and
lesbians. The early political goals tended to focus first on decriminalization and equalization in
age of consent, generally focusing on civil rights and decriminalization. While the achievements
and specific ordering of civil rights goals varied across states there is also a recognizable
consistency in the goal set sought (Waaldijk 1999). Across states, decriminalization, equalization
of consenting age, ability to serve in the military, provisions to prevent discrimination, legal
recognition of relationships and parental rights are clearly on the gay-rights agenda. Where a
policy goal is achieved, the strategy is disseminated to organizations in other countries via
international conferences and organizations such as ILGA. Because of this continuity across
advanced democracies, it is possible to regard the policy initiatives of the movement as
congruent in the states that will be studied here.
In the next chapter I discuss the methodological approach to be used in the subsequent
chapters. In detailing the theoretical framework and its connection to the statistical modeling
used, I provide a rationale for a consistent structure for examining a diverse set of policies. This
chapter will also explain a statistical modeling technique that has not previously been applied to
the study of policy change in favor of LGB rights expansion.

7

Notably, documentaries using Stonewall and Christopher Street Liberation Day parade footage made an impact in
Germany while documentaries on Nazi oppression of homosexuals bolstered the drive of American organizations.
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The first policy chapter, Chapter Three, addresses prohibitions on discrimination. As
Waaldijk points out, after decriminalization of homosexual behavior is achieved the next goal in
most industrialized democracies is to pursue protections from discrimination, which in many
ways represents the acknowledgement of LGB persons as complete citizens.8 Furthermore both
LGB specific and general prohibitions against discrimination represent important access to the
market and the free exchange of one’s labor.
Because of the relationship between prohibitions on discrimination and citizenship, these
policies are in many ways closely related to states’ policy toward LGBs openly serving in the
military, the focus of Chapter Four. As the military is a symbol of the nation, the ability to serve
within the military is a sign that one is recognized as a citizen of the state with rights and
obligations of citizenship. This is particularly true in states with mandatory conscription for
either males or males and females. Thus Chapter Four examines when states adopt policies that
allow LGB persons to serve in the armed forces.
In Chapter Five policies recognizing LGB relationships are analyzed. The ability to
create a partnership that is recognized by the state has increasingly come to be understood as a
fundamental human right to create a family. State recognition of a partnership between two
consenting adult is also bequeathed with privileges in every state. Such privileges range from
lower rates of taxation relative to single individuals to access to decision making in the medical
care for one’s partner to advantages in pension and inheritance rights. These policies are
addressed subsequent to the discrimination chapter both because the usual order of the goals fits

8

Removal of sodomy laws is not addressed in this research because it would significantly constrain the dataset.
Because the analysis begins in 1971, the number of states that would be right-censored is sufficiently high that
results would likely have very little validity. Many states made general reforms to their constitutions or penal codes
prior to 1971 and the removal of sodomy laws was a result of creating a more parsimonious and enforceable set of
regulations as much (or more than) the result of any pressures from the LGB community.
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this pattern as well as the need to recognize that discrimination exists and should be prevented
before the privileges of partnership can be extended.
All three of the policy chapters explain the policies to be examined and provide a context
through the examination of two illustrative cases at the national level and examination of the
international context of the European Union that affects many of the cases in the analysis.
Because the independent variables are nearly identical across these chapters, the review of the
research design will be brief and focus on relevant differences within the chapter.
Following the policy chapters will be a final chapter devoted reviewing the findings and
their impact upon the theory as relevant for future research. This chapter serves as final
assessment of the value of the theory and addresses the strengths and shortcomings of this
research. Additionally it provides perspective on the prospects for future research and the
importance of continuing research in this area as it is a rapidly changing field.

10

Ch 2: Context and Methodology for Studying LGB Public Policy
If one were to review Sociological Forum’s mini-symposium on social movement
theories (vol 14, no 1 March 1999), one would be struck by the multitude of interpretations
applied to political opportunity structure and resource mobilization theory and the use of each as
an explanatory tool for understanding social movements. While this insightful debate clearly
informs this research, it is outside the scope of the project to attempt to resolve the debate or
respond to the individual arguments of each paper within the symposium. Rather, the goal here is
to incorporate additional paradigms as a complement to political opportunity structure and
resource mobilization to develop a more careful use of these theories. Using the transnational
LGB movement as the core of this research, an attempt is made to synthesize elements from
public policy theories with theories of political opportunity structure and resource mobilization
and examine the applicability of the synthesized theory to policy change. This shifts the focus
from mobilization or social movement development to social movement success defined as
policy change. Additionally the use of event history modeling as the statistical technique to test
the applicability of combined theory allows for the incorporation of the endogenous nature of
policymaking whilst retaining primary focus on the usefulness of the explanatory variables.
This chapter establishes the broader academic context in which this research fits
including how it relates to existing literature on social movements, public policy, and LGB
studies. The review of the literature begins with existing theoretical frameworks for
understanding and examining social movements. The second section reviews the literature
regarding public policy that is most applicable to the theory and research design employed here.
The previous chapter reviews the historical context of the LGB movement and makes the case
for understanding the movement as transnational..
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I propose that public policy, particularly policy that relates to a social movement’s goals,
must be analyzed as a function of the interactions between resources and institutions.
Furthermore, it is problematic to assume that movement resources and institutions should be
modeled as identical components to understanding policy. Movement resources are both filtered
through and impacted by the political and social institutions in which they operate, thus
institutions act as intervening rather independent variables.
The theory informs the statistical methods used, event history modeling, as well as the
operationalization of formal and informal institutions. Thus, following the discussion of the
theory, I present the methodology to be used as well as the operationalization of the variables. A
brief explanation of event history modeling and the rationale for using event history modeling is
presented along with explanations of possible parameterizations. The operationalizations of the
variables are explained, including an explanation of the advantages and shortcomings of each
measure as well the selection process and sources.
The chapter concludes with expectations for the findings. Because this is an ongoing
movement, the expected findings present prospects for continuing change in the policy
development across the states studies. This final section will also review the road map for the
subsequent policy chapters.
Relevant Literature
Resource Mobilization
Social movement scholars who espouse resource mobilization theory see movements as a
function of unequal power distributions and the desire by those with less power to seek redress
(Amenta & Zylan 1991). Resource mobilization begins with a critique of discontent based
theories of collective action and argues that grievances alone do not lead to mobilization because

12

grievances are constant (Tilly 1978, Jenkins & Perrow 1977, Oberschall 1978). These critiques
and the underpinnings of what would subsequently be resource mobilization theory were
outlined by Snyder and Tilly (1973) in their attempt to explain collective violence in France.
They juxtapose the founding components of resource mobilization with the dominant discontent
paradigm for collective action based on relative deprivation, or change lagging behind
expectations. Unlike discontent theories, in which collective action is attributed to the
momentary irrational behavior of actors, resource mobilization theory sees social movements as
the rational result of groups responding to reductions in the costs of mobilizing or increases in
either the benefits to be gained or the likelihood of success (Jenkins 1983, Valocchi 1993). The
goals of social movements are defined by institutionalized power relations and the conflicts that
such power relations create. Since discontent within the system is ubiquitous, mobilization as
well as success are functions of resources (Jenkins 1983).
Resource mobilization theory points out that common interests are also insufficient for
mobilization to occur, but argues that where well developed organizations and social networks
exist, mobilization is more likely. This is because preexisting organizations that have constructed
dense interpersonal networks and strong group identity lower the costs associated with
mobilizing. Group or associational mobilizing is easier than individual mobilizing (McCarthy &
Zald 1973, Amenta & Zylan 1991, Valocchi 1993). Governmental actors who serve as delegated
agents of social control also impact the likelihood of mobilization because of their ability to raise
the costs of collective action (McCarthy & Zald 1973). The resources available to a social
movement organization and the likelihood for success may also be shaped by countermovement
organizations, which oppose the social movement and mobilize to prevent its success.

13

Scholars have applied resource mobilization theory to a variety of social movements and
social movement organizations in attempts to explain when mobilization occurs, what style or
format the mobilization takes, and, more limitedly, how successful mobilization is in achieving
goals. McAdam (1982), for instance, examined how changes in the Black community in the
United States from the 1910s to the 1960s provided additional resources for mobilization which
therefore led to the Black civil rights movement. His argument noted the importance of both
increased financial resources as well as the importance of Black churches gaining independence
from white churches and thus providing indigenous community resources for mobilization. Also
examining the Black civil right movement in the United States, Jenkins and Eckert (1986)
interpreted resources as including elite support for movement ideas and organizations and found
this to be important in explaining organizational development. The Italian environmentalist
movement mobilization has been explained in terms of social and human capital (Donati 1996).
Success of the Nicaraguan revolutionary movement has also been explained as partially a
function of resources available, such as support external to the movement, money, and the
number of organizations within the movement (Cuzán 1990).
Resource mobilization is understood here in terms of the resources that can be created
and used by a social movement or social movement organization, drawing more from Donati’s
interpretation than that of Jenkins and Eckert. The importance of resource mobilization in this
instance is in its ability to provide an explanation for whether a movement has the wherewithal to
achieve policy change and how long it will take until success is achieved. The level of resources
a social movement possesses and devotes to the achievement of a goal, specifically a goal of
policy change, impacts the likelihood of and duration until success. While financial resources are
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important, the instruments of organizations and tools available to social movement organizations
also have significant impact.
The resource mobilization tradition developed nearly exclusively in the United States in
the 1970s and as a result clearly reflects the impact of movements of that era and location. Tilly
(1978) framed social movements as challengers seeking access to the polity, generally in terms
of basic citizenship rights. This frame seems to draw on the US Black civil rights movement that
would also be the focus for the works of McAdam (1982) and Jenkins and Eckert (1986).
Many New Social Movements (NSMs), including the gay rights movement, are not
challengers in the sense Tilly referenced, because influence on policy change is the goal, rather
than basic citizenship rights. Although the policy change sought by the LGB community can be
interpreted as basic citizenship rights, and the strategy of deploying this framework has been
adopted by some movement organizations, the access to the polity is not equivalent to lack of
access to the polity experienced by the groups addressed in the traditional resource mobilization
literature. Lesbians, gays, and bisexuals have voting rights and the same level of access to the
political system as other citizens; what the gay rights movement seeks are changes to policies
that (tacitly or explicitly) allow differentials in their treatment to the detriment of LGB persons
and recognition of the validity of their relationships and lifestyle. The change in what a
challenger seeks does not change the basic premises of resource mobilization, but may impact
the importance of particular resources.
Another important change for resource mobilization is the advent of the internet as a
resource. The internet changes the relative importance of leadership that has been emphasized in
resource mobilization. Movements that draw heavily on the internet for information
dissemination and communication among members do not require the same kind of leadership
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resources as previous movements or movements that do not draw on the internet as a tool
(Peckham 2007). First, the internet’s ability to instantly disseminate and exchange information
worldwide means that action coordination does not require a movement elite’s initiation.
Furthermore, members are able respond to movement elites that are geographically distant but
have ideological proximity. This is important for the gay rights movement because there is not a
single identifiable leader for the global movement and yet the global movement exists and
coordinates action. The transnational nature of the LGB movement has only increased with the
spread of technology. Just as the “Arab Spring” uprisings in the Middle East in spring of 2011
and the even more recent Occupy Wall Street movement have used social media to dissemination
information and coordinate actions, so too has the LGB movement relied on technology to
expand their levels of coordination. LGBT websites, such as www.gay.nl, a Dutch LGBT news
and networking site; and www.365gay.com, a U.S. news, culture and networking site, have a
tradition of providing forums for political discussions, the organizing of meetings, and helping
those in the closet reach out to the wider gay community. Gay organizations have expanded
from the simple forums and chat rooms of the 1990s to use Twitter, Facebook, mobile alerts,
emails, and their websites to reach LGBT identifiers, allies, and advocates across the globe.9
The role of social movement organization in the development of policy is captured and
explained by resource mobilization theory. The extent to which an organization or a movement
as a whole has the capacity to impact the time it takes for the government to enact policy that is
favorable to the movement is dependent upon the resources available to the organizations within
the movement. While developed predominantly to explain the successes of the US civil rights

9

While the role of the internet in facilitating the transnational nature of the movement is noted, the subsequent
analysis in this dissertation does not control for the scale of internet usage. Because data on internet use is neither
available nor particularly applicable until 1990, inclusion of a control for internet usage would constrain the duration
of the dataset and vastly increase left censoring.
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movement, resource mobilization extends to new social movements’ capacity to prompt more
expedient policy change.
Political Opportunity Structure
The most obvious existing school of thought to draw from in tandem to resource
mobilization theory is political opportunity structure. Both comparative politics scholars as well
as public policy analysts have utilized political opportunity structure in their research.
Furthermore, the two paradigms are developmentally connected, as will subsequently be
discussed. The concept of political opportunity structure was first developed by Peter Eisinger
(1973, 11) who wrote that “environmental variables are related to one another in the sense that
that they establish a context within which politics takes place.” Eisinger noted that patterns of
political behavior were shaped by this context and particularly by those elements of context that
contributed to opening the political system to outside influence or insulating it from outside
influence.
Eisinger developed the notion of political opportunity structure to provide a theoretical
explanation for the connection between variables of the political environment and political
behavior. While the political environment was believed to have impact on political behavior and
had been tested as such, little had theoretically connected the two. Eisinger’s purpose was to
explain how the elements of the political environment provide a context for political behavior
and how a relatively open or closed context affects urban protest. The subsequent findings were
that for American cities the relationship between political opportunity structure and protest is
curvilinear but most protests did not lead to policy change. This finding supports assertions that
institutions matter. Specifically relevant to this research is that institutions may serve a filtering
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function and as such can reject, dampen and discourage, or facilitate and encourage calls for
policy change made by interest groups and social movements.
The premises behind political opportunity structure begin with the notion that “the
environmental variables are related to one another in the sense that they establish a context
within which politics takes place” (Eisinger 1973, 11). These factors that together develop a
political opportunity structure that subsequently serves to facilitate or obstruct social movement
pursuit of policy change. Political opportunity structure is understood as a compilation of
variables, each of which makes the opportunity structure more open or closed. It is the collection
of these that comprise the political opportunity structure as a whole, so while we speak of the
structure itself as open or closed in reality it is often a mixture of elements some of which
facilitate government receptivity to social movements and some of which obstruct receptivity.
Following on this, scholars have found that the impact of mobilization is mediated by context, so
outcomes are a function of how mobilization, action, and political opportunity are combined
(Piven and Cloward 1977, Amenta et al 1992, Skocpol 1992).
Since Eisinger, political opportunity structure has developed to explain the rise of social
movements beyond US urban protest. Political opportunity structure encompasses not only
institutional structure, but the variety of “signals to social and political actors which either
encourage or discourage them to use their internal resources to form social movements” (Tarrow
1996, 54).
Political opportunity structure scholars use “the idea of structures as a frame within
which human action takes place” (Giugni 1998, 366). The importance of structure that Eisinger
recognized and developed comes out of the sociological traditions of Europe, most notably those
of Marx and Weber. Marxist theory points to the importance of particularly class structure in
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shaping human behavior. Weber’s approach to bureaucratic institutions and their role in shaping
politics and policy provides the inspiration for the importance of political structure in shaping
human behavior with regard to policy (Giugni 1998). While the tradition makes note of the role
of formal political institutions as well as social institutions, the most visible and continuously
used aspect of political opportunity structure are formal rules and institutions of the political
system because they are the easiest to observe. Because of the focus on formal political
institutions, political opportunity structure is often used to “explain how the political context
affects the differential development and influence of ostensibly similar movements” (Meyer
2003, 17) and less attention is given to how social structures also influence these movements.
Even within this limitation to political structure, scholars have varied in their
understanding of what is encompassed by political opportunity structure as well as how those
concepts can be effectively operationalized for research. Acknowledging this, Tarrow (1998)
developed categories into which political opportunity structure variables can be grouped. The
first category is the degree of openness in the polity, which is notably key in the work of
Kitschelt (1986) who employs an open/closed polity and a strong/weak implementation
dichotomy to understand opportunity. The second category is the stability of political alignments
which can be important in understanding the frequency in which opportunities for social
movements arise. Variables that attempt to operationalize the presence of allies or support groups
are categorized together and draw from Tarrow’s own ideas about cycles of protest. Jenkins and
Perrow’s (1977) study of the mobilization of farmworkers provides an example of Tarrow’s
favorable political elites category of political opportunity. Tarrow’s (1998) last two categories
are closely related; Tarrow distinguishes between elite divisions and tolerance for protest and the
tolerance of dissent by the state.
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Similarly, Koopmans (1999) attempted to clarify the components that should be included
in political opportunity structure. Rather than categorizing variables that have been used to
understand political opportunity structure, Koopmans divided the concept into three logical
claims that can be gleaned and tested from the concept:
1. Variations in opportunity are the most important determinant of
variations in collective action.
2. Relevant variations in opportunity result primarily from the interaction
of social movements with political actors and institutions.
3. Variations in such opportunities are not random or a mere product of
strategic interaction, but are to an important extent structurally shaped.
(Koopmans 1999, 95-96)

While it is certainly a step forward to identify testable claims made by a theory, his focus
is entirely on the role of structure in the development of the movement rather than
acknowledging the important implications of political opportunity structure on movement
success. This shortcoming is important because political opportunity structure not only
“introduces analytical tools to study the degree of openness of a domestic or global governance
system to intervention by social movement actors. It also attempts to operationalize and analyze
the way political systems condition the success of movements” (Krieger 1999, 72).
Turning to the cultural elements of political opportunity structure, Elazar (1966) suggests
that one aspect of the cultural structure that can impact the success of social movements is the
public perception of legitimate interaction with government. This can limit both the policy
realms the public feels is acceptable for organizations to attempt to shape as well as the strategies
available to social movement organizations. An example of this in practice is the nature of
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acceptable interaction between domestic organizations and the European Union governance. The
overlapping authority of the EU and national governments provide some new possibilities for
social movement organizations, but these are constrained by the culture of acceptable interaction
between domestic NGOs and a supranational governance (Kreiger 1999). This acceptability not
only varies by state, but also by time as we have seen recently with the growing resentment
amongst Germans toward the European Union. Support for the European Union has declined
sharply as Germans observe credit crises and downgrades among fellow member states that then
put strain on the collective currency and place an economic burden on Germany that they feel is
both disproportionate and unfair.
Political opportunity structure, while developed in the context of urban protest within the
United States, explains how the institutional and social parameters of the moment impact the
effectiveness of social movements far beyond the restrictions of either urbanization or the United
States. From political opportunity structure an understanding is gained of how formal institutions
serve as filter for the impact of forces on public policy, serving to either dampen the effect of
inputs or heighten them. In the same way, the social context, or informal institutions, also filter
the inputs that groups inject into the policy making process. The informal institutions can either
reinforce claims made by social movements or can undermine the validity and popularity of such
claims, thus impacting the likelihood of and duration until policy change occurs.
Public Policy Theories
Given the previously stated goal of applying the social movement literature to policy
success, it is necessary to examine how social movements, specifically the LGB movement,
interject in the policy process. The policy literature has developed to explain how policy occurs,
but often fails to answer the why questions. Why is a policy adopted or why is a policy adopted
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at this particular point in time and not another? The development of policy theory from the
garbage can model through streams theory to punctuated equilibrium demonstrates how the
policy theory literature had developed without adding a clearly defined, specifiable causal
mechanism.10 When the iterative process of policy making, explained in punctuated equilibrium,
is combined with political opportunity structure, a causal theory takes shape. Political
opportunity structure provides punctuated equilibrium with the causal mechanism it lacks to
move from a descriptive theory to an explanatory theory. Additionally, when integrated with
policy diffusion theory, an understanding of the time dependency observed in the causal
mechanisms across states adopting related policies is also further specified.
Policy adoption has been explained by Cohen, March, and Olsen (1973) via the garbage
can model, which essentially takes the process model, turns it on its head and says that policy
making is not an orderly rational process at all. While this model made the valid point that policy
making does not always flow from agenda-setting to formulation to adoption, it also left how
policy is adopted unspecified. Kingdon (1995) offers a revision of the “garbage can model”
developed by Cohen and March. Kingdon (1995) describes three streams: the policy stream,
which contains the universe of potential policies; the political stream, which contains the ever
changing nature of the political environment; and the problem stream, which contains all
problems or issues in society. Kingdon explains that a policy entrepreneur seizes an opportunity
when the political stream is right to highlight an issue from the problem stream and supply its
solution in the form of the policy entrepreneur’s chosen policy from the policy stream. One

10

A notable exception is Lowi’s (1964) explanation of policy development as a function of the type of policy to be
made. This was a break through approach as it described politics as a function of the policy rather than usual
explanation of policy a function of politics. His typology focused on the institutional structure of the United States
which limits its applicability and leaves little room for changing dynamics for the same policy with the same content
over time. An additional exception that will subsequently be discussed is the growing literature on policy diffusion,
which explicitly examines when and why policy adoption occurs.
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important contribution here is the importance of a policy entrepreneur who seizes opportunities
to make policy happen. An additional but admittedly closely related contribution is inclusion of a
dynamic political environment which could provide a bridge between the political opportunity
structure as designed by social movement scholars and Kingdon’s model of policy formulation.
The theory of policy punctuated equilibrium (Baumgartner and Jones 1993) relates to
Kingdon’s idea of a policy entrepreneur as a catalyst and simultaneously draws from biological
scholarship the ideas of punctuated equilibrium to form a model of how policy emerges.
Previous models of policy making either focused on dramatic change, notably the garbage can
and streams models, or on incremental change (see Easton 1965 for systems theory; Lindblom
1959, Lindblom 1979, Hayes 2001 for incrementalism). Baumgartner and Jones (1993)
recognized that when looking at policy development historically, a model that incorporated both
slow incremental change as well as sudden more dramatic change is vital. Punctuated
equilibrium fits this by proposing that most policy change is indeed incremental, but that
incremental development/stasis is at times interrupted by short periods of rapid change or sudden
breaks from the previous policy development.
Punctuated equilibrium necessarily begins with an explanation of why the norm is
incremental change or stasis in policy. Baumgartner and Jones argue that incrementalism in
policy making is a function of what they call term a negative feedback process. The premise here
mirrors that of Pierson’s(2005) path dependency arguments in which the longer a state continues
policy in one vein, the more difficult it becomes to change the policy or policy track. When
policy is initially developed it is packaged with a policy image and policy venue, it is these two
factors that become self-reinforcing as policy perpetuates.
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The policy image is the simplified symbolic form of the problem or issue to be addressed.
It defines a problem in a particular set of terms and thus leads to a specific solution bundle
(Baumgartner and Jones 1993). Policy image is important to punctuated equilibrium because a
fundamental shift in how the problem is defined can lead to a break from the stasis and thus a
punctuation in the incremental development of public policy. Related to the policy image and
simultaneously distinct and important is the policy venue. The policy venue is the institution of
government that is deemed responsible for the problem or policy. Most problems have several
different possible definitions and thus several equally valid options for what part of the
government should address the problem. The selection of venue plays an integral role in
determining what kinds of policy will be pursued. Once a venue and image are defined, it
becomes increasingly difficult to change either the image or the venue without some major event
that disrupts the existing paradigm for addressing the problem and as a result changes the policy
image as well as possibly the policy venue.
The stability in the policy image and venue that reinforces incrementalism, but does not
preclude the occasional sudden change in policy, requires that sudden policy change also be
addressed in a comprehensive model of policy development. Baumgartner and Jones explain
sudden change as punctuations in the status quo that generates a change in the policy image
and/or venue producing new policy and a new policy trajectory. It is here that the policy
entrepreneur becomes important as this individual is responsible for guiding the new trajectory
for policy. The policy entrepreneur may also be responsible for generating the shift in the policy
image in the first place and thus serves as Baumgartner and Jones’ attempt at a casual
mechanism. The problem with the policy entrepreneur as causal force in the model is that it is as
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unpredictable as an exogenous shock and can really only be identified post hoc which ultimately
destroys the predictive power of the model (Shockley 2007).
Punctuated equilibrium also relies on the aforementioned idea of negative feedback to
bring a causal mechanism into the theory. Negative feedback reinforces policy stability by
discouraging policy change via entrenching interests in existing policy paths. When rapid change
does occur it is due to a shift from negative feedback, which reinforces, to positive feedback,
which advocates for change usually via shift in the policy image. While this does appear to
function as causal mechanism it still fails to generate an explanatory theory because once again
one can only identify the feedback change post hoc. The change in feedback may be related to or
caused by the policy entrepreneur but because the existence, tactics, and identification of a policy
entrepreneur can also only be identified post hoc, we still lack a predictable, testable causal
mechanism.
Policy Diffusion
The above policy theories examine policy adoption and change as largely a function of
domestic factors, which ignores the role of policy diffusion across jurisdictions. Policy diffusion
“occurs when one government’s decision about whether to adopt a policy innovation is
influenced by previous choices by other governments” (Graham, Shipan and Volden 2008, 3).
Because decision makers in government seek to simplify the process of developing solutions to
problems that arise, they seek out information about policies that have already been implemented
elsewhere in response to the same or similar policy problems (Mossberger 1999; Grossback,
Nicholson-Crotty, and Peterson 2004; Berry and Baybeck 2005, Volden 2006, Shipan and
Volden 2008). The policy diffusion literature thus adds dimension to the policy stream from
Kingdon’s streams theory. Rather than examining the universe of potential policies, policy
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makers examine the success or failure of existing policies in other jurisdictions addressing the
problem. Meseguer (2005) notes that in particular policy diffusion based on either learning or
emulation tends to be further bounded by the narratives regarding success and failure and their
interpretation by policy makers, which is influenced by proximity, however proximity may be
interpreted in a number of ways.
Within policy diffusion Shipan and Volden (2008) have delineated between diffusion that
occurs as a result of learning, competition, imitation, and coercion. Meseguer (2005) provides a
nuanced examination of the distinction to be made between learning and emulation, which is
conceptually identical to Shipan and Volden’s (2008) imitation. Learning and emulation are
similar in that both are horizontal forms of diffusion, that is policy diffusion often occurs across
jurisdictions at the same level such as state to state (Meseguer 2005). Brandeis (1932) saw policy
learning in particular as potentially occurring not only horizontally but also vertically in which
subnational jurisdiction serve as laboratories that “test” the impact of policy prior to nationwide
adoption. Once policy success is apparent, policy diffusion via learning, either horizontally or
vertically, “naturally follows” (Graham, Shipan, and Volden 2008, 24). Policy learning as
described by Meseguer (2005) is contingent upon proximity, most notably geographical,
ideological and/or historical. Thus in her example of horizontal policy diffusion regarding
market deregulation spread amongst the developing Asian Tiger and Latin American states in the
1980s and 1990s but did not further spread to developing states in sub-Saharan Africa.
In addition to policy learning, in which policymakers increase knowledge of the results of
particular policy options emphasizing examples of successful policies, policy emulation may also
be an impetus for policy diffusion. Emulation relies less on increasing knowledge regarding the
impact of policy and instead emphasizes increasing credibility of the state, improving status in
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the international arena, or conforming to the norms developing in the international arena
(Meseguer 2005). An example of such emulation would be Hungary’s adoption of LGB rights
policies to appear more similar to Western Europe when applying for European Union
membership. The focus of the policies was not success or failure in other states, in fact the
policies have been marginally enforced at best, but rather the desire to appear in line with the
norms in high status states and a supranational institution.
Given the role of supranational institutions, it is also important to examine coercion as a
potential mechanism for policy diffusion. Policy diffusion via coercion occurs when “some set of
actors attempt to impose their preferred policy solutions on another government” (Graham,
Shipan, and Volden 2008, 26). Such coercion could be said to occur when the European Union
incorporates new social policies into treaties and directives that represent a significant change
from existing policy within the member states. Policymakers in states are compelled to adopt
policies favored by other governments in order remain a part of or receive benefits from the
supranational institution. Another example from Meseguer (2005) would be the influence of
international financial institutions on the diffusion of deregulation policies in the 1980s and
1990s. While policy learning and emulation were emphasized as the causal mechanisms driving
the spread of deregulation, international financial institutions contributed to the policy diffusion
by incorporating deregulation into the requirements for loans.
Policy diffusion varies not only by causal mechanism type but also by policy actors
involved. Internal and external actors to the state adopting a new policy as well as “go-between”
actors are “crucial to a better understanding of the politics of policy diffusion” (Graham, Shipan
and Volden 2008, 20) including the type(s) of causal mechanism(s) likely to be involved.
Internal actors are those who influence policy adoption within the state such as the electorate and

27

elected politicians as well as domestic interest groups. The actors within a jurisdiction that has
previously adopted a policy are external actors and may be influential in creating the narrative
that can “sell” a state on similar policy adoption. Go-between actors are distinct from both those
actors within the state considering policy adoption (internal actors) and those within the state that
has already adopted (external actors), and serve as a conduit between the two. Thus supranational
institutions as well as international nongovernmental organizations are best described as gobetween actors (Graham, Shipan, and Volden 2008). True and Mintrom (2001) have emphasized
the role of these go-between actors in the diffusion of gender mainstreaming policies. They
argued that international nongovernmental organizations and supranational institutions,
specifically the United Nations, provide dominant explanatory power in the spread of gender
mainstreaming policies.
As the policy diffusion literature has developed it has increased in nuance expanding to
differentiate between types of policy diffusion as well as further examination of how the policy
actors involved may impact the form and extent of diffusion. For the purposes of this research,
this helps to buttress not only the conceptualization of institutions as filters, but policy
diffusion’s standard s-shaped curve supports the incorporation of time dependency into models
of policy adoption and change.
Intersection of Theoretical Frameworks
The connections between resource mobilization, political opportunity, and public policy
theories are both obvious and obscure. Because of the existing divisions within the study of
social movements, comparative politics, public policy, and, in the specific case used here,
minority politics, there has been insufficient connection between these schools of thought.
Resource mobilization and political opportunity structure have often been connected implicitly
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or explicitly, but nearly exclusively in the context of social movement studies. Policy process
theories in turn are underspecified, lacking causal mechanisms, and often atheoretical. Where
causal mechanisms have been developed, notably the policy diffusion literature, greater
examination is needed of when and where policy is adopted, what actors explain when and where
policy diffusion will occur, and how policy diffusion fits into conceptualizations of policy as an
iterative process (Graham, Shipan and Volden 2008).
As the concept of resource mobilization has developed, two approaches have emerged
(Canel 1997). The political interactive model of resource mobilization examines movement
development as a function of the density of the given group members’ social network within the
social movement, the pre-existing organizations that social movement organizations can draw
on, and the structure of opportunities. This aspect of the resource mobilization paradigm
subsequently developed into the political opportunity structure paradigm. In contrast, the
organizational-entrepreneurial model turns to organizational dynamics such as, leadershipmember relations, resource management, and leadership experience in order to explain how
social movements are organized and maintained (Canel 1997, Gamson 1987, Perrow 1977). The
political interactive model bolsters the argument for using resource mobilization in concert with
political opportunity structure to explain social movements, while both of the models of resource
mobilization provide important insight into what constitutes a resource. The political interactive
model demonstrates the need to include measures of network density within the movement such
as the number of LGB organizations in a given country or the number of gay publications. The
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importance of fiscal resources and leadership emphasized in the organizational-entrepreneurial
model argues for the inclusion of organizational budgets in examining movement success.11
Political opportunity structure is at times presented as an alternative to the resource
mobilization paradigm (Goodwin and Jasper 1999, Jaswin 1999), but this is unnecessary because
resource mobilization and political opportunity structure are complementary. While resource
mobilization is important to social movement success because of the obvious need for movement
organizations to have expendable resources for action, it is also necessary to incorporate an
understanding of what impacts the use or lack of use of resources and the subsequent success or
failure of the movement to achieve goals. Jackson (1992, 31) points out that “rather than
competing with socioeconomic variables as direct determinants of state policy,” which are often
correlated with resources mobilization theory, “political system characteristics may operate as
mediating factors that either facilitate or impede the translation of …preferences into policy.”
Policy outputs are explained in terms of organization characteristics such as numbers of voters or
liquid assets or socioeconomic demographics of organization membership and the strategic
choices made by elites guided by these resources in the resource mobilization literature (Meyer
2003).
As previously noted, policy punctuated equilibrium benefits from the incorporation of
political opportunity structure into its concept of policy entrepreneurs. Punctuated equilibrium
relies on policy entrepreneurs interceding into the policy process to change the policy trajectory.
Political opportunity structure lends predictability to the rise of a successful policy entrepreneur
via adding measurable qualities of the political system as determinants of entrepreneur success.

11

While fiscal resource would ideally be included in this analysis, organizations were reticent to release such
information. Furthermore, for those organizations that no longer exist, reliable budget data could not be located at
the time of this writing.
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It is in this causality void that resource mobilization and political opportunity structure
become vital to the modeling of the policy process. When will a policy entrepreneur arise and
shift the feedback trajectory? Political opportunity structure informs the when by explaining
innovation capacity in terms of political and social institutions. Punctuated equilibrium failed to
incorporate the notion that institutions could inform timing of punctuations because it has been
nearly exclusively applied to the US, thus formal institutions have been constant. When
comparing across states, institutions vary and the impact of openness in political and social
institutions can be tested. When the political opportunity structure is more open, the likelihood of
a policy entrepreneur appearing is greater. Therefore, we can expect greater, more frequent
periods of radical policy change, or so called punctuations, in states with a more open political
opportunity structure. Additionally, where the institutions that comprise the political opportunity
structure are similar, policy diffusion is more likely.
Resource mobilization further informs expectations for policy adoption as the probability
of adoption via diffusion or the rise of a policy entrepreneur is expected increase when resources
are greater. As the resources of the national LGB movement increase, the probability one or
more national organizations will engage with the international movement in the diffusion of
strategies and tactics also increases. Furthermore, it is logical to expect the policy entrepreneur to
either come from the social movement or be closely related to the social movement in some way.
The power and resources of the social movement should thus be an indicator of how likely the
rise of policy entrepreneur is. The more developed the social movement, the more likely there
are professionalized movement leaders and as a result there is more likely an individual with the
knowledge base, time and fiscal backing to serve as a policy entrepreneur. Thus increases in
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resources increase the probability of policy adoption via increasing both the probability of a
policy entrepreneur and the probability of policy diffusion via sharing of tactics.
The political opportunity structure emphasis on actors can be integrated with the policy
diffusion literature to explain patterns in policy diffusion related to institutional proximity rather
than geographic. For instance, an institutional similarity between the United States and Australia
such as federalism may be more relevant to policy diffusion than the lack of geographic
proximity. The internal, external, and go-between actors delineated in the policy diffusion
literature can be used to generate greater nuance in our understanding of the political opportunity
structure as consisting of more than merely domestic actors.
Models of the policy process have evolved via increasing specificity over time. Among
the most recognizable models are the garbage can model, the streams model, and punctuated
equilibrium theory, which constitute an interconnected progression of model development.
Punctuated equilibrium models how policy changes over time via delineating specific roles to the
policy image and venue in the process. While it is clear that rapid policy change happens when
the image and venue are changed by the policy entrepreneur, it is unclear when a policy
entrepreneur will arise and be successful in generating a policy image and/or venue shift.
Political opportunity structure informs punctuated equilibrium by providing a causal mechanism
driving the success of policy entrepreneurs.
Theory
When does policy change occur? This is the fundamental question in much of policy
research including the research here. As previously discussed, many different theories have been
developed to understand and explain policy change. When social movements desire policy
change, what impacts how long it takes for a movement to be successful in achieving goals? This
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is the key question of this research and a point in which social movement theory and policy
analysis collide.
When examining policy change as a function of movement resources, we must identify
policy adoptions that would constitute success by the standards of the movement. In this research
three policy types are considered, each with varying levels of policy within type. Chapter three is
devoted to general prohibitions on discrimination in the form anti-discrimination legislation and
constitutional amendments. Anti-discrimination provisions are subdivided into two levels;
policies that could be interpreted to include LGB persons via vague clauses and policies that
explicitly include sexual orientation as a protected category. Chapter Four addresses access to
military service and also subdivided into policies that allow LGB persons to serve with some
restrictions or exemptions and policies that allow LGB persons to serve openly. Partnership
recognition is the focal policy area of chapter five. Partnership recognition is subdivided into
recognized cohabitation, registered partnership, and civil union or marriage.
Policy change that is related to social movements is a function of the resources of the
movement. The more resources the social movement has at its disposal, the more options in
terms of strategy they can pursue. Organizational resources are thus the first factor to shape the
strategic options available to induce policy change. Resources are a necessary condition for
policy success, but are not sufficient to insure policy change occurs. The capacity of a social
movement is filtered through the institutional framework of the state and the social context in
which the movement exists, which constitutes the political opportunity structure. Furthermore,
preexisting policy impacts the resources, social context and institutional receptivity for social
movements seeking policy change. Additionally, policy diffusion generated by supranational
institutions may compel states to adopt LGB rights policies.
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The modern LGB liberation movement provides an opportunity to examine how
organizational resources are processed in the political system by institutions and social context to
generate policy output. This is not to say that the movement is always successful or that policy
change occurs. As we know from Dye (1984), public policy is not just the decisions government
makes, but also the non-decisions made by government
Policy making is also not an instantaneous event, it is a process that requires time for
development. Likewise the process of government recognizing and translating the demands of
social movement organizations relative to societal orientation toward the movement requires
time. As a result of the importance of time in the nature of policy design and social movement
recognition, it is important to consider how time affects policy making in addition to the other
determinants.
Organizational resources are necessary but not sufficient conditions for social movement
success. The extent and shape of organization resources is less important than how these
resources interact with formal and informal institutions. This is important because it means that a
strong, well organized social movement is not by default more successful or more likely to be
successful than a weak, relatively unorganized social movement. A minimum existence of
resources is necessary and beyond that it is the interactions that matter, because, recall from both
the political opportunity structure and resource mobilization paradigms, formal and informal
institutions can both magnify and depress social movements and by extension the policy outputs
a social movement can achieve.
According to the policy process literature, once policy is created it is has an impact on the
conditions in society, specifically feedback from policy output to organization resources and
openness of informal institutions should be expected. This sort of endogeneity has often forced
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scholars to resort to only studying segments of the policy process or only a single instance of
policy change, leaving much of the feedback and more dynamic processes of interaction between
policy and the forces that created it ill understood. By examining the policy determinants and
policy outcomes over time in an event history framework, we can observe the impacts of
feedback without applying an endogeneity model. This is possible because the extent to which a
policy output impacts any of the determinants will be incorporated into the subsequent values of
that determinant.
It is important to distinguish those determinants which should fluctuate over time and
thus be responsive to a feedback versus those determinants that should be regarded as static.
Formal institutions are the structural design of government and thus are regarded as constant for
the cases selected.12 Conversely, informal institutions are expected to fluctuate over time and be
responsive to policy feedback loop. Because of the important differences between these types of
institutions, they are modeled as distinctive categories. I categorize the relevant determinants as
follows in table 2.1:
Table 2.1 Categories of Independent Variables
Organizational
Formal Institutions
Resources
-number of national LGB organizations -electoral system
-number of LGB publications
-federalism
-structure of the executive

Informal Institutions
-economic threat
-diversity
-urbanism
-amenable public officials

In order to fully understand the policy a given state has toward gay rights it is important
to examine not only how open the political system is, but also the social context within the state.
Utilizing the concept of opportunity as either open or closed, a state can have any combination of

12

Because this analysis only examines advanced democracies, the structures of government are stable over the time
period of analysis. Expanding this dataset to a more diverse set of countries would require additional considerations
for structural changes that may occur in for example democratizing countries.
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open/closed social opportunity and open/closed political opportunity. This opportunity filters the
resources of social movement. The likelihood of policy corresponds to both the movement
resources available as well as the opportunity structure.
Figure A
Formal Institutions

Duration until
Policy Change

Organization
Resources

Informal Institutions

Gay rights policy falls under what has variously been called morality politics, social
regulatory policy, or the culture wars, all of which emphasize a distinction between issues that
engage value and moral judgments in place of or in addition to economic judgments (Wald,
Button, & Rienzo 2001). Innovative policy in this area is especially prone to constraint from
informal institutions as well as government structure, making it an apt initial look at the role such
constraints play in determining policy outputs. In order to more fully specify the model of policy
adoption, while the dependent variable is duration until policy change, the level of policy is also
accounted for by allowing for any given case to experience multiple events during the
observation period.
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Research Design
Methodology
Box-Steffensmeier and Jones (2004, 1) introduce event history modeling by reminding us
that “for many research questions, timing of social change is at least as interesting as
understanding the event culminating the history” and this would certainly seem to the be case
when one is interested in the impact of social movements on public policy. While both the public
policy literature and the political opportunity structure emphasize the importance of timing,
researchers have often failed to give time itself a spotlight in the statistical analysis. It is in this
context in which theories converge to direct us toward a consideration of the event, in this case
policy, and the history that leads up to the event.
Previous scholars have deployed time-series analysis to study public policy as well as
social movements, but as Tuman and Hannan(1984, 3) and Box-Steffensmeier and Jones (1997)
have pointed out, too often time-series analysis ignores the temporal structure and accounts for
time with the limited use of autocorrelation. When we are interested in a dynamic process it is
problematic to use a regression approach that cannot simultaneously address the issues that are
likely to arise, most importantly right censoring and OLS regression’s assumption of normally
distributed residuals (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 1997, Cleves et al. 2008).
Right censoring occurs when a case is in the risk pool for an event to occur but the event
does not occur during the period of analysis, that is it continues to be at risk after the observed
period ends. In this research these would be states that have not adopted an LGB-friendly policy
by 2005. If an ordinary least squares regression model were applied, mathematically it would be
treating a state that does not adopt a new policy identically to a state that adopts a policy in the
final year of the dataset. For example, Greece adopts an anti-discrimination policy that explicitly
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includes sexual orientation as a covered category in 2005, the final year of the dataset, while the
United States has still yet to adopt a national level discrimination protection policy that applies to
LGB persons. If regression analysis in which time is operationalized as the dependent variable
were to be used, then these two cases would presumed to be identical, which is inaccurate. A
dummy variable could be included for policy adoption in the regression analysis, but then
information would be lost via the use of a less efficient model that does not incorporate temporal
nature of the event as had been theorized (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 1997; Tuman, Hannan,
& Groeneveld 1979).
Even if the data did not include right censoring, duration analysis would preferable to
regression because of the assumptions made about residuals. Regression assumes a normal
distribution of residuals, and this seems unlikely if time dependency is truly relevant (Cleves et
al. 2008). For this reason the statistical analysis in each subsequent chapter begins with an
evaluation of the time dependency. If there is no evidence of time dependency, then an
alternative method should be used.
Event history modeling expressly focuses on the temporal nature of a research question
by parameterizing the survival and hazard functions of the data. The survival function is
probability function for a state continuing to be in the risk pool. For this analysis the survival
function models the probability that the state will not adopt a LGB-friendly policy. Thus in
subsequent discussion of the survival rate, a higher survival rate indicates that a variable
prolongs the time until a state provide greater rights for LGB citizens. Similarly, the hazard rate
has a counterintuitive interpretation in this research. A high hazard rate indicates that a state is
more likely to adopt a policy that will benefit LGB persons. In short, survival is bad while
hazards and failures are good in the context of this research.
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In duration analysis, the hazard and survival functions can be unparameterized, which is
used to test for time dependency and does not include covariates; semi-parameterized, as the Cox
model; or fully parameterized, with any of a variety of functional forms. The Cox proportional
hazards model is a logical starting point for duration analysis once one is confident that time
dependency does indeed exist and is relevant because it is semiparametric, that is the baseline
hazard is left unestimated. This can be advantageous, but is also less efficient in coefficient
estimation. Furthermore, the Cox regression ignores changes to variables that occur in timer
periods in which no state fails. For example, in 1994 no state in the dataset adopted a policy, so a
Cox proportional hazard model would ignore changes in the explanatory variables for that year.
Thus if one has theoretical reasons to prefer a particular parameterization, it is advisable to
parameterize rather than use the Cox (Cleves et al. 2008). Because the parameterizations vary by
the policy type, the parameterization and explanation of why it is preferable is explained in each
chapter for each policy.
The following research is comprised of independent variables that fall into one of three
categories used to predict duration until policy adoption measured as time in years.13 The
duration begins when a state enters the dataset and ends when a policy is adopted. Because there
are multiple levels of policy evaluated in this research, states may “fail” multiple times during
the observation period. In order to account for this and better incorporate the endogenous aspect
of public policy making, a shared frailty parameter is added to the model. The assumption of
shared frailty in this dataset indicates that I assume the adoption of a lower level policy in a state
will be correlated with the subsequent adoption of a high level policy in the same state.14

13
14

See Appendix for list of countries including the dates in which they enter and exit the dataset.
By lower level and higher level I mean the level of protections or rights that the policy accords LGB persons.
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Policy chance is modeled as a function of LGB movement resources and institutions
based on the resource mobilization and political opportunity structure literature. Movement
resources form the base of the model as institutions are understood to be filters for these
resources. Institutions are also subdivided into formal institutions, essentially the structure of
government, and informal institutions, the social norms or proxies for norms.
Movement Resource Variables
The resources available to movement organizations play a vital role in determining policy
success. One of the best measures of social movement resources is the number of voters within
the movement or identity group, but this is problematic for LGB politics due to the lack of
consensus on the percentage of homosexual and bisexual persons in society and the frequency of
underreporting in surveys. As a result alternative measures of movement strength must be used.
The number of national LGB organizations is an apt measure of movement strength that
is particularly useful for the purposes here. The number of gay right organizations serves in part
as a proxy for the size of the gay population, but also indicates the extent to which LGB persons
are committed to political change. Only national organizations are included because the focus of
the research is national level policy and local/regional organizations are more likely to be
focused on local/regional policy or social change. Furthermore, “organization[s] only have a real
social or political impact if they can be said to constitute…a movement with at least some kind
of common strategy and policy goals” (Hooge 2005, 976) and national level organizations reflect
a common strategy and greater coordination. National organizations are measured via counts of
the organizations listed Spartacus International Gay Travel Guides issued from 1971 through
2005 and verified via organizations websites.15

15

Website validation was not available for all organizations, particularly those that existed in the 1970s but
collapsed before the 1990s. When possible these organizations were validated by gay history archival websites, but

40

The number of LGB publications is also relevant to organization strength because it
demonstrates both a connected gay community as well as an avenue for mobilization.
Publications targeted at gay men, lesbians, and/or bisexuals provide connection within the
community by disseminating information about community events and providing a forum for
discussion of issues that are LGB-specific. Such publications can also disseminate information
about public officials’ responsiveness to the gay community and policy agendas for gay rights
organizations. The number of publications in a state is also measured via the listings of
publications available in Spartacus International Gay Travel Guides produced between 1971 and
2005.
Formal Institutions Variables
As noted above, movement resources are only one component to consider when
attempting to understand policy change. These resources are filtered through institutions that can
serve to either increase or decrease the effectiveness of the movement’s strategies and resource
deployment. Formal institutions can encompass many aspects of governmental structure, but the
most relevant ones for this research are those that will have a direct impact on the openness of
the political system to social movement pressures.
Several factors shape the level of openness in a political system, one of which is the
electoral system. The electoral system is important because of its role in determining the number
of parties in a system. As district magnitude and thus the number of parties increases, it becomes
more likely that one of the parties will include the issue of gay rights in their policy agenda. As
parties attempt to secure votes in a multiparty system, they will need to find electorates that they
can capture and the LGB population is a potential voting bloc to capture (Frymer 2005).

organizations that could not be validated were included if they appeared in more than one annual edition of
Spartacus.
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Furthermore, as the number of viable parties increases, the likelihood that all parties will need to
be centrist and incorporate the views of the right and/or conservative religious factors will
decrease, allowing room for LGB rights to be incorporated into a party platform without
necessarily resulting in election losses.
Parties are important because ultimately parties control the issue agenda (Rohrschneider
1993). The party system is important because parties can be insulated from social movement
pressures for inclusion on the issue agenda by centralized organization that limit the points of
access for movement organizations. Specifically, “modified proportional laws facilitate the
evolution of smaller green parties, which increases the pressure on established Old Left parties to
respond favorably to social movement demands” while “the modified plurality system in France
and Great Britain shields established Old Left parties from minor-party competition” which
delays party response to new social movements (Rohrschneider 1993, 164). Electoral systems are
important in so far as the level of competition between parties is a function of the electoral
system and this party competition impacts the importance of public opinion on policy making
(Burnstein 2003). Golder (2007) originally classifies democratic electoral systems as being one
of four types, majoritarian, mixed, multi-tier, or proportional. Teorell, et al (2011) collapsed
these four categories to three, majoritarian, mixed, and proportional systems, which is the
categorization used in this analysis. Because categorical data with more than two categories is
problematic in duration analysis, I create two dichotomous variables for proportional and mixed
systems leaving majoritarian systems as the null. If I were to retain the three categories,
proportional equal to one, mixed system equal to two, and majoritarian equal to three; then
mathematically the model would be constrained to assuming that a mixed system has twice the
effect of a proportional system and a majoritarian system would have three times the effect of a
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proportional system. Hence two dichotomous variables were created leaving the majoritarian
system as a null category in the interpretation.
H1: Policy adoption will occur more quickly in states with more movement
resources and either a proportional or mixed electoral system than in states with a
majoritarian system.
Relatedly, the type of executive, while frequently correlated to the electoral system, is
important to consider as it points to the amount of power consolidated in the executive branch.
The greater independence from the legislature that the presidential model provides has different
implication for policy change as compared to mixed systems. Where the mixed executive
includes a head of state that is insulated from the political process, such as a monarch, the head
of state may provide rhetorical leadership on LGB rights issues without electoral costs. In a
presidential system the unitary executive is less insulated from popular opinion and thus may be
less likely to show leadership on civil rights for an unpopular minority. Mixed executives were
defined by constitutions that create a dual executive in the form of a president or monarch, the
head of state, and a prime minister, the formal head of government16 (Norris 2008). A
presidential system is interpreted as a state in which the head of state and the head of government
are fused in a unitary executive.
H2: Policy adoption will occur more quickly in states with more movement
resources and a mixed executive than in states with a presidential executive.
Federalism is an important part of the political opportunity structure and is generally
thought to increase openness as well as the number of veto players. While this is true, federalism
also changes the access points for social movements and thus the likely locus for policy making.

16

This coding admitted does not incorporate the nuances of the power distribution between the prime minister and
president.
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Federalism makes national level policy less likely even though it increases opportunities because
it encourages states to devolve responsibility for complicated controversial policy to regional and
local level governments. Policy change at the local level is often easier and less costly to achieve
for interest groups than is national policy, which in turn leads to a patchwork of policies across a
state. Policies developed at the local or regional level are unlikely to be adopted as national
policy because once devolution of responsibility has occurred it is likely to persist. When policy
is adopted at the national level, it is often to address existing policy at the regional level. Thus it
is expected that even this policy occurs later than would be expected in a unitary state. There are
often few incentives for the national government to develop policy that is already being
addressed by a lower level of governance. Unitary states are defined as those in which the
constitutions “where the national government retains sovereignty over all sub-national tiers”
whereas federal states are defined as those in which “governments has national and sub-national
units in a compound polity were each tier possesses some autonomous powers and functions”
(Norris 2008. 22).
H3: Policy adoption will occur more quickly in unitary states with more movement
resources than in federalist states.
In addition the structure of government within states, the impact of international
institutions must also be considered important given the increasing role supranational institutions
play in domestic policy. In particular I examine the influence of the European Union and the
European Convention on Human Rights as both have been influential in states’ policies
regarding minority inclusion in the polity. Both institutions are measured dichotomously as
member or non-member for each year, thus some states enter the dataset as non-members and
become members during the time span of analysis.
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H4: Policy adoption will occur more quickly in states with more movement resources
and that are members of the European Union.
H5: Policy adoption will occur more quickly in states with more movement resources
and that have signed the European Convention on Human Rights.
Informal Institutions
Formal institutions comprise one set of filters that impact the effect of social movement
resources, a second set of filters is comprised of informal institutions, or social norms. While
formal institutions are straightforward in their measurement, informal institutions can be more
elusive sometimes requiring that proxies be used because direct measures are unavailable.
The informal institutions examined here that are most closely related to the formal
institutions discussed above are amenable public officials. This relationship is cause for some
concern for multicollinearity as amenable public officials may, as discussed above, be closely
related to the electoral system in place17. Ideally amenable officials would include some measure
of openly gay public officials, but this information is insufficiently available for the entire
duration of the dataset across all of the states examined. Here amenable officials measures are
limited to the percentage of the national legislative seats held by women and the ideological
party placement of the executive, regardless of executive type. The percentage of women in the
legislature is anticipated to be important because women typically have higher tolerance levels
for homosexuality in general and are more likely to support gay rights than their male
counterparts. Furthermore, increased representation of women is associated with higher levels of
post-materialism, which should also increase the probability of LGB rights policy adoption.
Ideology of the executive, measured as the executive being from or composed predominantly of

17

After calculating the variance inflation factor (VIF), I find that there is not problematic collinearity between
amenable officials and the formal domestic institutions included in the model.
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a rightist, centrist, or leftist party, is important because of the role the executive plays in setting
the policy agenda. The party leaning of the executive data was taken from the Worldbank
database of political institutions. The executive was coded as rightist for parties defined as
conservative, Christian democrat of right-wing. The executive was coded as leftist for parties
defined as communist, socialist, social democratic, or left-wing. These categories were used to
create two dichotomous variables, rightist and centrist executives, leaving a null category, leftist
executives.
H6: Policy adoption will occur more quickly in states with more movement resources
and a higher percentage of females in the national legislature.
H7: Policy adoption will occur more quickly in states with more movement resources
and an executive of a leftist party compared to a rightist or centrist party.
Economic threat is an important indicator of tolerance toward minorities, including
homosexuals, and thus favorable social context for gay rights. “Greater economic security,
together with the attitudes fostered by vibrant civil society including greater trust and less
anomia, appear to increase espoused social tolerance” (Persell, Green, & Gurevich 2001, 203).
Because civil rights are often mistakenly interpreted as zero-sum by the public, when economic
distress is high public support for extension of civil rights to additional groups is perceived as
somehow reducing their own rights. Economic distress will be measured in terms of change in
GDP per capita and the annual unemployment rate.
H8: Policy adoption will occur more quickly in states with more movement
resources and higher GDP per capita.
H9: Policy adoption will occur more quickly in states with more movement
resources and lower unemployment rates.
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In addition to economic distress, degree of urbanism is an important determinant of gay
rights policy. Urbanism is related to greater tolerance with regard to sexual behaviors and thus
would be expected to be related to greater support for the extension of civil rights to sexual
minority groups (Wilson 1995). The percentage of the population residing in an urban area will
be used to measure urbanization. As people move toward larger urban areas and gain greater
exposure to more diverse social circles, there is increased pressure to express tolerant views
regardless of actual opinion (Persell et al 2001). As a result, the higher the level of urbanization
in a state, the more likely it is that LGB rights policy will be adopted.
H10: Policy adoption will occur more quickly in states with more movement
resources and greater urbanization.
Diversity within a state, much like urbanization, increases individuals’ exposure to
alternative view points and lifestyles. Previous research on LGB politics has noted the influence
of religion in morality politics in general and LGB rights in particular, thus I include ethnic
fractionalization within a country as a measure of the diversity in a state18. A state dominated by
a single ethnic and cultural identity is less likely to adopt anti-discrimination policy protecting
minority rights, including policies that protect the rights of sexual minorities.
H11: Policy adoption will occur more quickly in states with more movement
resources and more ethnic fractionalization.

18

This is operationalized as the probability that any two randomly selected persons within the state will be
from different ethnic groups, thus the higher the value the greater ethnic diversity. Because of the relationship
between ethnicity and religious identification, this measure also serves to capture some degree of religious
fractionalization. This is relevant because religion is not included directly in the analysis but is generally considered
to be relevant to the status of LGB rights (see for example D’Emilio 1983, Sherrill 1996, Smith & Haider-Markel
2002, Merin 2002).
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Table 2.2
Dependent
Variable

Organization
Resources

Formal
Institutions

Informal
Institutions

Variable
Time until policy
change

Operationalization
Years

Movement
Strength

# of LGB organizations

Ability to
disseminate
information

# of gay publications in a
country

Electoral system

Proportional
Representation/
Majoritarian/ Mixed
/Presidential/Mixed

Structure of the
Executive
Federalism

Federalist/ Not Federalist

International
Treaties
Diversity

Membership in the EU
European Convention
Ethnic Fractionalization

Economic
security

GDP per capita

Urbanism
Political
Opportunities

Unemployment
% of the population in
cities
% of legislative seats held
by women
Party leaning of the
Executive

Source19
Government legal documents
including constitutions & civil
codes, law journal reports on
legal changes, the ILGA
World Legal Survey
Spartacus Gay International
Travel Guides validated by
websites for individual
organizations
Spartacus Gay International
Travel Guides validated by
websites for individual
publications
Golder Democratic Systems
Around the World New York
University
Norris Democracy TimeSeries Dataset
Norris Democracy TimeSeries Dataset
www.europa.eu
www.echr.coe.int
Fearon Ethnic and Cultural
Diversity by Country
Worldbank IMF Government
Finance Statistics
Worldbank IMF Statistics
Vanhanen Index of Power
Resources
OECD Gender, Institutions,
and Development Database
Worldbank Database of
Political Institutions

Many of the variables to be examined are closely related, so there is potential for
multicollinearity. One potential source of multicollinearity is the measures of movement strength
and information dissemination. Movement strength is measured as the number of LGB

19
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organizations and information dissemination is measured as the number of gay publications.
Because gay publications are often closely linked or supported by LGB organizations, it would
not be surprising to find that changes in the number of gay organizations also yield changes in
the number of gay publications. Likewise, acknowledging the work of Downs (1957), we would
expect party competition in the form of effective of number of parties to be correlated with the
electoral system. The potential for multicollinearity was assessed via the variance inflation factor
(VIF) test. A VIF score above ten would indicate that multicollinearity is problematic (Kutner et
al 2004). The reported VIF scores range from 1.05 (change in GDP per capita) to 3.51 (LGB
organizations) with a mean VIF of 2.05, thus multicollinearity is not increasing the standard
errors in the models found in Chapters Three through Five. Furthermore I examine the
correlation coefficients across the independent variables (Appendix F).
Policy does not occur instantaneously; in fact as previously discussed, it is often modeled
incrementally. Thus a cross-sectional approach would be unlikely to exhibit many of the causal
processes that occur over time in policy making. Gay politics would likely be impacted by slow
causal processes such as demographic shifts and threshold effects in which the movement is not
perceived as politically significant until it reaches a critical mass (Pierson 2005). Event history
modeling provides significant advantages over cross-sectional models for examining policy
determinants. Event history models can examine change over time as a result of immediate
response or building effects and places event occurrence into a historical context. Amenta and
Zylan (1991) advocate inclusion of temporal considerations when studying social movement
success in particular because “the rise of a social movement may be epiphenomenal—indicating
that policies may soon change rather than constituting the reason for changes.” Additionally,
cross-sectional analysis is poorly suited to examining the role structural factors play in policy
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making because structural factors rarely generate immediate change that would be necessary to
be observed in a cross-sectional analysis.
Table 2.3: Descriptive Statistics for Independent Variables
Obs Mean
Std. Dev.
Organizations
956 6.791
7.353
Publications
908 5.97
8.772
Proportional Representation
957 0.679
0.467
Mixed Electoral System
957 0.079
0.271
Mixed Executive
957 0.914
0.28
Federalist
957 0.228
0.42
European Union
957 0.437
0.496
European Convention
957 0.744
0.437
Ethnic Fractionalization
884 0.269
0.199
Change in GDP per Capita
915 993.567 1957.171
Unemployment
932 6.835
4.554
Urbanization
911 72.852 12.282
Percentage of Women in Parliament 827 13.552 10.035
Rightist Party Executive
957 0.39
0.488
Centrist Party Executive
957 0.345
0.476
Eastern Bloc
958 0.081
0.274

Min
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.012
-7606.73
0.1
42.1
0
0
0
0

Max
35
63
1
1
1
1
1
1
0.88
13439.64
30.4
97.2
42.7
1
1
1

Cases
The cases in the dataset were selected based on the limited applicability of a common
goal structure of the transnational LGB movement to those states which were both sufficiently
democratic that a movement could form and sufficiently industrialized for urbanization to have
occurred and economic stability high enough to permit the cultivation of the LGB movement.
Furthermore, advanced industrialized democracies are expected to have greater and growing
concern with matter of equity, equality, and self-actualization, understood as post-materialism,
that would promote the development of a movement whose goals match the policies defined here
(Inglehart 1995). The level of democracy in states was evaluating using polity scores (Marshall
& Jaggers 2002) and a threshold of a nine on the zero to ten polity scale was required for the
state to be included in the dataset. Advanced industrialization is understood to be those states
whose percentage of GDP derived from agriculture and manufacturing is relatively small (O’Neil
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2005). For the purposes of this dataset the percentage of GDP from agriculture was added to the
percentage of GDP from industry, for a state to be included in the dataset the combined value for
both agriculture and industry had to be below the global mean for agriculture and industry
combined.
In addition the quantitative analysis, it is important to include case studies as that serve as
a narrative that will give insight into how the process of policy change in response to a social
movement occurs. The cases chosen follow neither a most different nor a most similar systems
design because rather than constituting a separate test from the quantitative measures, they are
intended to demonstrate the importance of the variables chosen. The Netherlands is an epitome
of policy change that reflects the agenda of the LGB movement, and is thus one example used to
demonstrate how the variables in the model play out. The second example case, the United
States, is contrastingly an archetype of policy stagnation with regard to gay rights.
Additionally, because gay rights policy studies are still in early development, a narrative
on the development of policy in general is necessary to inform the reader. The case studies
provide an accompaniment to the quantitative analysis that reinforces the logic behind the
variable selection.
Because the majority of the cases being drawn on are members of the European Union, I
am also including a narrative on legal changes of the EU as a metacase. Changes in EU law have
spawned changes in state law as well as in public opinion across the EU states. It is important to
acknowledge the role of a supranational institution in domestic politics and policy if one is to
really understand why policy change occurs when it occurs.
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Chapter Overview
Each of the subsequent policy chapters addresses a different policy area of LGB rights.
Chapter Three begins the policy chapters with an analysis of prohibitions on discrimination, as
protection from discrimination provides a foundation for increased access to the polity. Chapter
Four examines access to military service for LGB persons. As symbol of the nation-state, access
to military service is an important marker of full citizenship status. The fifth chapter examines
policies recognizing LGB partnerships. Because the state recognition of a relationship imparts
not only symbolic status but also tangible economic and legal benefits and obligations, state
recognition of same-sex couples is an important area of civil rights pursued by the LGB
movement. Chapter Six reexamines the theory in light of the results from chapters three through
five and provides suggestions for how these results should influence future research.
Does combining resource mobilization theory, political opportunity structure theory, and
the policy process model provide a more thorough understanding of policy change as it relates to
social movements in a democracy? The modeling described seeks to answer this question using
the context the transnational LGB movement in advanced democracies. By examining three
substantive areas of LGB-related policy, discrimination, military personnel policy, and
partnership recognition, it will be possible to gain insight into the varying applicability of the
theory over different types of policies deemed desirable by the same movement.
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Chapter 3 Anti-discrimination Policy
Invidious discrimination is treating someone or some group differently and as inferior in
comparison to others. Increasingly governments have had to address discrimination, often via
policies that explicitly prohibit discrimination on certain grounds or promote discrimination for
specific purposes. Governments that support anti-discrimination legislation base their support on
two different but important rationales: correcting for market inefficiencies and pursuing human
rights. Discrimination alters the delicate balance of the market and creates barriers to maximizing
efficiency. Anti-discrimination policies seek to correct this while also acknowledging the
existence of a particular prejudice in society that deters certain groups of people from fully
participating in the market. Governments further support anti-discrimination policies on the
grounds of protecting or promoting human rights, based on the premise that human rights are
infringed upon when an individual or group is unable to fully engage in society due to invidious
discrimination.
Ensuring equal access to employment is important on both of the bases for antidiscrimination policy. Equal access to employment is important to the fundamental premise of a
market that maximizes exchanges . To truly maximize exchanges in the market, laborers must
have freedom of choice to pursue employment that best utilizes their skills. When an individual
suffers demotion or dismissal on the basis of discrimination, she is forced to either reduce her
labor value below fair market value or incur the costs of migration to a jurisdiction in which she
will not be discriminated against. Clearly this process, when repeated for all or most of the
individuals in a particular subset of the population, skews the employment pool. Furthermore,
discrimination also interferes in an individual’s ability to pursue livelihood in the profession or
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specific job of their own choosing. This undermines the ability to maximize individual utility as
well as fiscally care for oneself.
Human rights are basic, universal, and egalitarian in nature. While a somewhat vague
concept, this understanding has been adopted by the United Nations in the Declaration of Human
Rights (1948) and includes the ideas that individuals are equal in dignity and rights are based on
our endowed ability to reason, possession of a conscience and potential for fraternity.
Discrimination undermines the dignity of persons and infringes on individual rights to pursue
individual interests. Insofar as states have an obligation to respect and protect the dignity of
citizens, they have a parallel obligation to prevent citizens from denying that same respect to one
another. Discrimination prohibitions target precisely this problem and seek to restore human
rights to those whose rights have been infringed upon by the prejudice of others.
Thus, anti-discrimination policy is necessary when invidious discrimination infringes
upon the market and/or human rights. I will emphasize its importance with regard to human
rights, but it should be noted that economic reasons exist and are used to validate antidiscrimination laws.
The following aims to answer the question of what kinds of anti-discrimination policy
exist in advanced industrialized democracies and analyze how differences in organizational
resources and formal and informal institutions within countries impact the duration until such
policy develops. Additionally, I will discuss the developments leading toward anti-discrimination
policy in two states that serve as illustrative cases of the extremes on the spectrum of
discrimination policy within the dataset. The United States and the Netherlands illustrate
divergent paths that states may take in the development of LGB rights. Furthermore, I will
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discuss the European Union’s impact on its member states with regard to discrimination
prohibitions.
Because one of the fundamental questions of this research is to find out how important
social movement resources are in expediting policy change, it is important that the policies
covered are those that are pursued by LGB organizations. Discrimination in general designates
some citizens as more equal than others and is thus deserving of attention from both LGB
organizations as well as this research.
Ending discrimination has been a major goal of LGB organizations who have tackled the
issue both in terms of policy change and in terms of changing social norms and perceptions of
lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals. Employment discrimination has been a key issue for lesbians,
gays, and bisexuals because sexual orientation has often constrained the economic opportunities
for individuals whose sexual orientation is known to potential employers. Furthermore, LGB
persons have often suffered loss of employment based on their orientation and it was and is often
the case that individuals have no recourse when such discrimination occurs. As a result the
International Lesbian and Gay Association lists equality in employment among the LGBT issues
it seeks to address as does its partner organization ILGA-Europe. In Ireland, for example, the
Gay and Lesbian Equality Network (GLEN) was founded in 1988 on the premise of working
toward LGB equality. GLEN played a crucial role in the development of Ireland’s Unfair
Dismissals Act of 1993 and the subsequent Employment Equality Act(GLEN 2008).
Additionally, the Queer Business Women Association in Austria has a clear objective of
eliminating employment discrimination against lesbians. Due to the persistent invisibility of
lesbians in public life, QBA seeks to increase visibility while also eliminating the prejudices that
face lesbian professionals
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Given the premise that discrimination is harmful to human rights as well as the market
and is thus worthy of government intervention, it should be expected that public policy change
will occur as discrimination is more clearly understood. This chapter examines the policy change
in discrimination prohibitions as a function of resources and political opportunity with the goal
of understanding when states create policy to improve human rights and economic opportunities
for the LGB population. In the first section of the chapter I will examine policies that prohibit
discrimination. This section is subdivided into sections describing the policy evolution in the
European Union as well as in both of the illustrative cases, the Netherlands and the United
States. The following section briefly reviews the research design before presenting the results of
the statistical models used to explain the duration until policy is adopted. Finally the chapter
concludes by placing the findings into the context of the theory and prospects for future research.
After examination of the results from the models, both support for the theory as well as
contrary findings that are cause to reconsider elements of the theory are discussed. In the results
both are discusses as well as alternative hypotheses to explain those findings that fail to support
the theory and hypotheses as outlined. While the models provide universal support for the
assumed shape of the hazard, the results do not support the frailty assumption that prior policy
adoption is an explanatory factor beyond the independent variables. There is not consistent
support for political opportunity to be modeled as a system of intervening variables; rather the
findings suggest the importance of direct effects of institutions particularly with regard to formal
institutions.
Policies Prohibiting Discrimination
Laws prohibiting discrimination with regard to sexual orientation often take the form of
an addition to a preexisting law prohibiting discrimination or a category, implied or explicit, in
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an amendment guaranteeing equality and prohibiting discrimination. When such provisions
specifically protect the right of LGB persons to employment, they often have specific limitations
to the laws’ competency. For instance, the military and public service positions that require a
high level of security clearance have often been excluded from anti-discrimination policies.
Often religious organizations are also given exemption from following some or all aspects of
equal employment law that include sexual orientation explicitly as a protected category.
Article 4(1) of the Employment Equality Directive of the European Union is a pointed
example of a clause that allows exceptions to laws prohibiting discrimination in certain
circumstances (Waaldijk and Bonini-Baraldi 2006). The second section of Article 4 allows
organizations “whose ethos is based on religion or belief, to treat persons differently on the basis
of their religion or belief” (Cormack and Bell 2005, 49). While not all member states have
included this exception in their policies on discrimination, many have including Austria, Cyprus,
Denmark, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Ireland, Latvia, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Slovakia and
the United Kingdom (Cormack and Bell 2005).
Policy in the European Union
Discrimination policy in the European Union developed through a combination of the
original Treaty of Rome and the Maastricht Treaty and interpretation via case law, subsequent
treaties and their interpretation via case law, and European Commission directives.
The Treaty of Rome, also known as the Treaty of the European Community (EC Treaty)
was the precursor to the Treaty of Maastricht. The provisions of the Treaty of Rome were
economic, thus its impact on discrimination regulation were limited to those that directly
impacted the integration of the European market. The preamble of the EC Treaty mentions a
guarantee of social progress that the European Court of Justice has interpreted, in conjunction
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with article 141 pursuit of both economic and social objectives, as supportive of antidiscrimination measures (Waaldijk & Bonini-Baraldi 2006). As a result of the initial focus on
economic unification, historically the measures regarding anti-discrimination have been those
that would impact the development of the common market. Discrimination is clearly
incompatible with the EU provisions for the free circulation of goods, services, capital and
people and the European Parliament has long recognized this applies to discrimination based on
sexual orientation (Reekie 1997). As discussed subsequently, the commitment by the European
Parliament to end discrimination against homosexuals dates back to 1984 (HREA 2003).
The issue of lesbian and gay rights was introduced to the European Parliament as being
under the competence of the European Union in the 1984 Squarcialupi Report on sexual
discrimination in the work place that in conjunction with the 1992 Roth Report led to the 1994
Resolution on Sexual Discrimination at the Workplace urging member states to decriminalize
homosexual acts (Sanders, 1996). Just prior to the Roth Report, the European Commission
acknowledged the problem of harassment of gays and lesbians via extending its sexual
harassment code to include protections for gays and lesbians.
The Treaty of Maastricht created the European Union in 1992, marking an opportunity
for increased competency at the international level. This generated the foundation for all future
treaties, directives, community decisions, and case law that address rights within the European
Union. It mentions the principles of non-discrimination with regard to nationality (Article 12),
producers and consumers of agriculture (Article 34), free movement of peoples (Articles 39, 43,
49, & 50), taxation (Article 90) and gender (Article 141). The treaty also takes an explicit
interest in improving employment conditions and facilitating employment through the European
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Social Fund developed in Article 130u, whose role in improving LGB employment opportunities
will be discussed subsequently.
The Maastricht Treaty also instructs that those fundamental rights that are guaranteed by
the European Court of Human Rights also be secured by the European Union. Based on the
freedom of movement provided for in the treaties of the EU, the 1992 Roth Report indicates that
without European Parliamentary control, the differentials in the legal rights of homosexuals
across member states equates to a restriction in their ability to migrate for the purposes of
employment (Roth 1994). In October of 1995 the European Parliament, voting on this argument,
adopted a resolution encouraging the European Commission to formulate directives in the area of
discrimination (Due 1996).
Despite the sporadic support for LGB rights from the European Parliament, EU
competences failed to cover discrimination based on sexual orientation until the Amsterdam
Treaty was signed in 1997. The Amsterdam Treaty, which went to effect in 1999, permitted the
European Council to take positive measures to ensure equality and specifically mentioned the
need to ensure equality in the workplace between men and women, but not sexual orientation. In
the interim between the signing of the treaty and its coming into effect, an important ECJ case
tested the applicability of EU laws regarding gender discrimination to cases of discrimination
based on sexual orientation. Grant v South West Trains Ltd.20 set precedent for sexual orientation
to be sufficiently distinct from gender that discrimination based on sexual orientation is not
covered in any way by gender discrimination law.

20

Grant was an employee of South West Trains ltd. who applied for spousal travel concessions for her same-sex
partner. South West Trains ltd. denied request on the basis that concessions for non-married partners were only
available to opposite sex partners. Grant sued on the grounds that the refusal constituted sex discrimination citing
that her predecessor had been given travel concession for his partner who had been a woman (Grant v South West
Trains ltd. 1998).
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Following the treaty and the landmark Grant case, the European Commission developed
two relevant directives: one regarding race and gender and another regarding a list of other
minority group categories including sexual orientation. Sexual orientation was a much debated
inclusion in the Equal Employment Directive as its inclusion meant that that member states were
required to enact anti-discrimination measures at the national level. The Equal Employment
Directive prohibits both direct and indirect forms of discrimination and instruction to
discriminate as well as harassment based on sexual orientation. The directive, as a compromise,
is more limited in its scope than the directive on race and gender. The Equal Employment
directive applies only to employment, self-employment, and membership in professional
organizations while the Racial Equality Directive on the other hand covers employment as well
as provision of goods and services. These directives and debates culminated in the Nice Summit
in 2000 with Article III of the Treaty of Nice prohibiting discrimination based on sexual
orientation in employment.
Member states had until either 2003 or 2004 to transpose the Directive into national law
depending on when they had joined the EU (Cormack & Bell 2005). States seeking accession
had until 2005 to transpose the law. Initially there were difficulties for many member states in
transposing the directive through their national legislatures. These problems were derived from
the social marginalization and prejudice that made such legislation unpopular among the public
in some states (Waaldijk & Bonini-Baraldi 2006). “By the summer of 2005, the European
Commission had started four infringement procedures based on the Directive” (Waaldijk &
Bonini-Baraldi 2006, 90). Infringement procedures occur when a state fails to implement a
directive. Of these four procedures, two were for failure to implement the Directive at all
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(Germany and Luxembourg) and two were for failure to implement in some regions (Finland and
Austria) (Waaldijk & Bonini-Baraldi 2006).
In same year as the Nice Summit, the EU also adopted the Lisbon Strategy with a goal of
advancing skilled labor across the member states. This included employment targets for the
general population, employment targets for specific subpopulations, and importantly the 20002008 EQUAL initiative. The EQUAL initiative sought to develop strategies to create a more
inclusive workforce via combating discrimination on various grounds including sexual
orientation (European Commission 2008).
Despite the beleaguered timeline for EU action on sexual orientation discrimination and
the problems of transposition, most states’ anti-discrimination laws go beyond the scope of the
directive either in terms of the grounds for discrimination, the scope of protection or the
competence of the equality body (Cormack & Bell 2005). Some states have chosen to adopt the
wording of the Directive nearly verbatim, while others have added clauses into the existing legal
framework. Despite variations in the wording of national laws, the national courts are under
obligation to interpret those laws in accordance with the nature and intent of the Directive.
Since implementation of the Employment Equality Directive, the EU has continued to
focus on eliminating discrimination. The 2007 “European Year of Equal Opportunities for All”
adopted by the Council of the EU focused on both strong implementation of anti-discrimination
measures within member states as well as reform of social norms regarding prejudice and
stereotypes (Moraes 2006).21 In the summer of 2008 the European Commission issued a new
directive on discrimination that would expand the scope of anti-discrimination measures to the
provision of goods and services. The inclusion of sexual orientation in this new directive was

21

The Moraes citation precedes the “European year of Equal Opportunities for All” because he is writing regarding
the Council of the European Union announcement in advance of the year’s scheduled events.
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heatedly debated with concerns over whether or not such a directive could pass in a Council that
included the new member states from Eastern Europe. Ultimately, the directive did include
sexual orientation among its protected categories and was passed by the European Council.
These policy changes at the level of the European Union are important because they
represent the policy progress of a supranational institution and place requirements on member
states to establish or reform laws in accordance with the treaties as well as the European
Commission directives. Furthermore, the European Commission monitors compliance with these
directives in the member states and can take legal action in the European Court of Justice (ECJ)
for noncompliance. European Union law takes precedence over national in many areas,
especially those that affect the free movement of goods, services, or labor. The procedure for
bringing such legal action is an arduous process involving a great deal of requests, responses,
and time allotments for change, but should the state continue to fail to comply they are subject to
penalties from the ECJ.
The process of incorporating sexual orientation into the protected categories covered by
EU directives and treaties has been a process requiring debates, reports, and non-binding
resolutions to ultimately build toward enforceable policy. The Treaty of Nice and 2008 European
Commission directive’s inclusion of sexual orientation as protected grounds is the culmination of
a process that began in 1984. Policies adopted via treaty and directive at the EU level compel
states to take more seriously issues of discrimination based on sexual orientation and take steps
to prevent such discrimination. As the EU has expanded its membership and competence, its
impact on LGB rights has become increasingly clear.
Policy in the Netherlands
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Although the European Union’s discrimination policy is quite recent, individual states
within the union have adopted anti-discrimination provisions and applied them to LGB persons
that predate EU policy. The Netherlands is an example of a member state in which the route to
an anti-discrimination policy was considerably less complicated than in the European Union. The
Dutch Constitution (Article I) has prohibited discrimination since 1983 when it was rewritten to
include more social rights. Article I does not explicitly mention sexuality, but because it
prohibits discrimination “on any ground whatsoever” it has been interpreted to imply inclusion
of sexual orientation22 (The Constitution of the Kingdom of the Netherlands 2002, 2).
Discrimination based on sexual orientation with regard to employment is prohibited specifically
by the Equal Treatment Act of 1994 (CGB 2006). The Equal Treatment Act not only specified
sexual orientation as protected from discrimination, it also created the Equal Treatment
Commission, which is responsible for addressing acts of discrimination throughout the
Netherlands.
The Equal Treatment Commission (CGB) is charged with the duty of investigating
alleged acts of discrimination based on any of the grounds covered under the Equal Treatment
Act. At its inception, the CGB was constrained to only investigating cases that were presented to
a Commission office. Victims or interested third parties who were neither the
individual/organization perpetrating an act of discrimination nor the party being differentiated
based on sexual orientation could report discrimination to the CGB, but this still limited reports
of discrimination to far fewer than the actual frequency with which discriminatory acts occurred
22

Waaldijk (1993) notes that the parliamentary debate surrounding the wording of the discrimination protections in
the revised constitution focused on whether or not include sexual orientation. The addition of “any grounds
whatsoever” was a compromise position between exclusion and inclusion of sexual orientation. Mattijssen and
Smith (1996) have subsequently interpreted the phrase to specifically and especially apply to sexual orientation. In
Van Zijl v Goeree (1987) the County Court of Appeals ruled that “any ground whatsoever” cover sexual orientation
with sufficient strength that the defendant’s right to freely publish anti-gay propaganda based on his religion was
overridden by the Plantiff’s right to be protected from discrimination based on “any ground whatsoever.”
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(Dominici 2007). Beginning in 2005, the CGB was given the power to conduct independent
investigations that has greatly expanded the scope of the Commission in addressing
discrimination within in the employment sector. Further, prior to 2005 CGB initiated
investigations had to be related to an entire economic sector rather than a specific firm or
individual (Simply Gay 2007).
The CGB is an important institution for discouraging and policing discrimination, but its
power is limited to arbitration and recommendations to the court. The commission is limited by
the scope of Dutch policy, thus it cannot take independent punitive action and is limited to the
employment sector. The CGB relies heavily on its influence within the courts and the negative
publicity that firms may incur if it is discovered that they are under investigation by the CGB.
While it is clear that both direct and indirect discrimination are prohibited, there are
certain exemptions from these laws with regard to employment. Religious institutions are a
notable example of the limitations on employment discrimination policy. Religious schools,
institutions, and organizations may discriminate based on sexual orientation if the employment
position includes educating others about the religion and the religion does not condone
homosexuality or bisexuality. The CGB must also distinguish between cases in which
discrimination has occurred and the law is violated and cases in which discrimination has
occurred but does not violate the law.
In addition to the Equal Treatment Act and the CGB, the Dutch government studied
discrimination based on sexual orientation via policy memorandums and surveys conducted by
the Social and Cultural Planning Bureau. Studies such as Acceptance of Homosexuality in the
Netherlands (2006), Homosexuality in the Dutch Armed Forces (2006) Simply Gay (2007),
Increasingly Normal, Never the Norm (2010), and Just Getting On With the Job (2011) study
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homosexuality, social norms, and homophobia within the Netherlands and provide policy
suggestions for reducing homophobia and increasing the social inclusion of LGB identifiers.
Additional studies, for example A Yellow Card for Sport (2007), that are not narrowly targeted at
addressing LGB issues still address sexuality in the context of the broader report. This allows
targeted policy making and closer tracking on the part of the CGB, who can thus be more
effective in pursuing independent investigations. Furthermore, it establishes a tone of
cooperation and support between the Dutch government and the LGB community.
As a result of the research commissioned by the Dutch government and its relationship to
the Center for Culture and Leisure (COC), the oldest LGBT organization in the world, a broader
more concerted effort to change social norms that facilitate discrimination has also been adopted
(COC 2012). For instance, the government has identified the primary sectors of society in which
discrimination based on sexual orientation persists, namely the youth and immigrant populations.
The Ministry of Education, Culture and Science is charged with emancipating the LGBT
community and Minister Dr. Ronald Plasterk, has been particularly active in promoting equality
and ending discrimination.
The history of LGB protections in the Netherlands contrasts with EU policy in both
duration and contention. Aside from early debates on explicit inclusion of a discrimination
protection in the constitution, the Dutch government has repeatedly made efforts to incorporate
the LGB community into Dutch society. By interpreting the “any grounds whatsoever” clause to
protect homosexuals from discrimination, the Dutch government has provided agencies like the
CGB and interest groups like the COC with the competency to improve the social situation for
the LGB population. As is evidenced by the government’s own reports, sexual orientation
discrimination is becoming less common in Dutch society with few exceptions.
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Policy in the United States
Where the Netherlands provided an example of leader state with regard to antidiscrimination policy, the United States stands as a contrasting laggard state. Anti-discrimination
policy regarding the LGB community in the United States has been piecemeal at best. The
United States lacks national legislation protecting the LGB community from discrimination,
despite efforts dating back to 1974 and Congresswoman Bella Abzug (Feldblum 2000). In fact,
national legislation in the United States has historically encouraged the dismissal of LGB
persons from their jobs within the federal workforce (Hirsch 2000). So while the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission could be seen in some ways as being comparable to the
Dutch CGB, it does not protect LGBs from discrimination because sexual orientation is not a
protected category in the United States. Anti-discrimination policies in the United States have
been enacted at the local or state levels in the form of municipal ordinances and state laws that
prohibit discrimination. While each ordinance and law passed is seen as a gain within the
movement, the result has been that only a portion of LGB persons are actually protected from
discrimination.23
National legislation protecting the employments rights of LGB persons is limited to two
executive orders. In 1995 President Clinton issued an executive order removing sexual
orientation as a consideration in the granting of security clearances, an important first step in
permitting employment advancement for LGB federal employees and employees of companies
holding military contracts (Hirsh 2000). Then in 1999 President Clinton signed Executive Order
13087 incorporating sexual orientation into the list of categories protected from discrimination
within the federal workforce (Executive Order 13087).
23

See van der Meide (1999) for a thorough review of subnational legislation in the United States and
www.taskforce.org and www.hrc.org for updated information since the van der Meide report.
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The National Gay and Lesbian Taskforce and other LGB organizations have long pushed
for national legislation that would add sexual orientation to the categories of minorities protected
from discrimination. Such legislation with national scope would be a significant gain for gay
rights, but requires legislation. While Clinton was able to incorporate protections for LGB
identifiers for federal employees via executive order, a public sector discrimination prohibition is
beyond the scope of an executive order. As mentioned above, such legislation has been
introduced regularly in Congress since the mid-seventies but has yet to pass. Beginning in 1994
the bill retitled the Employment Non-Discrimination Act (ENDA) and has progressively gained
larger numbers of co-sponsors with each introduction to Congress (HRC 2010). In 1996 ENDA
came its closest to passage but failed in the Senate by a single vote. Subsequently debate
regarding ENDA in Congress became dominated by the power of the religious right’s grip on the
Republican party and interpretation of the bill as an endorsement of immoral, and thus unAmerican, behavior (Feldblum 2000). Thus despite Clinton’s support for LGB rights, the
progress of ENDA and success of LGB advocates at the national level was severely constrained.
Despite the seeming opportunity of the years of the Clinton administration, ENDA was
never passed so Clinton’s support for the bill was never tested. During the subsequent George W.
Bush presidency the bill continued to be introduced but with less potential for success. While the
number of cosponsors grew during this period, Bush’s determination to veto ENDA remained
steady. LGB rights groups turned their lobbying attention to the state level during the period as
the political opportunity had clearly contracted under Bush and some states were more amenable
to increasing the civil status of LGBs.
The state strategy proved fruitful with several states adopting discrimination prohibitions
between 2000 and 2008. Maryland (2001) and New York (2002) adopted laws banning
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discrimination based on sexual orientation. Rhode Island (2001), New Mexico (2003), California
(2003), the District of Columbia (2005), Illinois (2005), Maine (2005), New Jersey (2006),
Washington (2006), Iowa (2007), Oregon (2007), Vermont (2007), and Colorado (2007) all
adopted laws prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity or
expanded previously legislation covering sexual orientation to also include gender
identity/gender expression (NGLTF 2011). State level success is important and worthwhile, but
the goal of passing ENDA remains as national coverage removes the impairment on gays who
are unable to pursue employment opportunities in the many states that do not offer protections
against discrimination. In these laggard states LGB organizations opt for pursuing discrimination
protections in cities that may be more liberal and amenable to anti-discrimination laws than the
state as a whole. For example, in the clearly laggard state of Louisiana the city of New Orleans
has passed a non-discrimination act. The political capital expended to make these policy gains
with such narrow jurisdiction highlight the closed nature of the political opportunity structure of
many states.
More recently ENDA has found renewed support at the national level as President Barack
Obama has publicly announced his willingness to sign ENDA into law once passed by Congress.
When introduced in 2009 the bill had 209 cosponsors in the House but when it was reintroduced
in the 112th Congress the number of cosponsors dropped significantly to only 111, likely as result
of the influx of Republican and Tea Party freshman congresspersons (HRC 2011).
The overall picture of the United States is dismal for LGB protections at the national
level and considerably mixed at the subnational level. The lack of policy success for LGB
protections in Congress and the minimal success with Presidential orders have moved much of
the focus to subnational levels. It is only recently with the Obama administration that hopes for
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national level discrimination protections have risen. Increasing support for ENDA and changes
in public opinion may open the door for protections, but the US government is certainly not
leading the way for such changes.
While the importance of curtailing discrimination and the mechanisms for doing so may
be nearly uniform across the democracies of the Global North, the extent to which individual
states see sexual orientation as a category worthy of protection varies considerably. Whether
considering general prohibitions on discrimination or looking at legislation specifically
protecting LGB persons, there are wide gulfs between states like the Netherlands, a leader state,
and the United States, a laggard state. Additionally, it is no longer feasible to examine only the
state and its domestic institutions and politics to understand such differences. The European
Union’s growing competency in social policy as well as the precedents set by the European
Court of Human Rights have come to impact those nations who are members of either or both
institutions. The cases described above provide a context with which to understand the
subsequent statistical analysis that expands the research to include up to thirty-six countries.
Anti-Discrimination Policy Modeled
When and where can anti-discrimination policy adoption be expected? In Chapter Two
policy change was formulated as a function of resource mobilization, political opportunity
structure, and punctuations in the equilibrium of the existing policy paradigm. Therefore, antidiscrimination policy should occur when organizational resources are available, formal
institutions facilitate organizational involvement, and informal institutions are favorable.
Anti-discrimination policy is a goal for LGB movements, thus such policy is expected to
be more likely when and where LGB movements have greater resources to advance their goals.
Resource mobilization theory sees social movements as the rational result of groups responding
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to reductions in the costs of mobilizing or increases in either the benefits to be gained or the
likelihood of success (Jenkins 1983, Valocchi 1993). Anti-discrimination policy has an
inherently high level of benefit so it is expected LGB organizations would see deployment of
resources as cost effective. The high level of benefit is two-fold. There is the obvious benefit of
improving the daily situation of LGB persons in terms of ability to carry out functions of daily
life including retaining employment, maintaining an adequate living arrangement, and being able
to take part in society.
A secondary benefit that follows from the first is that preventing discrimination will
produce greater resources for social movement organizations. As more LGB persons are able to
be out, they also provide additional resources for the social movement either directly or
indirectly. Directly, those who are out face fewer barriers to participation in an organization
directed at LGB rights. Indirectly, LGB persons who are open about their sexuality may
influence social norms by challenging stereotypes and increasing the exposure of the heteromajority to the LGB population. For a visual representation of this model, please refer to chapter
two.
Anti-discrimination provisions in the law vary in scope. In this analysis discrimination
prohibitions are characterized as fitting into one of two categories depending upon the
applicability of the law to the LGB community. Policies that prohibit discrimination generally or
provide a list of covered categories with a clause indicating the list is not exhaustive are
considered to be of a lower level than policies that explicitly list sexual orientation as a protected
category under the law. Legislation that prohibits discrimination in general or includes a clause
indicating that a list is not exhaustive leaves the extension of scope to LGB persons up to the
court system. For the reason, an anti-discrimination law that could be interpreted to cover sexual
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orientation is considered a policy success but certainly less of a success than a policy that
explicitly lists LGB persons as protected from discrimination based on sexual orientation. Using
the constitutions, civil codes, and criminal codes of the individual states in the dataset, I identify
states as falling into one of three policy categories in any given time: states that do not have a
discrimination policy that could be interpreted to include LGB persons, states whose policies
prohibit discrimination on a non-exhaustive list of categories but do not include sexuality
explicitly, and states with a policy that specifically protects individuals from discrimination
based on sexuality.
Ten models are used to examine hypotheses connecting movement resources, formal
institutions, and informal institutions to the probability of anti-discrimination policy adoption.
When LGB organizations and/or publications increase in the context of formal institutions that
facilitate the influence of the movement, it is expected that the probability of policy adoption will
increase and thus the duration until policy adoption decrease. States with proportional or mixed
representation systems should be more amenable to the LGB movement than states with a
majoritarian system, thus policy is more likely to be adopted in these. Similarly, states with a
mixed executive structure are also anticipated to be more amenable to LGB policy change
compared to states with a presidential system. Unitary states are more likely to pass national
legislation sooner than their federalist counterparts, so the probability of policy adoption should
be higher and duration until policy change shorter in unitary states. The European Union and the
European Convention on Human Rights encourage the adoption of greater minority rights
policies, thus member states are anticipated to have a greater probability of adopting antidiscrimination policy than non-member states. Where LGB movement resources, in the form of
organizations or publications, are greater in the context of an amenable institution as described
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above, the probability of policy adoption is expected to increase compared to where
organizations and/or publications function in the context of a closed institution.
Informal institutions are similarly expected to influence the probability of antidiscrimination policy adoption and filtering the impact of national LGB movement resources.
States with more amenable public officials, measured as the percentage of women in the
legislature and a centrist or leftist party leaning, will be more likely to adopt anti-discrimination
policies. Thus amenable officials should increase the positive impact of LGB resources on the
probability of anti-discrimination policy adoption. Where economic distress is lower, antidiscrimination policies should be easier to adopt, therefore positive change in GPD per capita is
hypothesized to be positively related to anti-discrimination adoption. Relatedly, lower
unemployment rates should also increase the probability of anti-discrimination policy adoption.
Recall from Chapter Two that diversity is expected to increase the probability of minority rights
policy adoption, thus higher levels of ethnic fractionalization and urbanization are anticipated to
increase the probability a state will adopt an anti-discrimination policy. Furthermore, when LGB
movement resources are functioning in the context of informal institutions that encourage antidiscrimination policy change, the probability of policy adoption should increase.
Event History Modeling
Event history modeling, or duration analysis, is used to examine the theory that was
explained in Chapter Two and briefly reviewed above. The model tested here envisions the
impact of movement resources on policy as filtered through formal and informal institutions. To
examine this using duration analysis, it is necessary to validate the assumption of time
dependency, analyze the model fit of the appropriate parameterization for the policy, and then
analyze the relationship between the independent variables in each of the three categories to the
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duration until policy change. Finally, following the interpretation of the last model, an
explanation is offered.
As previously mentioned, and explained more thoroughly in Chapter Two, this analysis
necessarily begins by examining the assumption of time dependency of duration until the
adoption of a policy prohibiting discrimination. More specifically, non-parametric estimations of
the survivor and hazard functions will be used to assess whether the time dependency is negative
or positive. The Kaplan-Meier estimate (FigureB1) shows that the probability of survival,
ranging from 0-1, declines over time which indicates that the likelihood of a state adopting a
policy increases over time. The Kaplan Meier survival estimate shows that after an initial decline
at the beginning of the dataset, 1972, the survival rate is relatively stable for nearly the first 20
years of analysis time at which point there is a great deal of policy adoption quite rapidly. The
Kaplan-Meier shows the probability that the states that have not already adopted a policy will
adopt one in the next time slice, in this case the following year.
Figure B
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Several parametric models were considered as each parameterization assumes a particular
form for the baseline hazard. It is important to note that the hazard function above (Figure C)
shows the shape of the hazard without the impact of the independent variables and it should not
be assumed that the hazard function when covariates are incorporated is the same as the hazard
function without covariates. Kaplan-Meier relies solely on time and the remaining number of
states that have not yet adopted a policy to estimate the hazard function. The Kaplan-Meier
estimates produce a nearly monotonic function. When covariates, such as movement resources,
formal institutions and/or informal institutions, are included, the hazard function predicted for
discrimination prohibitions is also anticipated to be monotonically increasing. While the baseline
shape of the hazard is similar both with and without the independent variables, the independent
variables impact the duration until policy adoption for individual states. Furthermore, the
independent variables impact the speed at which the hazard is increasing.
There are multiple parameterizations, assumptions about the baseline hazard, which are
monotonically increasing. If movement resources are working through institutions, then the
likelihood of a policy developing should be monotonically increasing provided that movement
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resources are also either static or increasing. Furthermore, informal institutions that are
anticipated to positively impact the probability of policy adoption are also increasing over time,
for example urbanization and GDP per capita, which reinforces the expectation of a
monotonically increasing baseline hazard.
There are three distributions that fit a monotonically increasing hazard, the Weibull, the
gamma, and the Gompertz. Of these three the gamma cannot be utilized because it is
incompatible with a model that also incorporates shared frailty, the expectation that a country’s
prior policy record is related to its probability of policy adoption for subsequent years. The
Gompertz and the Weibull distributions are appropriate when the hazard rate, or risk of adopting
a policy, is expected to increase monotonically over time so both fit the theoretical expectations.
While both the Weibull and the Gompertz are monotonic functions, they are estimated
differently and have slightly different implications. The Weibull is a two-parameter model in
which p is the parameter that determines whether the hazard is monotonically increasing,
monotonically decreasing or constant, in which case the Weibull parameterization is identical to
the exponential parameterization and the exponential parameterization should be used. When ̂ is
less than one, the hazard is monotonically decreasing, which would be contrary to the theory.
When ̂ is greater than one, the hazard is monotonically increasing, as the theory indicates.
When ̂ is one, the hazard is constant. The Gompertz is monotonic as well and increases or
decreases exponentially depending on the shape parameter. The shape parameter for the
Gompertz is γ. Similar to ̂ for the Weibull, when ̂ is less than zero the hazard is monotonically
decreasing, when ̂ is greater than zero the hazard is monotonically increasing, and when ̂ is
equal to one the hazard is flat. An important difference between the two is that the Weibull can
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be estimated as either a proportional hazards model or as accelerated failure time model whereas
the Gompertz is exclusively a proportional hazards parameterization (Jenkins 2008).
Because the theory alone does not specify which of the monotonic functions is preferable,
analysis of each model began by assessing the relative model of fit of the Gompertz and the
Weibull. The model fit results consistently indicated that the Gompertz parameterization was
preferable to the Weibull based on both the Akaike Information Criterion and the Bayesian
Information Criterion. In addition to comparing the Gompertz to the Weibull, I also compare the
model fit of both to the Cox. Recall from Chapter Two that the Cox is used as a comparison
because it is a semi-parameterized hazard and thus allows the hazard to fluctuate rather than
follow a fixed functional form. The Cox is less efficient than a parameterized model, but its
flexibility places fewer assumptions on the data. This comparison thus serves as a check on
whether it is more appropriate to leave the hazard unparameterized. The Gompertz and Weibull
parameterizations are both preferable to the Cox according to the results from both the AIC and
BIC tests, thus the Gompertz parameterization will be used for the models below.
As mentioned previously, discrimination prohibitions are modeled as multiple failure
data in which a country may adopt one level of a policy and then subsequently adopt another
policy at another, higher, level. Modeling this data as multiple failure without taking into account
that some policy adoption is related to a previous policy adoption would insufficiently model the
iterative and recursive nature of policy making. I incorporated shared frailty to the model to test
for whether previous policy in a state impacts subsequent policy development. The frailty for the
discrimination policy models is parameterized as having a gamma distribution.24

24

See Chapter 2 for an explanation of frailty distributions considered for this analysis and the process for selecting
the inverse Gaussian over the gamma.
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Table 3.1
Formal Institution Interaction Event History Models for Antidiscrimination Policy
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Model 5
PR
executive
federalism
EU
ECHR
interaction
interaction
interaction
Organizations
0.979
1.017
1.048
1.025
1.02
(0.08)
(0.044)
(0.053)
(0.055)
(0.043)
Publications
0.903
0.653
0.89
0.897
0.835
(0.903)
(0.303)
(0.053)**
(0.052)*
(0.078)*
Proportional
0.043
0.094
0.107
0.075
0.089
Representation
(0.042)***
(0.073)**
(0.087)**
(0.064)**
(0.067)***
Mixed
0.049
0.071
0.086
0.052
0.064
Electoral
(0.048)**
(0.063)**
(0.081)**
(0.053)**
(0.056)
System
Mixed
0.241
0.019
0.4 (0.512)
0.343
0.18
Executive
(0.311)
(0.043)*
(0.449)
(0.213)
Federalist
1.118
1.085
0.935
0.995
1.017
(0.481)
(0.459)
(0.505)
(0.418)
(0.423)
European
0.799
0.723
0.747
0.678
0.692
Union
(0.326)
(0.294)
(0.304)
(0.295)
(0.285)
ECHR
5.05
5.476
4.423
5.631
2.408
(4.206)*
(4.48)**
(3.701)*
(4.787)*
(2.149)
PR* Orgs
1.035
----(0.102)
PR* Pubs
1.082
----(1.082)
Exec*Pubs
-1.456
---(0.674)
Fed*Orgs
--0.957
--(0.088)
Fed*Pubs
--1.073
--(0.097)
EU * Orgs
---0.975
-(0.093)
EU * Pubs
---1.085
-(0.125)
ECHR * Pubs
----1.137
(0.099)
gamma
0.17
0.167
0.16
0.163
0.171
chi-squared
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
theta
N
706
706
706
706
706
Chi-squared
17.07**
18.68**
15.18*
15.51*
17.66**
* p 0.1 ** p 0.05 *** p 0.001
Note: hazard ratios reported based on Gompertz parameterization; standard errors in parentheses
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Table 3.2

Organizations
Publications
Ethnic
Fractionalization
Change in GDP
Unemployment
Urbanization
% Women in
Parliament
Rightist
Executive
Centrist
Executive
Ethnic*Orgs
GDP*Orgs
GDP*Pubs
Unemployment*
Orgs
Women *Orgs
Women*Pubs

Informal Institution Interaction Event History Models for Antidiscrimination Policy
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Model 5
Ethnic
GDP
Unemploy.
Women
Right Exec.
interaction
interactions
Interaction
Interaction
Interactions
1.121 (0.093) 1.043 (0.065) 0.994
0.714
1.03 (0.075)
(0.112)
(0.126)*
1.004 (0.061) 0.976 (0.053) 0.994
1.046
0.997 (0.044)
(0.042)
(0.125)
770.369
16.587
16.43
37.701
15.37 (17.936)**
(11511.847)* (18.926)**
(18.714)*
(45.835)**
**
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000 (0.0001)
(0.0001)
(0.0002)
(0.0001)
(0.0001)
1.086 (0.058) 1.103
1.088
1.149
1.114 (0.06)**
(0.059)*
(0.095)
(0.066)**
0.975 (0.023) 0.963 (0.022) 0.962
0.962
0.961 (0.022)*
(0.022)*
(0.025)
1.05 (0.028)* 1.052
1.059
0.963
1.059 (0.028)**
(0.029)*
(0.028)**
(0.044)
1.014 (0.759) 1.198 (0.913) 1.16 (0.932) 0.638
1.688 (1.556)
(0.495)
1.034 (0.664) 1.235 (0.816) 1.197
0.709
1.21 (0.8)
(0.811)
(0.463)
0.622
----(0.13)**
-1 (0.00004)
----1.000
---(0.00004)
--1.003
--(0.011)
---1.017
-(0.009)*
---1.001
-(0.007)
----1.004 (0.11)

Rightist Exec. *
Orgs
Rightist Exec*
----0.956 (0.091)
Pubs
gamma
0.142
0.144
0.146
1.08
0.142
chi-squared theta 5.2e-7
1.000
1.000
-1.000
N
564
564
564
564
564
Chi-squared
17.72*
12.73
11.84
21.27**
12.43
* p 0.1 ** p 0.05 *** p 0.001
Note: hazard ratios reported based on Gompertz parameterization; standard errors in parentheses
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Results
Iterative policymaking that is related to the demands of social movement should not be
analyzed in the context of the power of the movement alone. Nor should policymaking be
examined purely in the context of the structures of government or the informal institutions that
inform policy decision making. Capturing a complete picture of the policy making that occurs
related to the LGB movement requires that all of the above be considered, particularly where
primary interest is in when policies are adopted by advanced democratic states.
Recall from the model visually represented and discussed in Chapter Two that that
movement resources are believed to work indirectly through formal and informal institutions.
Thus it is necessary to examine the interaction effects of movement resources and institutions. In
order to avoid serious multicollinearity problems, the interactions are run separately in a series of
models. This also allows comparison across models that contain a stable set of independent
variables and different interactions terms. Furthermore, the model proposes informal and formal
institutions as separate filtering mechanisms, thus two sets of models are examined, one set of
formal institutions and their interactions and one set of informal institutions and their interactions
Interactions Between Formal Institutions and Movement Resources
The formal structures of government impact the probability that an anti-discrimination
policy will be passed and it was theorized that the impact was a function of the filtering power of
institutions on movement resources such as organizations and publications. In the findings
discussed subsequently and evident in Table 3.1, the impact of some formal institutions is indeed
statistically significant. However, the findings support a reformulation of the theory in which the
impact of formal institutions is independent from that of movement resources given that the
interaction terms are statistically insignificant across all formal institutions.
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The models show consistent support for the assumption that the baseline hazard is
monotonically increasing. Because gamma is positive in all five models, there is support for the
assumption that the probability of policy adoption is increasing over time across all states.
Frailty, the assumption that previous policy history predicts future policy, is not statistically
significant. While frailty was expected, it speaks to the specification of the model that it is
insignificant. Policy adoption is sufficiently predicted by the independent variables that frailty
does not add explanatory value beyond that already provided by the formal institutions and
movement resources.
Across all five formal institution models, proportional representation is statistically
significant and decreases the probability of policy adoption as indicated by hazard ratio below
one (see Table 3.1). It had been hypothesized that a proportional representation system would
increase the probability of policy adoption and thus reduce the duration until policy change so
this finding is surprising. The impact of a proportional representation system ranges from a
92.5% reduction in the probability of a state adopting a discrimination policy to an 89.3%
reduction in the probability of policy compared to state with a majoritarian system.25 I examine
the precise impact utilizing the hazard ratio from model five because it is both closest to the
mean impact of proportional representation across models and the most statistically significant
result for proportional representation across the models. Figure D below uses the results from
model five and shows that the hazard, the likelihood that policy will be adopted, increases far
more rapidly when the electoral system is majoritarian rather than proportional when holding the
number of organization at the mean and rounded to a whole number (7). Furthermore, the
average predicted duration until policy adoption when all states are assumed to be majoritarian

25

The hazard ratio for a proportional representation system in Model 1 should not be interpreted as a direct effect
because the interaction terms use proportional representation as a constituent term.
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would be 14.527 years after entering the dataset but if all states were assumed to have a
proportional representation system the average predicted duration until policy adoption is 32.013
years. For the assumption of proportional representation for all states this is an increase of 5.711
years over the actual predicted duration until policy adoption of 26.302 years. The assumption of
a majoritarian electoral system, in contrast, reduced the average predicted year of adoption from
that given the actual electoral systems in the data by 11.775 years.
Figure D
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A mixed electoral system is statistically significant across four of the five models for
formal institutions; it is not statistically significant in the model that includes the interaction
between the European Convention on Human Rights and LGB publications. Although it was
hypothesized that a mixed system would increase the probability of policy adoption compared to
a majoritarian system, the results find that a mixed electoral system reduces the probability of
policy adoption compared to a majoritarian system. The impact of a mixed electoral system
ranges from a 95.1% to a 91.4% reduction in the probability of policy adoption. Figure E below
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shows the difference between the probability of policy adoption for states with a majoritarian
system over the timespan of the analysis versus the probability of policy adoption for states with
a mixed electoral system when LGB publications are held constant at six, which is the mean and
rounded to the nearest whole number.26 If all cases in the dataset were to have a majoritarian
electoral system and six publications, based on the results from model 2, the average predicted
duration until policy adoption would be 17.248 years. In contrast, if all states in the dataset were
to have a mixed electoral system and six publications, the average predicted duration until policy
adoption would be 34.017 years.
Figure E
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Across the models a mixed executive is negatively related to the probability of policy
adoption, reducing the probability of policy by 60% to 98.1%. This finding is only statistically
significant in the model in which an interaction term examining the impact of publications in
states with a mixed executive is also included. The interaction term is also statistically
26

Publications rather than organizations are used as the measure of movement resources here because the interaction
term for organizations was not included in the model due to multicollinearity.
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significant, and confirms the hypothesis that when LGB resources, in this case publications, is
filtered through a mixed executive, the probability of policy adoption increases by 45.6%
compared to presidential system. Thus in 1971 a state with actual values identical to Italy,
specifically a mixed electoral system but lacked a national LGB publication, the predicted year
for an LGB specific discrimination policy to be adopted was 1984 whereas in the same year a
state with values identical to the United States, specifically with a presidential system and two
nationally distributed publication, the predicted year for the adoption of any discrimination
prohibition is 1976. Thus, when the interaction term is equal to zero, states with a mixed
executive are anticipated to adopt policy later. Compare this to a state with identical values to
Sweden, that is with just one national publication and a mixed executive, the predicted year for
failure is 1981, three years sooner than the predicted year for policy adoption in a state with
values identical to Italy.27
The statistical insignificance of federalism as well as membership in the European Union
is also consistent across all five formal institutions models, indicating that federalism and the EU
are not as important in predicting discrimination policy adoption as hypothesized. As mentioned
previously, the interaction terms including either federalism or the European Union are not
statistically significant. The impact of federalism on the probability of policy adoption is
inconsistent across the models in addition to being statistically insignificant. The European
Union was hypothesized to increase the probability of policy adoption, but in all five models the
EU reduces the probability of policy adoption.
The European Convention on Human Rights increases the probability of policy adoption
as hypothesized across all five models and is statistically significant in four of the five models
27

These predictions are intended to be illustrative and do not take into account changes in the states that actually
occurred between 1971 and the predicted year for adoption. Predictions would update as values change over time in
the intervening years between 1971 and the predicted year for adoption.
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for formal institutions. The ECHR is not statistically significant in the model in which the
interaction between the ECHR and the number of LGB publications is also included. Using the
results from model 2 in which the ECHR is most significant, states who have signed the ECHR
are 4.476 times more likely to adopt a policy prohibiting discrimination than their counterparts
who have not signed the treaty. For example, in 1971 Denmark was a member of the ECHR and
the predicted year of policy adoption is 1982 while Finland, which was not a member of the
ECHR, has a predicted year of policy adoption of 1991 based on the figures from 1971.28
Figure F
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Formal institutions prove to be statistically significant independent of movement
resources but not when interacted with movement resources. This may be the result of society
organizing around institutions that are fixed in advanced industrialized democracies. This is
reason to reconsider whether formal institutions act as a filter, as theorized, or instead structure
the forms of organizations deployed by social movements. What is clear from the models is the
importance of some formal institutions. The electoral system in a state impacts the probability of

28

See important caveat in note 8
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policy adoption, with majoritarian systems surprisingly beneficial for social movements pursuing
policy change. Of the two supranational institutions included in this research, only the ECHR has
a significant impact on the adoption of discrimination prohibitions. Analysis in subsequent
chapters will provide greater insight into the consistency of the impact of formal institutions
across types of LGB rights policy.
Interactions Between Informal Institutions and Movement Resources
Informal institutions are theorized to be an important filter on social movement resources
in advanced democracies where public officials must be responsive to social norms as well as
interest groups. Unlike the findings for formal institutions, the results for the models of informal
institutions indicate that interactions between informal institutions and social movement
resources impacts policy. This supports the theorized understanding of informal institutions as a
filter for social movement resources. Of the informal institutions included in the five models in
Table 3.2, ethnic fractionalization is the most consistent in terms of both statistical significance
as well as impact on policy adoption.
All five models support the assumption of a monotonically increasing hazard, which
means that the probability of policy adoption is increasing over time across all states (see gamma
values in Table 3.2). As in the formal institutions models, a measure of shared frailty based on
the theory that prior policy will impact future policy beyond the impact of the independent
variables was also included in the model. Across the models frailty is not statistically significant,
which indicates that the frailty parameter does not capture anything that is not already captured
in other explanatory variables.
Of the two measures of social movement resources used in all five models, only
organizations is statistically significant and that is only true for Model 4 which includes the
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interaction between women in parliament and both measures of movement resources. The impact
of organizations and publications on policy change is inconsistent across the models, increasing
the probability of policy in some models while decreasing it in others.
Ethnic fractionalization is statistically significant and positively related to the probability
of policy adoption across the five models in Table 3.2. This indicates that the more ethnically
diverse the state, the more likely it is that it will adopt a discrimination policy. The average
predicted year for policy adoption when ethnic fractionalization is below the mean is 2004,
whereas the average predicted year for policy adoption when ethnic fractionalization is above the
mean is 2002.Figures G and H below show the disparity between the predicted year of policy
adoption and the actual year of policy adoption.
Figure G
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Figure H
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Although ethnic fractionalization is positively related to policy adoption and statistically
significant when organizations are at zero, when organizations are present the interaction
between ethnic fractionalization and organizations reduces the probability of policy adoption.
This is surprising given the theory that informal institutions filter social movement resources
which hypothesized that increases in the number of organizations in a state would make policy
more likely in states with greater ethnic fractionalization.
Figure I
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Unemployment was hypothesized to be negatively related to discrimination policy
adoption because feelings of economic threat should make it more difficult to pass legislation
providing protections to minorities. The findings show that unemployment increases the
probability of policy adoption across all models and is statistically significant except when the
model includes either an interaction term that include unemployment or the interaction between
ethnic fractionalization and LGB organizations to the model. Using the results from Model 2 (see
Table 3.2), as unemployment increases in a state, the probability of discrimination policy
adoption increases by 14.9%. For example, in 1988 Greece had an unemployment rate of 6% and
a predicted year of policy adoption of 2004. If the data are manipulated to increase the
unemployment rate in Greece in 1988 by 1%, to 7%, Greece would be expected to adopt a
discrimination policy 2 years earlier in 2002.29
Although urbanization was hypothesized to be positively related to the probability of
policy adoption, the findings show that decreases the probability of policy adoption in the five
informal institutions models examined by 2.5% to 3.9%. In three of these models the impact of
urbanization is statistically significant. As mentioned above, in 1988 one would predict Greece
to adopt a discrimination policy in 2004. In 1988 58.6% of the population of Greece was
categorized as residing in a urban area. If 10% more of the population had been residing in an
urban area in 1988, discrimination policy adoption is predicted to occur three years later in
2007.30
The percentage of parliamentary seats held by women is statistically significant and
positively related to discrimination policy adoption in every model except when interaction terms

29

As was the case with the previous prediction examples, this is intended to be illustrative of when Greece would be
predicted to adopt a policy given differing values for unemployment. This prediction would update over the
intervening years between 1988 and the predicted years as the actual values for the variable change.
30
See previous footnote for important caveat to these predictions
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between women in parliament and social movement resources are included. When these
interactions are included in the model, the interaction between women in parliament and
movement resources increases the probability of policy adoption and the interaction with
organizations specifically is statistically significant. Figure J below shows the hazard functions
for when the average number of LGB organizations attempt policy change when there are no
women in the legislature versus when 10% and 20% of the legislature is made up of women. The
greater the percentage of women in the legislature, the greater the hazard function is and the
more quickly it increases over time.
Figure K
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Informal institutions impact the probability a state will adopt an anti-discrimination
policy. The diversity within a state makes a substantial difference when attempting to predict
when policy adoption will occur. More diverse states are much more likely to adopt
discrimination protections than states with less diversity. The percentage of the legislative seats
held by women also proves to be important with gains for women’s representation in governance
associated with increases in the probability discrimination policy will be adopted.
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The results from the ten models presented have some important consistencies that have
implications for the theory. All of the models validate the assumption of monotonically
increasing hazard, indicating that the probability of policy adoption is generally increasing over
time as anticipated. Across the ten models the findings consistently show that the frailty
parameter is insignificant, which indicates that there is not a relationship between policy history
and the probability of subsequent policy adoption that is not captured by the independent
variables in the models. These findings support the specification of the model and the premises
of the theory.
The findings for the informal institutions provide some support the theory’s
conceptualization of institutions as filters on movement resources while the findings for the
formal institutions show an independent rather than interactive effect on the duration until policy
change. The five models that examine the interactions between formal institutions and movement
resources indicate that the institutions independent of organizations or publications have an
effect on the probability of policy adoption while the interactions do not. In the informal
institutions models I find support for a filter effect in which LGB organizations interacted with
ethnic fractionalization or the percentage of women in parliament are both statistically
significant. It is thus worth considering the possibility that some informal institutions may indeed
act as filters on social movement resources while formal institutions structure society and the
more specific tactics social movements deploy. It is beyond the scope of this research to examine
how social movement tactics vary by institutions structure, but this should be considered an apt
avenue for future research.
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Conclusion
When do states adopt policies prohibiting discrimination? With regard to LGB persons, it
was theorized that such policy is a function of the resources of the LGB movement filtered by
formal and informal institutions. When movement resources exist in the context of amenable
informal institutions and formal institutions are structured to be more responsive, the duration
until a policy is adopted will be shorter. This theory was developed in the contextual framework
of resource mobilization theory, political opportunity structure models, theories on the policy
process as well as the literature on policy diffusion. The results from the models examining how
the duration until policy change varies by the interactions between movement resources and
institutions provide mixed support for the theory. Informal institutions such as women holding
seats in the legislature as well as the diversity within the state interact with movement resources
in their impact upon the probability of policy adoption whereas formal institutions appear to only
have direct independent consequences for policy adoption.
The Netherlands and the United States were used earlier in the chapter to illustrate the
development process for LGB discrimination policy in the extreme cases of a leader and laggard
state respectively. Because these cases were chosen as the extremes, they are not necessarily
typical of the dataset but the countries included here are sufficiently narrowly constrained that
even these extremes of the spectrum remain characteristic of the sample. Previously these two
countries were used to illustrate the reasonableness of the theory, thus it is important to now
reconsider the narrative of these two cases in the context of the findings of the statistical analysis
of the complete dataset.
The finding in some models that movement resources decrease the probability of policy
adoption was inconsistent with the theory, but parallels observations in the two illustrative cases.
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The Netherlands was an early adopter of discrimination prohibitions that specifically protect
LGB persons while the United States had yet to adopt a national policy that would protect LGB
persons from discrimination, yet the United States has consistently had greater LGB resources
measured as the number of national organizations and publications that exist. It is likely that the
findings for organizations and publications are linked to the fact that not all organizations are
equal in terms of resources. For example, the COC in the Netherlands receives large grants from
the Dutch government and thus has considerable resources in addition to obvious institutional
access while the HRC in the United States must raise its own funds, cannot offer contributors tax
benefits for contributions, and has considerably less institutional access. Additionally,
Baumgartner and Leech (1998) note that the US system facilitates the rise of many interest
groups, thus the larger numbers of interest groups may demonstrate that the structuring nature of
formal institutions as an alternative understanding to the filtering conceptualized in the
hypotheses.
Across the models examining formal institutions, the findings support the importance of
the electoral system in determining the probability of policy adoption. Contrary to the hypotheses
as well as the history for both the Netherlands and the United States, a proportional
representation or mixed electoral system decreased the probability of policy adoption. While the
model anticipates that the United States should be the leader state based on the electoral system,
history shows that the United States is clearly a laggard particularly in comparison to the
Netherlands. It is possible that this is a function of the size and scope of the dataset in which very
few cases have majoritarian systems which served as the null category. In future research that
considers a wider variety of countries, it is possible that the implications of the electoral system
will correspond to the hypotheses.
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An alternative explanation for the findings that proportional and mixed electoral systems
decrease the probability of policy adoption is that the bargaining in such systems has a negative
impact on a policy adoption. Although a minority party may gain disproportionate influence in a
government based on the need to form a coalition, minority parties will still need to engage in the
bargaining process. It could well be that minority parties who include LGB rights in their
platforms are also more likely to bargain away these rights in favor of other policy priorities or
greater power within the coalition. This would be particularly true where social norms make such
trade low cost for the party in terms of votes. It is beyond the scope of this research to examine
to what extent parties exchange commitments to LGB rights for other policies or power, but this
should certainly be considered in the future to provide a more nuanced understanding of the
relationship between the electoral system, party structure, and placement of LGB rights on the
policy agenda.
The European Union was examined as a metacase to illustrate the role of this particular
supranational institution and it was hypothesized that membership in the EU would increase the
probability of policy adoption. Although the EU has encouraged increasing tolerance, social
acceptance, and equality in member states, actual policy making in the EU and cases in the ECJ
can be notably slow as explained in the discussion of the European Union. It is thus
understandable that the impact of the European Union is not as hypothesized. Furthermore, the
European Convention on Human Rights is also included in the statistical analysis as an
additional supranational institution relevant to LGB rights. The ECHR began ruling in favor of
LGB rights well before the EU adopted the 2008 directive on sexual orientation discrimination,
thus it is the ECHR that is statistically significant rather than the EU. This does not necessarily
diminish the value of examining the European Union as an illustrative metacase that provides
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context for the development of policies in member states, furthermore the impact of the EU may
be more relevant in other policy areas.
According the results for the role of ethnic fractionalization in statistical models for
informal institutions, the United States should have adopted discrimination protections for LGB
persons by now yet ENDA is still merely a bill rather than a law. When examining the
interaction effects between ethnic fractionalization and LGB organizations, it is necessary to
shift expectations to the Netherlands as the more probable early adopter. When organizations are
working in the context of a more ethnically diverse society the probability of policy adoption
decreases, as is borne out in the case of the United States. This poses an interesting puzzle
because the findings for the interaction contradict the hypotheses but are congruent with the
historical record for the two illustrative cases while the findings for the direct effects of ethnic
fractionalization support the hypotheses and are contrary to the illustrative case studies. The
impact of ethnic fractionalization across the models in future chapters will provide greater
insight into the role of diversity in the probability of policy adoption.
The findings indicate that contrary to the expectations, unemployment is positively
related policy adoption. It was hypothesized that unemployment would decrease the probability
of policy change as it increased individuals’ feelings of economic threat. Perhaps this is
counterbalanced by the mobilizing power of economic threat within marginalized communities.
As unemployment increases, awareness of one’s vulnerability to employment discrimination
may act as a catalyst for greater pressure. The finding for the interaction between unemployment
and LGB organizations, though statistically insignificant, supports this alternative hypothesis.
The findings for urbanization were also contrary to the expectation. The literature on the
impact of urbanization on LGB community and LGB rights affirms the hypothesis that increases
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in urbanization should increase the probability of LGB rights policies, including an antidiscrimination policy. The possibility that urbanization should be measured as a threshold
dummy variable rather than a continuous variable was considered, but rejected this alternative
operationalization as the resulting models were not as good of a fit to the data based on the AIC
and BIC. Furthermore, using a dummy variable did not result in statistical significance and thus
the loss of information fails to improve the model or alter the statistical significance of
urbanization. Another possible explanation is that the lack of impact for urbanization as well as
its negative impact on policy adoption applies exclusively to anti-discrimination policy and is a
function of city governments’ adoption of anti-discrimination policy. For example, in the United
States many municipalities and counties have adopted anti-discrimination laws that specifically
protect LGB persons but the U.S. has yet to adoption national legislation. Similarly, the Japanese
government has yet to adopt a national anti-discrimination policy, but cities such as Tokyo have
adopted municipal laws prohibiting discrimination based on sexuality. It may be the case the
LGB persons whose city laws protect them from discrimination are less likely to mobilize for
national protections from discrimination. Given that LGB persons are likely to migrate to urban
areas, states in which more of the population is located in urban areas would also have fewer
LGB persons outside urban areas and thus fewer LGB persons advocating for a national antidiscrimination policy.
As discussed above, the percentage of women in parliament is positively related to the
probability of policy adoption thus more women in parliament translates to a shorter duration
until discrimination prohibitions are adopted. This is compatible with the hypotheses and also
corresponds to observations of the Netherlands and the United States as case studies. The Dutch
legislature consistently includes a greater proportion of women than the United States legislature,
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which has translated into the Netherlands early adoption of discrimination protections and the
failure of the United States to adopt any national protections against discrimination for LGB
persons.
Discrimination policy is a crucial goal for the LGB movement because it lays a
foundation for broader recognition of LGB persons as legitimate members of the polity.
Protection from discrimination promotes greater openness about sexual orientation and thus
lends strength to the movement as well. Discrimination is also detrimental to the state as it
reduces the efficiency of the market, thus it is in the state’s interest to respond to calls for policy
prohibiting discrimination. Although anti-discrimination policy in many ways seems to be
rational policy, many states have been difficult to persuade into policy adoption.
When a state should be expected to adopt a discrimination policy depends on the
resources of the LGB movement, the formal institutions of the government, and the informal
institutions of society. Here it was theorized that institutions serve as a filter on the effectiveness
of the LGB movement in achieving policy change and tested the associated hypotheses using
event history modeling on thirty-five countries between 1971 and 2005. With regard to
discrimination policy, informal institutions are more likely to act as filters on the LGB resources
while formal institutions have independent effects but not interactive effects. Furthermore, the
impact of some institutions, for example the electoral system and the political party of the
executive, is contrary to the expectations. Subsequent chapters examine the same set of variables
and thus will provide additional evidence on the generalizability of these findings to other areas
of policy.
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Chapter 4 Military Personnel Policy
Military service requires a great deal of the individual soldier, while at the same time
generating opportunities and unique learning experience as well as a sense of civic pride. For
these very reasons, exclusion from the military amounts to a declaration of incomplete
citizenship. While homosexual and bisexual individuals have served in their nations’ military
throughout history (often with little attention to that particular aspect of the soldier), in the
modern military era they have been excluded from service. As Binkin and Eitelberg (1982, 26)
point out, this creates an “overt stigma of civic inferiority.” It is because of these connotations
for citizenship the LGB community has fought, with success in many countries, for the right to
serve openly in the military.31
Prohibitions on discrimination based on sexual orientation as discussed in chapter three
apply to employment, but military employment is often exempt from such legislation and thus
must be considered separately from general prohibitions on discrimination. Northern Ireland
provides an example of exemptions with regard to the military. Northern Ireland has
incorporated into its discrimination legislation an exception for acts safeguarding national
security, public safety or public order. In other countries, such as Portugal, the state courts have
assumed an implicit exception within the European Union Employment Equality Directive to
security matters. The United States “Don’t Ask Don’t Tell” (DADT) military policy on sexual
orientation discrimination merely placed parameters on discriminatory practices, and considered
this sufficient to protect privacy.

31

See the work of the Palm Center (www.palmcenter.org) for a regularly updated list of countries that allows
homosexuals to serve openly in the military as well as a list of the those countries that ban homosexuals from
service. For regularly updated news stories on legislation as well as jurisprudence regarding sexuality and military
service around the world see the International Gay and Lesbian Association (www.ilga.org)
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This chapter examines the policy change in access to military employment as a function of
resources and political opportunity with the goal of understanding when states create policy to
improve human rights and economic opportunities for the LGB population. The first section of
the chapter examines military policy with regard to LGB persons and follows the same structure
as chapter three examining the European Union’s relevance to military policy followed by the
policy evolution in the Netherlands and the United States. Finally the chapter concludes by
placing the findings into the context of the theory and prospects for future research.
Military Service Policy
Until the transformation of sodomy from aberrant behavior to orientation or identity
(Foucault 1976), militaries lacked policy specifically regulating sexuality apart from existing
criminal codes which soldiers and civilians alike were subject to. Since the early twentieth
century, nations have added specific provisions to military regulations regarding homosexuality.
When such additions to military code were adopted, they were uniformly opposed to LGB
persons in the armed forces rather than prohibiting specific behaviors. The seemingly worldwide
spread of military codifications banning homosexuality among the ranks, interestingly also had
nearly uniform justifications. Countries seemingly move from rationale to rationale for why
homosexuality, as opposed to homosexual acts, is grounds for exclusion in a nearly identical
pattern across those states that maintain a ban. The pattern thus begins with bans on homosexual
activities based on national laws against sodomy.
Until the 1970s homosexuality was characterized as a disorder within the medical
community, thus many states prohibited homosexuals from serving in the military because they
could not pass the requisite medical requirement. In this manner being gay was comparable to
having asthma or poor eye sight in the view of the military (Herek 1996). Some countries still
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rely on this rationale despite the changes amongst the medical establishment regarding sexuality.
For instance, the Polish military directs soldiers who are discovered to be homosexual to
psychiatric treatment followed by discharge on the basis of personality disorder if the
serviceperson is proven to be homosexual (Dalvi 2004). As recently as 2003 Russia regarded
homosexuality as comparable to drug addiction when considering potential enlistees, and official
policy is to draft such persons only in times of war (Dalvi 2004). While Portugal does not have a
formal policy barring LGBs from military service, in practice many are screened out as part of
the medical examination portion of the induction process, creating an informal understanding of
homosexuality as a medical deficiency.
As it became less and less acceptable for nations to equate homosexuality with medical
deficiencies, new arguments for exclusion arose. For instance, during the Cold War the United
States justified discharges on the basis of homosexuality, as well as limitations on security
clearances, via security risk. The foundation for the security risk rationale was that homosexuals
were at a higher risk for blackmail than their heterosexual counterparts. This was similarly the
motivation for Israel’s limitations on homosexual soldiers, who were permitted to serve but not
allowed to hold positions that required higher levels of security clearance (Belkin and Levitt
2000).
Anglo-Saxon countries in particular, have justified banning homosexual persons from
military service via a cohesion and effectiveness rationale. Australia, Canada, the United
Kingdom and the United States all relied on morale based justifications for discharging
homosexuals. Remarkably nearly identical phrasing was used across these countries, all of which
proposed allowing homosexuals to serve openly would generate problems in cohesion, morale,
discipline, recruitment, personal privacy of soldiers, and public perception (GAO 1992, Belkin
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and McNichol 2000a, D’Amico 2000, Dalvi 2004). Despite these arguments for prohibiting
homosexuals from military service, or prescribing that they be closeted and celibate, many
countries do allow LGBs to serve openly.
Australia (1992), Canada (1992), and United Kingdom (2000) have all lifted their
guidelines that prevented homosexuals from serving openly in the military and found that it did
not have an adverse effect on overall morale, unit cohesion, recruitment or retention32 (D’Amico
2000). In fact, in 2003 over a quarter of NATO participating countries allowed LGBs to serve
openly and by 2010 only six of the 43 NATO and ISAF nations excluded LGB persons from
serving in the military as of 2010 (Europa 2005; Goodwin et al 2010).
Militaries are symbols of a country so to be systematically excluded from military service
is to be excluded from an important part of the national identity and notions of citizenship.
Before sodomy laws were lifted, LGB persons were able to serve as long as they were celibate
but as these laws were lifted LBG persons became excluded as a category of persons rather than
based on any action. Initially justifications for such exclusion were medical in nature and thus
had broad support, but as the medical community’s views on sexuality evolved, military views
did not in many countries. Exclusions became based on security threats and interpretations of
homosexuals as de facto communists. Once this rationale could no longer hold, states justified
military bans based on concerns of unit cohesion or morale in which the LGB person was not the
problem but their impact on other soldiers warranted their exclusion.
Policy in the European Union
As part of the unification process, the European Union has established the Common
Foreign and Security Policy and the European Defense Agency. The European Defense Agency
32

The United States also lifted its ban on LGB persons serving openly on September 20th, 2011. While preliminary
statements have been made that indicate there has been no effect since DADT was lifted, systematic research has not
yet been conducted as of this writing.
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is responsible implementing the European Capabilities Action Plan (Europa 2005). One of the
purposes of the Plan is for the EU to be able to carry out the Petersburg tasks, which include a
wide range of military responsibilities (Annex IV EU 1999, Europa 2005).To this end the EU has
adopted competency goals for intelligence and command and control as well as capability goals
for troop deployment (Annex IV EU 1999, Europa 2005).
Despite this policy, the EU lacks a standing army and primary responsibility for security
matters remains with the member states leaving personnel policies under each state’s control
(Frattini 2007). The EU relies on member states to contribute troops for missions, which are
limited to peacekeeping, crisis management, and humanitarian efforts (Europa 2005). Thus, the
European Defense Agency forces are akin to multinational forces on behalf of NATO or the UN
rather than being comparable to the military of single nation.
The European Union does not directly decide whether or not homosexuals are allowed to
serve in the European Defense Agency because service persons are provided and chosen by
member states. The aforementioned Equal Employment Directive does not address military
service, thus EU membership is not directly relevant to the national policies on conscription or
enlistment. Because of the European Defense Agency does not intervene in member state’s
military personnel policies, national LGB movement resources have focused on the policies in
their state rather than EU policy.
While the EU plays little or no role in military guidelines amongst its member nations,
the European Court of Human Rights may play a significant role in the development of LGBfriendly military guidelines. In 2000 the European Court of Human Rights heard two cases
involving the dismissal of homosexual service persons from the armed forces of the United
Kingdom. In both Smith & Grady v United Kingdom and Prean & Beckett v United Kingdom, the
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court ruled that discharging homosexual individuals for identity rather than specific conduct
amounts to a majority encroachment on minority rights. The court found that the policy violated
Article 8 of the European convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, which declares that citizens have a right to privacy (Dalvi 2004, Waaldijk and BoniniBaraldi 2006).
The influence of the European Union on military personnel policy is limited, but cases in
the European Court of Human Rights have forced changes in member states. Because member
states retain control over military personnel decisions, the following examination of the
Netherlands juxtaposed with the United States, clearly not a member state, provides more insight
into bans within the military than does an examination of the EU. Furthermore, the lack of
involvement ILGA-Europe in particular but LGB movement resources to pressure the EU into
taking a stronger stance on military personnel policy indicates that a reformed expectation
regarding the statistical significance of the interactions between movement resources and
supranational organizations.
Policy in the Netherlands
Like other nations, the Netherlands ban on homosexuals in the military began with a
medical basis. Unlike other nations, once the Dutch medical community no longer classified
homosexuality as a mental disorder, the military no longer barred homosexuals from serving in
the military. The Dutch military has allowed LGBs to serve openly since 1974 and the Dutch
government take pride in having been the first nation to remove its ban on gays in the military
(Adolfsen & Keusenkamp 2006, Breznik 2007, Simply Gay 2007).
Because of the over thirty-five year history of open service for LGB persons, the post1975 history of Dutch military policy regarding LGBs is one of integration rather than access.
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While the ban was lifted in 1974, the taboos in the military culture remained (Adolfsen &
Keusenkamp 2006). The machismo cultural norms of defense forces make coming out difficult
and the rotational nature of the personnel makes the norms more difficult to change as well as
more problematic. Military personnel are rotated every two to three years, which requires LGB
personnel to nearly constantly assess whom to be out to and when to come out (Keuzenkamp and
Bos 2007).
Thus a paradox was created that while “the Netherlands is considered one of the [nations]
most tolerant towards homosexuality … even here it seems that sexual orientation in the military
is a silent right” (Heinecken 1999, 1). To improve this situation, the COC developed a working
group on homosexuality and armed forces in 1980. This proved unfruitful though because the
group was never able to open a dialogue with the Ministry of Defense (SHK 2010). In 1987 a
group of homosexual career officers and noncommissioned officers decided to create the
Homosexuality and Armed Forces Foundation (SHK) out of the working group. The SHK
organized itself akin to a trade union and sought to represent gay and lesbian personnel (Breznik
2007). Soon after, the State Secretary for Defense called for formal research on the position of
LGBs within in the military (Adolfsen and Keusenkamp 2006, Breznik 2007). The subsequent
research was the basis for the development of training sessions on the Ministry of Defense’s
policy of nondiscrimination for all three branches (Adolfsen and Keusenkamp 2006). The SHK
and the Dutch Ministry of Defense have sought to improve the situation for LGB persons in the
military and remove the paradox of closeted service.
Because the Dutch military sees integration of LGB soldiers as part of its duty to provide
the conditions for the optimal function of each individual, the Ministry of Defense subsidizes the
SHK and promotes further study of personnel experiences and opinions. Despite these efforts,
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even now approximately 25% of gay service men are still closeted at work.33A recent study,
Uniform Out of the Closet (2006), provides important insights into how successful the inclusion
of LGBs in the military actually is. In this report the Dutch Social Planning Bureau found that
while LGBS see the MoD as gay-friendly, they also report discriminatory experiences such as
nasty comments, insults, or inappropriate jokes (Adolfsen & Keusenkamp 2006). Then State
Secretary Cees van der Knaap responded to the findings by noting challenges still existed for
professional soldiers who also happen to be gay (ACOM 2009).
The story of LGB persons gaining access to the military in the Netherlands is notably
brief due to the immediate policy change after homosexuality was removed from the medical
community’s list of mental disorders. The focus for Dutch LGB persons interested in the military
has instead been on issues of inclusion and privileges. LGB movement resources through the
COC and SHK have worked on creating a more open environment in the military and the
development of policies focused on integration rather an access. The Dutch Ministry of Defense
has created a concerted effort since the establishment of the SHK in 1987 to integrate LGB
persons into military service and maximize their opportunities to be effective soldiers.
Current policy in US
The earliest signs that the United States military was cognizant of and concerned about
homosexuality within its ranks came long before current debates or even the modern LGB
movement. In 1919 the Newport, Rhode Island naval base underwent an investigation by the
Admiral of the Second Naval District for “immoral behaviors” after Chief Machinist’s Mate
Ervin Arnold presented his personal investigation into the gay subculture taking place at the
Army and Navy YMCA in Newport. The Admiral’s investigation resulted in the dishonorable
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Of the LGB personnel surveyed for Uniform out of the Closet (2006) all those who reported being in the closet at
work were gay men.
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discharge of sailors, an additional Senate investigation, and the development of a policy toward
homosexuality within the military (Murphy 1988, Haggerty 2003). The subsequently developed
policy was that all “sodomists” were to be court-martialed under the Articles of War (Haggerty
2003). At this time the policy was notably focused on the sexual act rather than on orientation
and generally referred to male to male anal intercourse rather than all forms of sodomy.
Following World War II, the military developed a uniform policy on the matter of gays in
the military that changed the focus from “sodomists” to homosexuals. This change was
predicated on the new understanding within the psychological literature of homosexuality as a
mental disorder (D’Amico 2000). This was also a convenient way to demobilize and reduce
military costs by removing soldiers that were no longer necessary from the ranks. Persons
discharged for homosexuality received “blue discharges” that precluded them from receiving
military benefits (Berube 1989).
McCarthyism made discharging homosexuals from the government patriotic and ushered
in an understanding of homosexuality as dangerous (Hirsh 2000). Homosexuals were framed as
posing the same threat to society as communists. Because homosexuals could not reproduce,
they supplemented the ability to reproduce with extensive recruitment using codes, passwords,
secret meeting places and more, according to McCarthyists (Haggerty2003). This proved useful
when American Psychiatric Association removed homosexuality from the list of mental
disorders. Though the military could no longer rely on medicine, they could still claim danger.
Even if homosexuals were not communists themselves, their susceptibility to blackmail based on
their lifestyle became the new basis of exclusion of LGBs from the military (D’Amico 2000).
In 1982 the Department of Defense revised the policy towards homosexuals in the service
in order to clarify and make it uniform across all branches of the military (Herek 1996). The new
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Department of Defense directive (DoD directive 1332.14) stated explicitly that homosexuality is
incompatible with military service. The Directive also marked a new shift in rationale as it went
on to outline all the ways in which homosexuality would be detrimental to morale, discipline,
and maintenance of order.
In 1986 the military ordered an investigative report on personnel issues by the Personnel
Security Research and Education Center (PERSEREC). The agenda for this report was to
examine policy toward security clearances, in particular the correlation between homosexuality
and security violations (GAO 1992, Haggerty 2003). The report exceeded its directive and went
on to assess the military’s ban on homosexuality at all levels. The report concluded that sexual
orientation was “unrelated to job performance in the same way as being left- or right-handed”
(GAO 1992, 33). Despite having commissioned the report, the Department of Defense rejected
the report as a position paper (Haggerty 2003). The assistant defense secretary for manpower
issued a statement declaring that the report would have no effect on the policy because the ban
was a matter of “military judgments about overall combat effectiveness [which] are inherently
subjective nature” (Lancaster 1992, A2). In 1992 Representative Patricia Schroeder (D-CO) and
Senator Howard Metzenbaum (D-OH) used the report to introduce legislation that would
overturn the ban in the military (Herek 1996). The legislation did not pass, but it did place the
issue on the agenda for then presidential candidate Clinton.
Clinton campaigned on lifting the military ban, which could be done with an executive
order at the time and indeed nine days after the election Clinton froze all discharge procedures
based solely on homosexuality while the policy could be evaluated (Herek 1993). Following
Clinton’s action, Senator Sam Nunn (GA-D) proposed a bill in Congress to make the ban on
homosexuals in the military a law and thus supersede Clinton’s potential executive order (Herek
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1996). Ultimately, the policy that was written into law was a compromise that purported to allow
LGBs to serve provided they were not open about their sexuality.
The new “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” (DADT) policy varied from previous bans on gays and
lesbians in the military in that sexual orientation no longer proscribed whether one was eligible
for service or not. Homosexuals and bisexuals could technically serve in the military under this
policy, provided they did not identify themselves as homosexual, did not disclose intent or desire
to engage in a same-sex sexual act and remained celibate. Questions about sexuality were
removed from the induction procedure and commanding officers were order not to ask personnel
about their sexuality (Service Members Legal Defense Network 2005). DADT if anything made
discharge policy more confusing those accused of homosexual behavior, thus in 1993, the same
year DADT was enacted, the Service members Legal Defense Network (SLDN) began
representing LGB service members. Since the SLDN has engaged the President to create policy
prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation in the military (Servicemembers Legal
Defense Network 2012).
Despite DADT’s supposed intent to decrease discharges, significant numbers of service
men and women continued to be discharged for homosexuality. Over 14,500 troops have been
discharged under DADT, including 757 soldiers with mission critical skills34 just between 1994
and 2003 with 58 Arabic languages specialist discharged in 2003 alone despite military shortages
in Arabic translators (SLDN 2011, Frank 2010, GAO 2005). The enforcement of DADT has
also placed a heavy financial burden on the US military with cost estimates ranging from $190.5
million to $363.8 million in just the first ten years of the policy (Barrett et al 2006, GAO 2005).
Subsequent analysis by Williams Institute estimates the total cost through 2010 to be $555
34

Mission critical skills are defined by those particularly necessary for current military engagements including the
conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq. These skills include interrogations specialization, translators, explosives disposal
expertise, signal intelligence analysis, and missile and crypological technical skills.
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million accounting for recruiting and training replacement troop costs, but excluding
administrative costs associated with enforcement (Gates 2010).
In response to DADT and the continued discrimination of LGB servicepersons, the
Center for the Study of Sexual Minorities in the Military (CSSMM) was founded in 1998 and
later renamed the Palm Center and subsequently incorporated as part of the Williams Institute at
the University Of California Los Angeles School Of Law. The intent of the CSSMM was to
provide research materials on sexual minorities in the US military and developments abroad as
well as raise public awareness of the problematic nature of the DADT policy (Palm Center
2009).
Military officers’ opinions have shifted significantly regarding DADT in recent years.
Following President Obama’s 2010 State of the Union Address remarks that Congress must end
DADT, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the highest uniformed official in the United
States, Michael Mullen addressed the Senate Armed Service committee expressing his view that
DADT be repealed. Following this meeting he tweeted “Allowing homosexuals to serve openly
is the right thing to do to. [It] Comes down to integrity” (Montopoli 2010, 4). This set an
important precedent within the military due to the importance of chain of command. If the
highest officer in the land publicly supports allowing homosexuals to serve openly, lower level
officers can make similar statements in support of repealing DADT.
By the end of 2010 the House and Senate both passed a bill repealing DADT and Obama
signed this into law on December 22nd, 2010. The bill was certified by President Obama and
Secretary of Defense Panetta and Adm. Mullen on July 22nd, 2011 which gave the armed forces
60 days to prepare for and transition to the new policy. The repeal took effect on September 20th,
2011 following the period of transition. In the interim time the Servicemembers Legal Defense
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Fund offered guidelines for LGB troops for rules and regulations during the transition as well as
the guidelines for behavior after September 20th, 2011 (SLDN 2011). The final version of the bill
did not include the original provision prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation in
the military, thus the SLDN continues to pressure the President to issue an executive order
ending such discrimination and representing the legal interests of LGB, but recently
transgendered, persons (Servicemembers Legal Defense Network 2012).
In comparison to the policy developments in the Netherlands, the US policy on LGB
persons serving the military has been a considerably more complicated and certainly more
lengthy process. The US military designated homosexual behaviors as immoral behaviors
warranting a dishonorable discharge dating back to 1919. From this point forward the need to
exclude LGB persons from military services persisted, though the rationale changed over time.
After a decade of research into the costs of DADT and the validity of the arguments the policy
was based on, the US government has now ended all legal barriers to military service. Whether
or not the US military will take a similar path to the Dutch military in promoting inclusion and
addressing individual soldier prejudice is yet to be seen.
The military for any state serves as more than simply an organization for defense; the
military is also the bearer of the state’s symbols including a symbolic understanding of
citizenship and inclusion in society. Furthermore, the military in some states is compulsory and
thus an absence of military service is an indicator that one is not fully a part of the nation. While
the European Union utilizes personnel from the militaries of member states to carry out the
Petersburg tasks, it does not place parameters on member states regarding military personnel
policy leaving competency for whether or not exclude LGB persons to the states. While the
Dutch military policy on homosexuality began much like other states, with bans based first on
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criminality and then medicalized, the Netherlands was also the first state to remove bans on LGB
persons serving in the military. The United States, by contrast, had long been considered a
laggard in opening up military services to LGB persons who wished to open regarding their
sexuality, until 2011 when the ban was finally lifted. What factors encourage some states to
remove policies prohibiting LGB persons from serving in the military earlier than others? The
case studies above illustrate how the policies have changed in the Netherlands and the United
States as well as the role of the EU and ECHR in military personnel policy and provide context
for the subsequent statistical analysis of thirty-five states.
Military Policy Modeled
When do states remove limitations or bans on LGB persons in the military? Policy with
regard to LGB rights is a function of the resources within the LGB movement and the filtering
process of formal and informal institutions. Military policy is thus modeled utilizing the same
combination of resource mobilization theory, political opportunity structure, and public policy
theories explained in Chapter Two and deployed in Chapter Three to explain discrimination
prohibitions. When the formal structures of government facilitate organizational involvement
and access and the informal institutions are favorable, LGB resources will be effectively
deployed to reduce the time until military bans are lifted. The rationale for the hypotheses tested
and explained below can be found in Chapter Two. These are the same hypotheses examined in
Chapter Three, thus the results from the models contribute to the hypothesis testing begun in the
previous chapter.
The formal structures of government filter movement resources making policy adoption
more or less likely depending on the institution. It was theorized that the electoral system,
structure of the executive, federalism and membership in international organizations will shape
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the duration until military personnel policies that allow LGB persons to serve will be adopted.
Proportional representation and mixed electoral systems states are hypothesized to be more likely
to pass LGB rights legislation than states with majoritarian electoral systems. Thus increases in
organizations and/or publications in states with proportional representation or mixed electoral
systems should create policy sooner than states with the same number of organizations but a
majoritarian electoral system. States that have a mixed executive system are more likely pass
LGB rights policies than states with a presidential system, so increases in movement resources in
states with a mixed executive are more likely achieve policy adoption. It was hypothesized that
federalism encourages policy development below the national level, thus federalism reduces the
probability of policy adoption. Furthermore, movement resources in federalist states are more
likely to be diverted to policy change at lower levels and thus organizations and publications in a
federalist state will have less impact on policy change than in a unitary state. The European
Union and European Convention on Human Rights encourage the adoption of policies protecting
minority rights, thus states who are members of these institutions were anticipated to be more
likely to pass LGB rights policies in the previous and subsequent chapters. The case study of the
Netherlands and history of the metacase, the European Union, provide evidence for a
reconsideration of this theory. Because of the lack of involvement of LGB organization in
altering EU and Dutch military policy, it is conceivable that the interaction terms between LGB
resources and supranational institutions will prove to be insignificant. Nevertheless, member
states are anticipated to a greater chance of policy success than non-member states.
Informal institutions can also accelerate or decelerate the duration until social movements
achieve policy success. As was the case in the previous chapter, the impact of diversity was
examined, economic distress, urbanization, and the presence of amenable public officials on how
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social movement resources translate into increases in the probability of policy adoption.
Diversity is measured as ethnic fractionalization and should increase the probability of policies
protecting minority rights, thus a military policy allowing LGB persons to serve is more likely to
be adopted in ethnically diverse states with LGB movement resources than in more homogenous
states. Economic distress tends to discourage the adoption of minority rights policies, thus LGB
movements working in states in which GDP is declining or unemployment is high are less likely
to achieve policy success. Urbanization is closely related to diversity as urbanization increases
the exposure of citizens to a wider variety of individuals and lifestyles, ultimately increasing
tolerance of differences as well as providing greater freedom for urban citizens to be openly
LGB. As a result, the LGB movement should achieve policy gains more quickly in states with
higher levels of urbanization. While formal institutions consider the structure of government, the
government is made up of officials whose viewpoints inform their policy decisions. When the
executive of a government is controlled by a rightist party, the LGB movement will be less able
to change policies to be more favorable compared to when a centrist or a leftist party controls the
executive. Additionally, because women tend to be more tolerant toward LGB issues and more
likely to promote minority rights, the LGB movement is more likely to achieve policy success in
states with more women in the national legislature.
Preventing discrimination and accessing full citizenship is clearly a goal of the LGB
movement. While general prohibitions on discrimination have often received greater attention
from LGB activists, the ability to serve in a state’s military is important economically for LGB
servicemembers and important symbolically for all LGB persons. The greater the number of
national LGB organizations and publications that exist, the more likely it is that some of these
organizational resources will be devoted to gaining access to military employment. The
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likelihood that LGB persons will be permitted to serve openly in the military is expected to be
related to the presence or absence of general prohibitions on discrimination based on sexual
orientation. The duration until a policy that removes bans or limitations on military service is
likely to be shorter in a state that was an early adopter of discrimination protections. Thus in
addition to independent variables explained in Chapter Two and modeled in Chapter Three, the
duration until military personnel policy change occurs is modeled with a control variable for the
existence of an anti-discrimination provision in the state.
As mentioned previously, most states’ limitations on LGB persons serving in the military
were originally based on the criminality of homosexuality or homosexual sex acts and the
military ineligibility of criminals. As criminality and later health based restrictions became
inapplicable, policies barring LGB persons from military service had to be created on other
grounds. Because this research is interested in when the LGB movement achieves policy success,
the dissertation examines when these bans or restrictions are lifted rather than when the policy
barring service was originally adopted. Using publications and press releases from the Palm
Center, the ILGA World Legal Survey, and news reports from wire services, major newspapers,
and English translations of major newspapers, I identify the year in which states adopted new
military personnel policies pertaining to the sexuality of soldiers. While some states move
directly from bans on LGB persons to allowing LGB persons to serve openly, other states first
take an intermediate step in which LGB persons may serve with limitations. As discussed
previously, LGB servicepersons may be constrained in the level of security clearance they may
receive or in how open they can be about their sexuality, but such policies still constitute a policy
gain compared to total ban on homosexuality in the military. States are thus categorized as
having a total ban, a policy that constrains LGB persons’ ability to serve, or providing complete
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freedom. Because the analysis uses a duration model to examine LGB policy success, the
dependent variable identifies when the policy was adopted as well as which type of the latter two
categories is adopted.
Event History Modeling
Duration analysis, also known as event history modeling, is used to test the applicability
of the theory explained in Chapter Two to military personnel policy. The theory conceptualizes
formal and informal institutions as mitigating factors in the relationship between social
movement resources and the policy changes the social movement seeks. More open institutions
will allow social movements to hasten policy adoption while closed institutions either
structurally or in terms of biased norms will delay policy adoption that is favorable to the
movement’s primary population.
Because duration analysis begins with an assumption of time dependency, the analysis
begins by examining the dependency structure of policy adoption with regard to military
personnel. The Kaplan-Meier non-parametric estimates of the hazard and survival functions
show that military policy is indeed time dependent. The Kaplan-Meier survival estimate clearly
shows that, over time, the probability of survival declines and does so at a fairly consistent rate
from just under ten years of analysis time through nearly 20 years of analysis time after which
point it flattens. This indicates that the probability of a state adopting a policy allowing LGB
persons into the military was increasing rather steadily for the first 20 years of analysis time at
which point there was much less change in the probability of policy adoption from one year to
the next.35
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In the dataset 10 years of analysis time is generally the 1980s and 20 years of analysis time would correspond to
1991 for cases that enter the dataset at the 1971 start point.
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When a parametric model is used for duration analysis it is important to consider
carefully the functional form indicated by the theory. The baseline hazard from the nonparameterized estimates should not be assumed to be the function form when independent
variables are incorporated into the model. When the independent variables are incorporated into
the model, the functional form of the hazard should be monotonic and more specifically
monotonically increasing.
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As discussed previously in Chapter Three, there are three hazard parameterizations that
fit the theory that the hazard rate is monotonic, the Weibull, the Gompertz, and the gamma. As
was the case in the previous chapter, the gamma parameterization can immediately be excluded
from consideration on the basis that the gamma distribution cannot incorporate shared frailty into
the model. Shared frailty is important to the model because military policy is also modeled as
multiple failure data. Many states moved initially from a complete ban on homosexuals in the
military to allowing homosexuals to serve but with restrictions, for example DADT in the United
States or restrictions on security clearance in Israel and Belgium, or allowed homosexuals to
serve but exempted them from mandatory service; for example in Italy one could avoid service
for reasons of homosexuality and in Finland a shorter conscription time was available to soldiers
who were homosexual. Subsequently many states removed all barriers to enlistment and
differential treatment of homosexual soldiers; furthermore some states never instituted a policy
that allowed LGB persons to serve with restrictions but moved directly from a ban to open
service, for example Australia. Because it is expected that those states that make an initial move
toward opening access to military service are subsequently more likely to remove limitations
entirely, it is necessary to incorporate a shared frailty assumption into the model. The shared
frailty assumption indicates prior policy adoption will impact the probability of future policy
adoption.
Between the remaining theoretically sound parameterizations, one must adjudicate
between the use of the Weibull parameterization or the Gompertz parameterization. The shape
parameter for both of these functions is interpreted nearly identically in which a value less than
one for the Weibull or zero for the Gompertz shape parameters indicates a monotonically
decreasing hazard while a value greater than one for the Weibull and zero for the Gompertz
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shape parameters indicates a monotonically increasing hazard. The Gompertz however specifies
that the shape parameter be increasing or decreasing exponentially whereas the Weibull does not
specify that the change be exponential. Furthermore the Weibull can be estimated as either a
proportional hazards model or as an accelerated failure time model while the Gompertz is
exclusively a proportional hazards model. Because both parameterizations are applicable based
on the theory, the Akaike Information Criterion and Bayesian Information Criterion measures of
model fit were used to adjudicate between the two.
These model fit results consistently indicated the Weibull, thus the models below all
utilize a Weibull parameterization. This is unsurprising when the unparameterized shape of the
hazard is examined and consider the greater flexibility the Weibull offers because it does not
specify exponential change. The comparison of the fit of the Weibull and Gompertz to the Cox
model to assess whether it would be preferable to leave the hazard unparameterized found that
the Weibull was preferable.36 The theory indicates a monotonically increasing hazard and
parameterizing the hazard provides more efficient estimates without the loss of information that
occurs when using the Cox. The flexibility of the Cox does not substantially change the results of
the model nor does it improve model fit, thus the more efficient Weibull parameterization is used
in all ten models below.
The analysis begins by examining models for how LGB movement resources, formal
institutions, and the interactions between two impact the probability of policy adoption. Because
the inclusion of many interactive terms in a single model leads to high levels of multicollinearity,
a series of models that examine the same independent variables but vary with regard to the

36

Recall from Chapter Two and Chapter Three that the Cox is more flexible than parameterized models because no
assumptions are made regarding the baseline hazard, but it is also less efficient and ignores changes in explanatory
variables that occur in years without events. The comparison is made to ensure that the assumptions regarding the
shape of the hazard provide a better model fit for the data than if the hazard were left unparameterized.
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interaction terms included is used in the analysis. The same process is repeated to examine the
impact of the informal institutions and interactions between informal institutions and LGB
movement resources. Additionally, a control for prior adoption of discrimination prohibitions is
included in all of the models because policy adoption is not only iterative and endogenous
regarding particular policies, but also within policy families, thus a general prohibition on
discrimination should make the removal of barriers to military service more likely. It was
expected that a discrimination prohibition that specifically includes sexuality as a protected
category to have a greater impact than a more general prohibition on discrimination that could be
interpreted as providing protections for LGB persons but does not include sexuality as a listed
category for protection.
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Table 4.1
Weibull Parameterization of Formal Institutions Models for Military Personnel Policy
Model 1 PR
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Model 5 ECHR
interaction
executive
federalism
EU
interaction
interaction
interaction
interaction
Organizations
1.111
1.038
1.066
1.048
1.052
(0.0700)
(0.0329)
(0.0445)
(0.0400)
(0.0401)
Print
0.979
0.983
0.977
0.999
0.992
(0.0470)
(0.0381)
(0.0392)
(0.0371)
(0.0401)
Proportional
2.962
1.408
1.247
1.544
1.393
Representation
(0.863)
(0.586)
(0.706)
(0.682)
(0.665)
Mixed Electoral 0.426
0.513
0.413
0.619
0.458
System
(0.898)
(0.818)
(1.001)
(0.966)
(0.916)
Mixed Executive
1.252
0.560
0.818
1.059
0.946
(1.376)
(1.375)
(1.182)
(1.309)
(1.394)
Federalist

1.927
(0.541)
European Union
1.571
(0.504)
ECHR
0.781
(0.709)
General
Anti- 3.541**
Discrimination
(0.603)
LGB
Anti- 3.573**
Discrimination
(0.497)
PR * Orgs
0.951
(0.0829)
pr_pubs
0.934
(0.0877)
mexec_pubs

2.179*
(0.443)
1.467
(0.429)
0.669
(0.571)
2.634**
(0.474)
2.948**
(0.465)

2.649
(0.718)
1.439
(0.486)
0.732
(0.684)
2.770*
(0.568)
3.404**
(0.519)

2.095
(0.510)
1.460
(0.485)
0.753
(0.671)
2.696*
(0.556)
3.514**
(0.504)

1.031
(0.0476)

fed_org

0.938
(0.0938)
1.036
(0.0851)

fed_pubs
eu_org

1.071
(0.0954)
0.894
(0.134)

eu_pubs
echr_pubs
p
1.83
chi-squared theta
1.46
N
636
chi-squared
16.91
* p 0.1 ** p 0.05 *** p 0.001

2.147
(0.512)
1.469
(0.493)
0.802
(0.701)
2.863*
(0.558)
3.533**
(0.505)

1.539
-636
14.32

1.706
0.51
636
14.61
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1.693
0.8
636
14.96

0.989
(0.0526)
1.716
0.81
636
14.15

Table 4.2
Weibull Parameterization of Informal Institutions Models for Military Personnel Policy
GDP interaction
Ethnic
Unemployment
Urban
Women in legis.
1.019
1.002
0.990
1.224*
1.004
(0.0394)
(0.0606)
(0.0707)
(0.128)
(0.0657)
0.963
0.971
0.973
0.801*
1.013
(0.0365)
(0.0299)
(0.0308)
(0.104)
(0.0549)
0.939
0.746
0.999
0.622
0.915
(1.011)
(1.348)
(1.052)
(0.679)
(0.991)
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
(0.000150)
(0.000105)
(0.000104)
(0.000109)
(0.000106)
0.996
1.002
0.982
0.998
1.009
(0.0468)
(0.0462)
(0.0737)
(0.0460)
(0.0499)
2.822**
2.885**
2.758**
4.222**
2.779**
(1.373)
(1.478)
(1.345)
(2.820)
(1.406)
1.041*
1.040*
1.040*
1.042*
1.052*
(0.0244)
(0.0237)
(0.0237)
(0.0243)
(0.0312)
0.524
0.521
0.487
0.576
0.564
(0.332)
(0.330)
(0.321)
(0.354)
(0.357)
1.353
1.331
1.291
1.418
1.391
(0.723)
(0.712)
(0.697)
(0.767)
(0.741)

Executive
1.003
(0.0450)
0.986
(0.0314)
0.915
(0.997)
1.000
(0.000104)
1.000
(0.0472)
2.821**
(1.386)
1.045*
(0.0241)
0.706
(0.552)
1.310
(0.704)

eastbloc

0.449
(0.277)

0.442
(0.273)

0.462
(0.290)

0.391
(0.250)

0.450
(0.278)

0.483
(0.302)

antidisc1

2.568*
(1.322)

2.531*
(1.289)

2.428*
(1.251)

2.726*
(1.558)

2.545*
(1.286)

2.615*
(1.352)

antidisc2

5.592***
(3.018)

5.641***
(3.088)

5.581***
(2.953)

5.766***
(3.044)

5.130***
(2.728)

5.225***
(2.795)

gdp_org

1.000
(2.36e-05)

gdp_pubs
ethnic_org

1.000(2.50e-05)

organizations
print
fe_etfra
changegdp
unemployed
urbdummy
m_wominpar
rightexec
centristexec

1.030
(0.170)

unemp_org
urbdum_org

1.003(0.00781)
0.807*
(0.0898)

urbdum_pub

1.233
(0.166)

women_orgs
women_pubs
right_org

1.002(0.00575)
0.995(0.00555)
1.047
(0.0728)

right_pubs
p
Chi-squared θ
Observations
Chi-squared

0.899
(0.0828)
1.998
2.7e-6
501
27.89**

2.002
2.6e-7
501
27.48***

2.042
1.7e-6
501
27.57***

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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2.079
9.8e-9
501
31.61***

2.027
2.7e-7
501
28.79***

1.991
-501
30.06***

Results
Social movements forged around minority identities that lack civil rights will make
policy demands on the state to achieve parity with their majority counterparts under the law. The
LGB movement is no exception and the demands for parity include an equal opportunity to serve
in the armed forces of their state. When do states respond to this demand via policy change that
allows LGB persons to serve in the military? Such policy change should occur when LGB
movement resources can work through amenable formal and informal institutions made up the
original hypotheses. In light of the history in the case and metacase studies, this hypothesis can
be reformed. Although the direct effect anticipated remain, the interaction between movement
resources and supranational institutions in particular seems unlikely to be statistically significant.
The structure of government may make policy change more or less difficult to achieve, thus
where the structures of government facilitate incorporation of interest group demands, it was
expected that the duration until policy change to be shorter. Relatedly, the informal institutions
will influence the responses of government to pressure from the LGB movement making some
states more likely to adopt policy allowing LGB persons to serve in the military and other states
less likely to adopt such policy.
Chapter Two discusses the interactive model for policy adoption in which LGB
movement resources are filtered by the formal and informal institutions in the state, thus the
impact of movement resources is indirect and interactive with institutions rather than direct and
independent from institutions. This is captured via a series of models incorporating different
interaction terms while maintaining a stable set of independent variables. These models are
clustered into the models examining formal institutions and those examining informal
institutions as these are proposed as separate filtering mechanisms (see Figure A in Chapter
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Two). A series of models is used due to the multicollinearity that arises when multiple
interaction terms with a common constituent variable are included in the model.
Interactions Between Formal Institutions and Movement Resources
The probability that a state will adopt a military personnel policy that opens up the
possibility of service to LGB persons depends in part on the structure of the government. It was
theorized that LGB movement resources interact with these formal structures of government,
which may serve to impede or expedite policy adoption. Furthermore, it was anticipated that the
prior existence of a discrimination prohibition will improve the probability of policy adoption
that allows LGB persons to serve in the armed forces. The findings in Table 4.3 below support
the possibility prior policy is important to the development of subsequent policy, but fails to
attribute significant explanatory power to the institutions.
The five models examining the impact of formal institutions and their interaction with
LGB resources consistently support the assumption of a monotonically increasing hazard. As
indicated by p, the shape parameter for the Weibull distribution, the hazard is increasing over
time. The frailty parameter, theta, is insignificant across the models which indicates that prior
adoption of a policy allowing LGB persons partial access to military service fails to significantly
impact the probability the state will later adopt a policy allowing LGB persons to serve openly
without restrictions. This is likely a function of the specification of the model and the extent to
which prior discrimination policy predicts the adoption of a policy which limits the ability of the
military to discriminate against LGB persons.
In all five models, the number of national LGB organizations is positively related to the
probability of policy adoption. This must be interpreted with caution however, because three of
the models include an interaction term for which organizations is a constituent term. It is also
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important to note that the findings for organizations are not statistically significant. To examine
the impact of organizations it is useful to look at model five as this model does not contain an
interaction term that includes organizations. Table 4.3 below shows how the probability of policy
change increases as the number of organizations in a state increases from zero.37 Thus, the
prediction for the year of policy adoption for a state without any LGB organizations in 1971,
such as Austria, is 2009 while the predicted year of policy adoption for a state with just one
national LGB organization in 1971, as was the case in Australia, is 2004.
Table 4.3
Number of
Organizations

Change in
Probability of
Policy38
5.17%
42.36%
102.67%
484.76%

1
7 (mean)
14 (+1 s.d.)
35 (max)

We hypothesized that the electoral system plays an important role in when LGB rights
policies will be passed, specifically that proportional representation and mixed electoral systems
would increase the probability of policy change compared to majoritarian systems. The findings
support the hypothesis that proportional representation systems will be more likely to adopt a
permissive military personnel policy across all of the models, but this finding is statistically
insignificant. Surprisingly, mixed electoral systems decrease the probability of military personnel
policy adoption relative to majoritarian systems, though this finding is also statistically
insignificant across all of the models. This indicates that while the model results show a negative
relationship, a positive relationship could exist and would be borne out given more data. This
could only be ascertained with statistically significant results. When the interaction effects
37

An interpretation of the direct effects for LGB publications is not included because this would be inappropriate
given it is a constituent variable for an interaction term in every model.
38
Change in probability compared to a state with zero LGB national organizations.
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between LGB movement resources and a proportional representation system are examined,
neither the interaction with organizations nor the interaction with publications is statistically
significant. Additionally, both of these interaction terms have the opposite impact as was
hypothesized; the probability of policy adoption decreases when organizations or publications
increase in the context of a proportional representation electoral system. Military policy tends to
be insulated from the legislative politics with the government often deferring much of the policy
making to the military hierarchy. This may explain the lack of statistical significance for the
findings with regard to the electoral system. It is also probable that interest groups that do not
represent exclusively veterans have less influence in areas of military policy, hence the lack of
statistical significance and negative impact of the interaction terms on the probability of policy
adoption.
The structure of the executive was also anticipated to impact the duration until policy
change with mixed executive systems more favorable toward LGB policy than presidential
systems. The results are inconclusive regarding the relationship between the structure of the
executive and policy change. In models one and fthe a mixed executive increases the probability
of policy adoption while in models three and five the probability of policy adoption is lower for
states with a mixed executive rather than a president. Model two shows that an increase in the
number of LGB publications in a state with a mixed executive decreases the probability of policy
adoption, but this is also statistically insignificant. These findings are not statistically significant
in any of the model, thus it is not possible to draw any conclusions regarding the impact of the
executive on military personnel policy here.
Of the formal institutions included in the models, the only institution with statistical
significance is federalism. It was hypothesized that federalism would be negatively related to the
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adoption of LGB rights policies because it should encourage fractionalization within the
movement as organizations seek territory level change rather than national change. With regard
to military policy, the findings indicate the opposite effect. Across all of the models, federalism
is positively related to policy change. These surprising findings may be attributable to the nature
of military policy, which is always at the national level. While organizations may target lower
level governments in federalist states when pursuing anti-discrimination policies or partnership
recognition, this is not a feasible strategy with regard to military policy. While it had been
anticipated that federalism would reduce the number of national organizations and encourage a
proliferation of sub-national organizations, coalition building for specific policies across these
subnational organizations was not incorporated into the model. Organizations that exist at the
subnational level may form coalitions to pursue military policy change because military policy is
exclusively at the national level.
The probability of policy adoption, shown below as the hazard function, for federalist
states is not only larger, but also increases more rapidly over time than the probability of policy
adoption for unitary states. The average predicted year for policy adoption of the states who
entered the dataset in 1971 would be 1996 if it were assumed they were all unitary. Alternatively,
if it were assumed that the same cohort of states to be federalist, the average predicted year for
policy adoption would be ten years earlier in 1986. Figures M and N show the disparity between
the predicted year of adoption and the actual year of policy adoption. The estimates for federalist
states are far more similar to the actual pattern of policy adoption. The adoption rate for unitary
states is nearly constant across years while the predicted year for adoption expects more
fluctuation. The results for federalism support the alternative hypothesis that when policies only

125

exist at the national level, sub-national organizations will coalesce around a narrowly defined
policy issue.
Figure M
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Figure N
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2005

The European Union and European Convention on Human Rights were both
hypothesized to have a positive impact on policy adoption. Members of the European Union are
more likely to adopt a policy that allows LGB persons to serve in the military according to the
findings, but it is not possible to be confident in these findings given the lack of statistical
significance across all five models. When LGB movement resources interact with European
Union membership the findings indicate that increases in the number of organizations positively
impacts the probability of policy adoption while publications negatively impact the probability of
policy adoption. In contrast, the findings for the European Convention on Human Rights are
contrary to the hypothesis as they indicate the states who have signed the convention are less
likely to adopt policies allowing LGB persons to serve in the military. This also holds for the
interaction term which shows that as the number of LGB national publications increases in an
ECHR signer state, the likelihood of policy adopt declines. Because the findings for the ECHR
are consistently statistically insignificant, there can be little confidence that this relationship is
accurately captured and thus could in fact be positive. These findings do, however, correspond to
the reformed hypothesis based on the case and metacase studies.
In the formal institutions models the most important independent variables are the two
measures of prior anti-discrimination policy, which are statistically significant for both variables
across all five models. General prohibitions on discrimination are policies that ban
discrimination but do not explicitly incorporate sexuality as a protected category. Although such
policy is not LGB specific, it is positively related to the adoption of military personnel policies
that provide LGB persons some ability to serve. The existence of a general anti-discrimination
law increases the probability of the adoption of a military policy by 163.4% to 254.1% across the
five models. For further examination the results from model two in which a discrimination policy

127

increases the probability of a military policy being adopted by 163.4% will be used. On average
the predicted year for adoption of a military policy is 21.811 years after a state enters the dataset.
If all of the states lacked a general prohibition on discrimination and an LGB specific antidiscrimination policy, the predicted duration until the adoption of a military policy is 2.818 years
longer, 24.629. Alternatively, if all states had a general prohibition on discrimination and lacked
an LGB specific discrimination policy, the mean number of years until military policy adoption
would be 15.486, 6.325 years earlier than the actual data predicts. The probability of military
policy adoption when a state has adopted a general discrimination prohibition and had not
adopted a LGB specific anti-discrimination law is much greater and increases more rapidly than
in states where neither a general nor an LGB specific anti-discrimination policy has been
adopted.
Figure O
Hazard by General Discrimination Prohibition
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Anti-discrimination prohibitions that explicitly include sexuality as a protected category
are consistently positively related to the adoption of military personnel policy allowing LGB
persons to serve. This finding is statistically significant across all five formal institutions models
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and demonstrates the importance of previous legislation in the development of future related
policy. The impact of an LGB specific discrimination prohibition ranges from a 194.8% to a
253.7% increase in the probability of adopting a military personnel policy that provides LGB
persons with some ability to serve. Figure P uses the results from model two, which is closest to
the mean impact of an LGB discrimination prohibition, and shows that the hazard for states with
an LGB specific anti-discrimination policy is much greater and more rapidly increasing
probability of adopting a military policy than do states without any discrimination policy. Recall
that if all states were presumed to lack any discrimination prohibition, the average predicted
duration until the adoption of a military personnel policy that provided LGB persons an
opportunity serve would be 21.811 years. In contrast, if all states had adopted an LGB specific
discrimination policy the predicted duration until the adoption of a military policy would be
10.377, over an eleven year reduction.
Figure P
Hazard by LGB Discrimination Prohibition
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Formal institutions and their interaction with movement resources prove to be less
important than the existence of anti-discrimination policy in determining when a state will allow
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LGB persons to serve in the military. The armed forces may be particularly resistant to change
and thus changes in military personnel policy may most readily occur when forced, based on
civilian legislation. This would explain the statistical significance of anti-discrimination policies
and lack of significance for almost all of the formal institutions. The only formal institution with
statistical significance is federalism and the significance is only found in one model. The
findings for federalism are surprising because they are contrary to the expectation that federalism
would reduce the probability of LGB rights policy adoption. The interaction terms between
formal institutions and movement resources were not statistically significant in any of the
models, which reinforces similar findings from Chapter Three. It is possible that formal
institutions shape the form of the social movement rather than act as a filter for social movement
resources. Further speculation on alternative hypotheses as well as the impact of the findings for
formal institutions will be discussed in the conclusion.
Interactions Between Informal Institutions and Movement Resources
Democratic governments must be responsive to the voting public, thus the informal
institutions that indicate the social norms and expectations of the public act as an additional filter
on the success of social movements. As was the case with the findings for formal institutions, the
findings produce little support for the filter conceptualizations of informal institutions modeled
as interaction terms. The findings do indicate greater support for informal institutions themselves
as important predictors of military personnel policy. As was the case with the anti-discrimination
policies discussed in Chapter Three, the findings support for the importance of women in the
national legislature. Additionally, the findings support for the role of urbanization in the adoption
of military policy whereas this was not significant in the previous chapter.
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Recall that an assumption of a monotonically increasing probability of policy adoption
was applied to all of the models, though the parameterization would allow either a monotonically
increasing or decreasing probability. As a result of this flexibility, it is necessary to look at the
shape parameter for the distribution to know whether or not the assumption holds. Because the pvalue across all of the models is greater than one, the probability of policy adoption is
monotonically increasing over time. In contrast, the hypothesis that prior adoption of a military
policy would be an important predictor of future military personnel policy adoption does not find
support in the models. The frailty parameter, which measures the extent to which states’ prior
policy adoption history impacts the probability of future policy adoption, is statistically
insignificant across all six of the informal institutions models. This indicates that the models’
independent variables sufficiently specify the probability of policy adoption that an additional
parameterization does not explain any additional variation.
The measures of LGB movement resources, the number of national organizations and
publications, are only statistically significant in model four (see Table 4.2). Because both of
these measures are constituent terms for interactive variables in this model, their direct effects
cannot be interpreted. This is particularly the case because the interaction terms include
urbanization, which is never at zero in the dataset. It would be illogical to examine the impact of
either organizations or publications in the context of a state with zero urbanization given that
such a state does not exist.
Unlike the findings for Chapter Three, ethnic fractionalization proves to be statistically
insignificant across all of the models. Furthermore, the findings for the ethnic fractionalization
variable are contrary to the hypothesis which is also distinctively different than the findings with
regard to discrimination policies. In the case of military personnel policy, ethnic fractionalization
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reduces the probability of policy adoption, except when interacting with LGB organizations.
When the number of national LGB organizations interacts with the degree of ethnic
fractionalization in a state, the findings show that increases in either produce a higher probability
of policy adoption. Because this finding is also statistically insignificant, there can be little
confidence in the relationship.
Similarly, the change in GDP fails to be statistically significant in any of the six models
of informal institutions. It had been anticipated GDP growth to be positively related to the
adoption of LGB rights policies, but across the models the findings show no effect. The hazard
ratio of one indicates that the probability of a state adopting a military personnel policy that
would permit LGB persons to serve does not vary as GDP changes, regardless of whether such
changes are positive or negative. When examining the interaction terms in which changes in
GDP are expected to filter the impact of LGB movement resources, again findings produce no
effect, though this too is statistically insignificant. As an institution, the military tends to be more
insulated from economic pressures. A poor performing economy is more likely to impact antidiscriminations policies that the civil population finds more relevant than military personnel
policies, which are less likely to be framed in economic terms.
Unemployment is included amongst the informal institutions as it was expected to
capture levels of economic threat, which should decrease the probability of policy adopt in much
the same way as decreases in GDP. The findings across the models are inconsistent with
unemployment decreasing the probability in three of the models and increasing the probability of
policy adoption in three of the models. Moreover, the results for unemployment fail to meet
statistical significance in any of the models. When examining how unemployment filters the
impact of national LGB organizations, the results show an increasing probability of policy
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adoption. This finding is contrary to the hypothesis as well, but is also statistically insignificant
and thus it is not possible to be certain of the findings. As mentioned with regard to change in
GDP, the armed forces are often insulated from the economic conditions in the state. Segal et al
(1999) show that while youth unemployment should increase enlistment in the military, this was
not always the case across enlistment periods. Thus unemployment has less of an impact on calls
for changes to increase access to military employment than hypothesized.
Nearly all of the literature on LGB rights points to urbanization as improving the
possibility of community formation and thus the likelihood of policy adoption to improve the
civil rights of LGB citizens. I examined the possibility of two types of measures of urbanization
with the expectation that urbanization would increase the probability of a state adopting a more
permissive policy with regard to military personnel. The use of a continuous measure of
urbanization was considered, as was used in Chapter Three, as well as a threshold measure which
consisted of a dummy variable indicating those states whose level of urbanization was above
72.85%, the mean level of urbanization in the dataset. Unlike the previous chapter, it was found
that the model fit improved when the threshold variable was used rather than the continuous
variable based on the AIC and BIC. Additionally, the explanatory value of the model based on
Wald’s chi-squared also improved when urbanization was modeled as a threshold rather than a
continuous variable.
Using the threshold measure of urbanization, the findings show that states with a high
level of urbanization are more likely to adopt a military personnel policy that allows LGB
persons to serve in some capacity. This finding is consistent and statistically significant across all
six informal institutions models. The impact of urbanization ranges from a 175.8% to a 188.5%
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increase the probability of policy adoption.39 To calculate specific estimates model six was used,
in which the impact of urbanization is closest to the mean and is statistically significant. In this
model urbanization increases the probability of policy adoption by 182.1%, so in 1972 a state
with 72.852% or more of its population urban dwelling, such as Belgium, would be expected to
adopt a military policy 18.657 years later or in 1989. A state with less than 72.851% of its
population dwelling in an urban area in 1972, such as Norway, would be expected to adopt a
military policy 26.597 years later, or in 1997. Figures Q and R below compare the predicted
year of policy adoption to the actual year of military policy adoption in states below and above
the urbanization threshold respectively.
Figure Q
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The results from model in which the hazard ratio for urbanization is 4.222 is excluded because it is constituent
variable in both of the interaction terms in this model.
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Figure R
Urbanization Above Mean
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When the interaction between LGB movement resources and urbanization is examined
mixed support for is found for the hypothesis. When the number of national LGB organizations
is filtered by urbanization, the probability of policy adoption declines, and the interaction is
statistically significant. Figure S below shows the probability of military policy being adopted in
states that are above the urbanization threshold with zero, five, and thirteen organizations while
Figure T shows the probability of policy adopt for the same numbers of organization in states
below the urbanization threshold.40 When organizations are filtered through urbanization,
increases in the number of organizations reduce the probability of policy change. The opposite
ordering of the probability of policy adoption can be observed when the same numbers of
organizations exist in states below the urbanization threshold. By contrast, when LGB national
publications interact with urbanization there is an increase in the probability of military

40

The numbers of organizations were chosen based on the mean and standard deviation for the urbanization and
organizations interaction term. The average number of organizations rounded to the nearest whole number is seven
with a standard deviation of seven.
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personnel policy amenable to LGB servicepersons being adopted, but this finding is not
statistically significant.
Figure S

.2
0

.1

Hazard function

.3

.4

States Above Urbanization Threshold

1971

1981

1991

2001

analysis time
Zero Organizations
Thirteen Organizations

Five Organizations

Figure T

.1
.05
0

Hazard function

.15

States Below Urbanization Threshold

1971

1981

1991

2001

analysis time
Zero Organizations
Thirteen Organizations

Five Organizations

The percentage of women in parliament should improve the probability of LGB rights
policies passing. While support for this hypothesis was found in Chapter Three and the results
are similar in this chapter. Across the six models of informal institutions, increases in the
percentage of women in parliament consistently improve the probability of policy adoption and
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these findings are statistically significant. To illustrate the impact of women in parliament the
results from model four which are statistically significant and closest to the mean hazard ratio for
women in parliament across the models is used. If 3.3% parliamentary seats in a state were held
by women in 1972, as was the case in Australia, that state would be predicted to adopt a military
personnel policy opening service to LGB persons in 1988. If the percentage of parliamentary
seats held by women had been the mean, 13.553%, rather than 3.3%, the predicted year for
policy adoption for the same state would be three years sooner, in 1985.41 The predicted year of
policy adoption for states with fewer women in parliament than the mean is very similar to actual
pattern of policy adoption in these states as shown in Figure U. The pattern of policy adoption
for states in which the percentage of women in parliament is above the mean is flatter than
predicted (see Figure V).
Figure U
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As in Chapter Three, this example is intended to be illustrative as the prediction for a particular year without
taking into account the updating that would occur in the intervening years between 1972 and the predicted years for
military policy adoption. Furthermore the altered number of women in parliament is a hypothetical and did not occur
in 1972.
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Figure V
Women in Parliament Above Mean
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It was theorized that LGB resources are filtered by informal institutions, thus the
interaction terms between movement resources and the percentage of women in parliament
should be significant and increase the probability a state will adopt a military policy that allows
LGB persons to serve. The results fail to support this hypothesis as neither of the interaction
terms are statistically significant. Moreover, when LGB publications are filtered by the
percentage of female parliamentarians, the probability of policy adoption declines.
The political ideology of the executive in a government was hypothesized to impact the
probability of LGB policies being passed and the probability of making changes to military
policy, thus it was anticipated that the party of the executive would be an important predictor of
LGB-related military personnel policy. More specifically, it was hypothesized that when the
executive branch is controlled by a rightist or centrist party a state would be less likely to adopt a
policy than when a leftist party had control of the executive. Rightist executives reduce the
probability of policy adoption by 42.4% to 51.3% compared to a leftist executive across the
models for informal institutions, which corresponds to the hypothesis, but these findings are not
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statistically significant. Centrist executives increase the probability of policy by 29.1% to 41.8%
compared to a leftist executive, which is contrary to expectations. Because these findings also
fail to be statistically significant, there cannot be confidence in this relationship.
Because of the differences with regard to social norms relative to most of the other states
in the dataset, a control variable for states in the Eastern bloc was included in the analysis. These
states are generally less tolerant of homosexuality and thus are expected to adopt policies later
than other nations. This control is not statistically significant in the models, but it does validate
the perception that Eastern bloc countries are less likely to adopt LGB rights policies. States
located in the Eastern bloc are between 51.2% and 60.9% less likely to adopt a policy allowing
LGB persons to serve in the military according to the six models of informal institutions.
As with the formal institutions models, a control for the adoption of a discrimination
prohibition was included in all of the informal institutions models. The findings in the informal
institutions models for the previous adoption of a discrimination policy mimic the findings from
the formal institutions models. A general discrimination prohibition improves the probability a
military personnel policy that allows LGB persons some ability serve will be adopted. This
finding is consistent and statistically significant in all six informal institutions models. Using the
results from model five, Figure W below shows that the probability a military personnel policy
will be adopted is greater and more rapidly increasing in states that have adopted a general antidiscrimination provision compared to states that have no discrimination laws that could be
interpreted to protect LGB persons. A general discrimination prohibition increases the
probability of policy adoption by 154.5%, which equates to 9.165 years reduction in the expected
year of military policy adoption over states that have not adopted a general discrimination
prohibition.
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Figure W
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An LGB specific anti-discrimination law has the same positive impact on the probability
of a military personnel policy being adopted, but the size of the impact is larger and the results
have a higher level of statistical significance than was found for a general anti-discrimination
law. States with a LGB specific discrimination prohibition are more than five times more likely
to adopt a military policy allowing LGB persons serve than states that lack a LGB specific law.
Figure X shows the difference between the probability of policy adoption in states with a LGB
discrimination law compared to states that have not adopted any discrimination policy that could
be interpreted as inclusive of LGB persons. The adoption of a LGB specific anti-discrimination
policy increases the probability of military policy being adopted between four and five times that
probability for states without an anti-discrimination policy that is LGB specific. The average
predicted number of years until a military policy is adopted is 11.078 for states that have adopted
an LGB specific anti-discrimination policy whereas the average predicted number of years for
states that have not adopted any form of discrimination policy is 24.82.
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Figure X
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When a state will adopt a policy that allows LGB persons to serve in the armed forces is
partially a function of the informal institutions of the state. States in which more than 72.85% of
the population resides in an urban area are much more likely to adopt a military personnel policy
allowing LGB persons to serve compared to states that have less urbanization. As was the case
with discrimination policy in Chapter Three, the percentage of women in parliament is a
significant predictor of military personnel policy adoption. As the percentage of parliamentary
seats held by women increases, the probability that a state will allow LGB persons to serve in the
military also increases. Thus states in which there is a high level of urbanization and more
women in parliament are likely to adopt policies much sooner than their counterparts with less
urbanization and/or fewer women in the legislature. However, states with more LGB national
organizations are more likely to have policy success regarding the military in states in which
urbanization is below the 72.85% threshold.
As was the case in the models examining formal institutions, prior adoption of
discrimination policy proves to be an important predictor of policies in the models for informal
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institutions. States that have adopted an LGB specific discrimination prohibition are over four
times more likely to allow LGB persons to serve in the military than states that have not adopted
such legislation. A general prohibition on discrimination that could be interpreted to include
sexuality also improves the probability of a state allowing LGB persons to be servicemen and
servicewomen. Thus controlling for the policy history regarding LGB rights proves as important
when modeling informal institutions as it was when examining formal institutions.
The eleven models included here provide evidence that both supports and contradicts the
expectations of the theory. It had been assumed a monotonically increasing probability of policy
adoption and find this to be true based on the shape parameter p. In all eleven models p is greater
than one, indicating that the probability of policy adoption is increasing over time. Also
consistent across all of the models were the results for the frailty parameter, which captures the
relationship between prior adoption of military policy and subsequent adoption of personnel
policy that allows greater freedom for LGB servicepersons. This parameter was not statistically
significant in any of the models, which indicates that adding the frailty parameter does not
contribute explanatory power to models beyond that achieved via the independent variables. This
is important for confidence in the independent variable selection. Furthermore, this suggests that
the feedback loop expected for an iterative policy process is captured by changes in the informal
institutions. The finding of statistical insignificance for the frailty measure is more problematic
in the formal institutions models due to the largely static nature of formal institutions.
Neither the formal institutions models nor the informal institutions models provide
support for the theory that social movement resources are filtered by institutions. All of the
models instead point to importance of prior policy, which reinforces policy’s iterative nature and
the connections between different policy areas within a policy family. Furthermore, this provides
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evidence for Waaldijk’s (1999) assertions that LGB rights generally proceed in an order in which
anti-discrimination law is a foundational step toward other rights. Amongst the formal
institutions models, federalism is the only statistically significant institution and this is only true
in one model. The informal institutions models also reinforce previous findings from Chapter
Three regarding the importance of women in the legislature. In all of the informal institutions
models the percentage of women in parliament increased the probability of policy adoption and
was statistically significant. Additionally, the informal institutions models support the
expectations that urbanization improves the probability of LGB rights policy. The informal
institutions models provide greater support for the theoretical expectation than the models for
formal institutions, but neither supports the hypotheses regarding interaction effects. It is likely
the case that military policy is insulated from interest group pressures and thus the observed
impact of movement resources independently and working through institutions is smaller than
either the expectation or the findings for anti-discrimination policy. Although the armed forces
may be insulated from political pressures, the military is not outside the scope of government,
thus changes in civil discrimination provisions do impact the military either by applying the
same rules to military personnel or requiring the armed forces to justify exclusion.
Conclusion
The armed forces are an institution and symbol in state that represents complete access to
social acceptance, but some groups have been excluded from military service and deemed merely
partial citizens. Here I examine when LGB persons gain access to the military across
industrialized democracies, arguing that access is achieved when the LGB movement has
resources to deploy in the context of amenable formal and informal institutions. These
institutions act as a filter accelerating or impeding the timeline toward policy change, depending
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on the nature of the institution. This theory draws from resource mobilization theory, political
opportunity structure models, policy process models and models of policy diffusion to create a
broad approach to the relationship between social movements’ demands for policy change and
the structures of society and government that respond to these demands.
Formal institutions are the structures that comprise government and thus shape the policy
possibilities in a state. It was theorized that LGB movement resources are filtered by the
structures of government and thus expected interactions between the two would be important
predictors of policy adoption. Here I examined the impact of formal institutions and their
interactions with LGB resources on the probability a state would adopt a military personnel
policy that allows LGB persons to serve. In addition to the formal institutions of government and
resources of the LGB movement, the control for the existence of anti-discrimination policies was
included which should increase the probability of military policy adoption. In the five models
that examine these relationships there was considerable support for the importance of prior
related policy but much less support for the importance of institutions and movement resources.
Informal institutions are the norms and social context in which policy is made. Unlike
formal institutions, which tend to be stable over time in advanced democracies, informal
institutions vary over time to reflect the changing nature of society. Among the informal
institutions considered here, urbanization and the percentage of women in parliament proved to
be significant predictors of when a state would adopt a military policy that allowed LGB persons
to serve in the armed forces. While it had been theorized the important effects would be those in
which movement resources interact with these informal institutions, the findings suggest that
direct effects between the social norms and the policy are more relevant. The finding that the
percentage of legislative seats held by women is significant and positively related to military
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policy adoption reinforces the previous findings from Chapter Three that women in parliament
play a key role in LGB rights policy. The six models for informal institutions also reinforce the
importance of previous anti-discrimination policy to the probability that a military personnel
policy will be adopted, a finding similar to that in the models for formal institutions.
In order to illustrate the expectations and ground them in cases, the United States and the
Netherlands were utilized as examples representing a laggard and leader respectively. These
states represent opposite extremes in many ways, though both remain characteristic of the dataset
as a whole because the data are narrowly constrained to advanced industrialized democracies. In
addition to these two examples, an account of the policy situation and development in the
European Union was included because the EU places important constraints on member states,
which by 2005 constituted more than half of the dataset. These cases were used previously to
illustrate and justify the theoretical expectations, thus it is important to reconsider how the
historical observations from these cases correspond to the findings from the statistical analysis.
We hypothesized that the more resources the LGB movement had, the higher the
probability of passing a military personnel policy would be. The findings provide mixed support
for the hypotheses in that the number of organizations in a state increases the probability of
policy adoption in ten of the eleven models but is only statistically significant in one, a model in
which organizations is a constituent term for the interaction between organizations and
urbanization that is also statistically significant but negatively related to policy adoption. The
number of national LGB publications in a state is negatively related to policy adoption in ten of
the eleven models, which is contrary to expectations and surprising given that both publications
and organizations measure movement resources. The differences in the findings for movement
resources can be attributed to differences in what the measures are capturing. The number of

145

LGB publications measures the ability of the movement to disseminate information, but may be
less accurate in capturing the resulting mobilization. The number of national LGB organizations
in a state was positively related to policy change in most of the models as anticipated, but its lack
of statistical significance is contrary to the hypothesis. Because of the insulated nature of military
policy, it is reasonable that social movements simply lack access to the necessary veto players in
government to effectively change this policy. It is beyond the scope of this research to look at
how access to different institutions within government varies across organizations and states, but
this would likely provide a more complete picture of policy development.
More important for the theory were the impacts for the interaction terms, as evidenced by
the illustrative cases. The Netherlands has fewer organizations and publications, but amenable
formal and informal institutions and thus adopted policy earlier than the United States, where the
movement had greater numbers of organizations and publications but were working in an
environment of hostile informal institutions and non-cooperative formal institutions. The results
for the interaction terms provide mixed support for the hypotheses.
Military policy change should be more likely to occur when organizations and
publications are increasing in a state with a proportional representation or mixed system rather
than a majoritarian system. The findings suggest the opposite of the expectations: increases in
movement resources in the context of a proportional representation system decrease the
probability of policy adoption. The results for mixed systems were inconsistent with two of the
models indicating improvements in the probability of policy adoption, three of the models
indicating mixed systems were less likely to adopt policy and all of the models lacking statistical
significance with regard to the electoral system. In addition to failing to support the hypotheses,
these findings are contrary to the observations from the two case studies. The lack of consistency
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in the findings for mixed electoral systems and the lack of statistical significance for either of the
electoral system measures in any of the models indicate that the electoral system may be less
relevant to military policy than it had been to discrimination policy. Responsibility for managing
soldiers and establishing the criteria for service may be left to the military, and the citizenry in a
state could be reasonably reluctant to legislate guidelines for military service believing that
matters of defense should be left to those who know the most about military readiness. If this is
the case, then the electoral system would have little impact on decisions regarding military
personnel.
The structure of the executive should have ramifications for the probability of change to
military policy; specifically when movement resources are deployed in a state with a mixed
executive, they should be more likely to achieve policy success. The findings confirm that
increases in the number of LGB publications in states with a mixed executive improve the
probability a military personnel policy allowing LGB persons to serve will be adopted. This
mirrors the observation from the case studies in which the US, with a presidential system and
high number of publications, has only allowed LGB persons to serve openly in 2011 whereas the
Netherlands, with a mixed executive and fewer publications, has allowed LGB persons to serve
openly in the military since 1986. The lack of statistical significance could again be remedied by
including a wider variety of cases, but it may also be attributable to the limited number of policy
adoptions found in the data. In the data there are 36 instances of policy adoption, but these are
clustered into just 26 countries adopting multiple levels of policy. Fewer policy adoptions makes
statistically significance less likely, thus expanding the dataset forward in time as more policy is
developed will likely improve the ability to accurately measure the impact of all of the
independent variables, including the structure of the executive.
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Two supranational institutions were included in the analysis, the European Convention
on Human Rights and the European Union, which also served as a metacase to illustrate
supranational policy developments and potential in the area of military personnel policy. Both of
these institutions were expected to decrease the duration until policy change by increasing the
probability signatory/member states would adopt a military personnel policy change open to
LGB persons. There is positive support for this hypothesis with regard to the European Union,
which increases the probability of policy change in all of the formal institutions models.
Furthermore, when organizations increase in EU member states, the probability of military
policy also increases. Although these findings are not statistically significant, they do indicate
that one should continue to view the European Union as a positive influence with regard to LGB
rights policies. Given the weak military integration in the European Union, the lack of statistical
significance becomes less surprising. The influence of the European Union may be attributable to
policy diffusion because soldiers from a state that excludes LGB persons from the armed forces
may serve in peace keeping missions for the EU alongside LGB soldiers from states that have
more open policies. It could be that as sentiments amongst the soldiers themselves change, the
likelihood of a change to military personnel policy increases.
Surprisingly, the findings show the impact of the ECHR to be negative on the probability
of policy adoption. This is not only contrary to the hypothesis, but it is also contrary to the
previous findings from Chapter Three. Although the impact of the ECHR either directly or
interacting with LGB publications is statistically insignificant across all the models, its
consistently negative impact is cause to consider how and why the impact for military policy is
so different from that for anti-discrimination policy. This was surprising given that the ECHR
ruling in 1999 that required Britain to lift its ban on LGB persons serving in the military applies
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to all states that are parties to the Convention. The lack of impact may be a function of states
adopting permissive policies prior to the ECHR ruling. It is also possible that military policy is
distinctively insulated from political pressures. Because the ECHR does not facilitate interaction
amongst military personnel across states, it would have little impact on military personnel policy
prior to the 1999 ruling. In order to capture the policy diffusion effects of interaction across
militaries, future research should examine the role of NATO and states’ participation in NATO
missions. It is also important to note that the confidence interval for the findings for the ECHR
and the interaction between the ECHR and LGB publications includes hazard ratios both above
and below one. It is thus entirely feasible that the ECHR improves the probability of policy
adoption. Additional research expanding the duration and scope of the data may find a positive
and significant impact for the ECHR as hypothesized.
Increasing diversity in a state should promote tolerance and thus make LGB rights policy
more likely to be passed. While there was support for this theory with regard to antidiscrimination legislation, ethnic diversity decreases the probability of military policy adoption.
These findings are not statistically significant and thus there cannot be confidence in the findings
and further consideration should be given to the development of alternative hypotheses. Because
this finding is not statistically significant and the confidence interval includes both increases and
decreases in the probability of policy adoption, an initial explanation is that expanding the
duration and scope of the dataset will provide evidence that diversity increases the probability of
policy adoption.
It was theorized that feelings of economic threat would be negatively related to LGB
rights, thus it was expected that negative changes in GDP and higher unemployment would make
states less likely to adopt policies allowing LGB persons to serve in the military. The findings
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indicate that economic threat is not relevant to military personnel policy with regard to sexuality.
Changes in GDP do not change the probability of policy adoption regardless of the direction of
the change, nor is the change in GDP statistically significant. The impact of unemployment is
inconsistent across the models with three models finding small increases in the probability of
policy adoption and three models indicating small decreases in the probability of policy but none
of these findings are statistically significant. The interaction terms that examine LGB movement
resources working through the context of economic stability or threat also prove to be
insignificant. Military and defense policy is often perceived as a distinct policy area from
economic issues, thus it may be the case that economics do not play a significant role in
decisions made about personnel in the military.
Amongst the informal institutions, urbanization proved to be an important predictor of
when LGB persons would be allowed to serve in the military in every model. Furthermore,
urbanization has the expected impact of improving the probability of policy adoption. The use of
a threshold measure for urbanization proved to be relevant and is reported in the models, but also
considered was the use of the continuous measure applied in Chapter Three. With regard to
military personnel policy, the threshold measure of urbanization provided a better model fit than
a continuous measure of urbanization. These findings, in juxtaposition with the findings from
Chapter Three, require reconsideration of the nature of the relationship between urbanization and
policy development.42 Why would a threshold effect be more appropriate for military policy and
a continuous measure more appropriate for discrimination policy? At this juncture it appears
relevant to return to the previous explanation that the findings for military policy may be
42

In Chapter Three I used the continuous measure of urbanization because it was a better fit for the model based on
the AIC and BIC compared to the threshold measure. Additionally some models failed to converge with the
threshold whereas this was not a problem when using the continuous measure to predict anti-discrimination policy
adoption. Chapter Six will discuss the relative merits and implications of each operationalization of urbanization for
the theory.
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systematically different because of the insulated nature of such policy. The results from Chapter
Five’s examination of partnership recognition will shed further light on the relationship between
the operationalizations of urbanization and LGB rights policy.
The findings for the percentage of women in parliament correspond to the hypotheses,
case studies, and the results from Chapter Three. When the percentage of the legislative seats
held by women increases, the probability of LGB rights policy also increases. This finding holds
across all six of the informal institutions models and is statistically significant in every model.
The cases illustrate these results as the Netherlands has consistently had a greater percentage of
parliamentary seats held by women than the United States’ congress and the Netherlands adopted
policies allowing LGB persons to serve in the military decades earlier than the United States.
While the findings regarding the interaction between women in parliament and movement
resources are not statistically significant, the interaction with regard to organizations is also in
the expected direction.
Given the importance of executive decisions regarding the use of military force in many
countries, it was expected that the party of the executive would impact when a state chose to
adopt a military personnel policy allowing LGB persons to serve. The findings confirm that
states with a right leaning executive are less likely to adopt a policy compared to states with
leftist executives. The narrative of policy development in the United States illustrates the impact
of rightist executives, as seen in the impact of the G.W. Bush administration’s policy regarding
LGB persons in the military. What is surprising is that these findings are not statistically
significant. Furthermore, centrist executives are more likely to adopt permissive military policy
for LGB persons. This fits the narrative of one of the case studies as the United States adopted
first Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell and then repealed discrimination against LGB persons in the military
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when centrist presidents held office. The Dutch government made its first steps to open military
service to LGB persons when a leftist government was in power, but lifted all bans when rightist
government held power, which is surprising and contrary to the findings.
Based on resource mobilization theory, political opportunity structure models, policy
process models, and theory on policy diffusion, it was theorized that LGB access to military
service would be a function of formal and informal institutions filtering the impact of LGB
movement resources. It was further hypothesized that policy history matters and thus expected
that the prior existence of anti-discrimination policy increases the probability a state will adopt a
military personnel policy that allows LGB persons to serve. The results found that formal
institutions and their interactive effects with LGB resources were insignificant when modeling
the probability of military policy adoption. This was surprising given the support for the direct
effects of institutions found in Chapter Three. Consistent with the finding from Chapter Three
were the findings for the importance and positive impact of women in parliament on the
probability of military personnel policy adoption. Additionally, the threshold measure of
urbanization was found to be significantly and positively related to policy adoption. These
findings imply that direct effects are more important than filtering effects for informal
institutions, which also contrasts with the findings from Chapter Three. The controls for the prior
adoption of anti-discrimination policy prove statistically significant and thus support the
hypothesis that the prior adoption of LGB rights improves the probability that additional LGB
rights policies will be adopted. The findings for military policy provide additional context for
assessing the theory and encourage additional consideration of direct effects as equally or more
important than the hypothesized interaction effects. Chapter Five will provide additional
evidence through the examination of partnership recognition policy that will point to military
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policy as different in kind compared to anti-discrimination and partnership recognition LGB
rights.
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Chapter 5 Partnership Recognition
Boele-Woelki (2008, 1949) has pointed out that “for more than a decade legal recognition
of same-sex relationships has garnered considerable attention around the globe.” This is most
assuredly an underestimate in terms of the time-line upon which marriage equality has been
building, but it certainly captures the greater global awareness of the issue of marriage equality
far beyond the LGB community itself. As homosexuals have sought the stability of lifelong
partnerships, they increasingly have looked for ways to institutionalize these relationships as this
signals to the broader community that two people have entered into a committed relationship.
Additionally, the state sanctioning of marriages serves an important function in establishing
social norms regarding acceptable relationship patterns and, as a corollary, expressions of
maturation. Furthermore, the state sanctioning of marriage amounts to far more than its cultural
implications: the rights and benefits that marriage accords two people who enter into such a
contract are numerous in every state. While some of these benefits could be achieved through the
expensive and time consuming process of private contracts, many of the rights cannot be
achieved privately.
Waaldijk (2006) conceptualizes national policy development with regard to LGB rights
as happening generally in an order of progression in which once decriminalization and
equalization of age of consent is achieved, the movement will push forward for protections from
discrimination. According to Waaldijk (2006) the next logical step in the progression is for the
LGB movement to pursue partnership recognition; thus having discussed discrimination (see
chapter 3), I move now to partnership recognition. Before examining the developments and lack
thereof in the illustrative cases (the Netherlands, the United States, and the European Union), a
brief discussion of the issue of partnership recognition and its various permutations is in order.
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Marriage, the legal institution, is a partnership entered into by two persons recognized
and sanctioned by the state that results in rights and obligations both between the persons who
have entered into the contract and between the state and these parties. Accordingly, the state has
reserved the right to define the conditions regarding who can enter into this contract, the
procedures required for the contract to be recognized by the state and made binding, and the
consequences that will result from the contract (Waaldijk 2004). National, international, and
subnational institutions have all been confronted with demands from the LGB community for
access to this specific institution (Merin 2002). This battle for access should not be surprising in
a modern context in which feminism has established “the personal is political” mantra (Waaldijk
2004). What may be more surprising for some is the insistence upon marriage rather than on
merely recognition and rights. If the legal description offered by Waaldijk were the most relevant
component to this debate, then surely this would not be so contentious. Furthermore, in many
countries the debate would have ceased after the adoption of partnership and/or cohabitation
legislation. This begs the question, why marriage?
For analytical purposes one may differentiate the cultural and legal aspects of marriage,
but this ignores the reality of marriage. Gay and straight alike, the distinctions between marriage
as a legal contract, marriage as a social signifier, and marriage as personal commitment are
rarely cognitively separate (Hull 2006). It is precisely because of this overlap that “partnership
recognition” is best conceptualized as a step toward marriage rather than the goal. Evidence of
this interconnection is peppered throughout the debate on marriage equality as proponents as
well as opponents mix legal and cultural arguments together without distinction.
In her study of same-sex couples in committed partnerships, Hull (2006) finds that “many
of these couples also invoke dominant cultural discourses of love and commitment to explain
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their own cultural practices, and some to reinforce cultural understandings of marriage as an
important life-course marker” (14). While these couples invoke culture, they also firmly
expressed in the same study the desire to access the practical rights and benefits of marriage
(Hull 2006). The recognition of the legal imperative for marriage is likely related to the
multitude of benefits which marriage affords and limited accessibility to these or similar benefits
outside of marriage. Thus these proponents perceive the need for marriage equality on both a
cultural and legal level. Rom (2007) points specifically to marriage equality advocates’ use of
citizenship, equality, and civil rights themes to frame the debate as an issue of fair treatment
rather than religious beliefs or traditional values. The use of these frames is strategic because
norms regarding equality are strong compared to norms of pluralism of lifestyles. The ways in
which cultural and law are interactive are most obvious among those LGBs who continue to
pursue marriage after partnership recognition legislation has passed and explicitly point out that
providing the legal framework does not provide the cultural impact and both are necessary (Hull
2006).
As mentioned above, proponents do not a hold a monopoly on the interplay between legal
and cultural frames for the debate on marriage equality. A February 2011 headline following the
decision of the Obama administration to no longer enforce the Defense of Marriage Act
illustrates this type of conflation:
“Obama Decision on Gay Marriage Shows Government Trying to
Abolish God; The hubris of Obama’s DOMA decision should astound us.
We have entered a brave new world—a world where the government has
not only the authority to raise taxes, but to raze marriage. Where it has the
authority not only to define speed limits, but to defy moral limits”
(Guzman 2011, 1).43

43

The Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) as well as the implications for Obama’s decision to no longer enforce
DOMA are discussed subsequently in the broader discussion of the policy development in the United States.
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In states that have yet to adopt partnership recognition, or in states that have adopted
lower forms of cohabitation but have yet to open up civil marriage, objections are based on the
equivalency between legal recognition and cultural acceptance. To these opponents legal
recognition constitutes state endorsement of homosexuality and homosexual partnerships as
normal, acceptable, and encouraged (Hull 2006).
Often opponents will connect marriage to procreation and emphasize the need to maintain
different-sex exclusivity to maintain marriage as the paradigmatic relationship for raising
children. As countries across Europe have opened up partnership recognition schemes for samesex couples, they have often conceded to such arguments from the opposition. European states
with partnership recognition have uniformly included clauses, at least in the initial legislation,
prohibiting same-sex couples from accessing parental rights. While the legal claim is made that
this is due to the dependency of European states on the international adoption market, members
of government also acknowledge a desire to retain norms of child rearing based on the nuclear
family model, regardless of cultural realities (Waaldijk 2002).
The legal argument for marriage equality is powerful in part because where a social
framework for relationship recognition is lacking, such relationships become more tenuous.
Without a legal institution, in the eyes of the state the partners in stable same-sex relationship are
legal strangers at worst and on par with friends who share a home at best. From the legal
perspective this could be remedied via alternatives to marriage. Indeed many states have sought
to eliminate the discriminatory effects of hetero-exclusive marriage without allowing same-sex
couples to enter into marriages via alternative relationship recognition schemes. This is
particularly true in those states that had previously adopted strong anti-discrimination legislation
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as it became increasingly necessary to address the ways in which family law conflicted with
discrimination law.
This chapter examines the forms of relationship recognition for same-sex partners that
have been adopted in advanced industrialized democracies and assesses the influence of the LGB
social movement, formal institutions and informal institutions on the duration until same-sex
partners are legally recognized. Context for this statistical analysis is derived from the illustrative
cases at each end of the recognitions spectrum: the Netherlands, as the first country to open civil
marriage up to same-sex partners, and the United States, as a country that has passed a national
law and many state level constitutional amendments specifically denying same-sex partners
relationship recognition. In addition to these two cases, the role of the European Union in
partnership recognition is also examined, largely via family reunification and freedom of
movement policies, and thus its influence on member states.
This analysis proceeds from the premises that partnership recognition is within the scope
of state authority and such legislation is a goal of the LGB movement. Furthermore, public
policy regarding the legal benefits, rights and obligations available to same-sex partners will be
and has been formulated in some states in response to pressures from the LGB movement. When
and where such policy is formulated and passed is a function of the resources of the LGB
movement and the filtering process of formal and informal institutions. The remainder of the
chapter begins by examining the illustrative cases, the Netherlands and the United States, as well
as the role of European Union to provide a context for understanding the methodological results.
Following this contextualization is a reiteration of the research design and the results of the
analysis. Finally the chapter concludes by readdressing the theory in light of the findings and
options for future research.
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Relationship Recognition
The various forms of partnership recognition that I find across the states in this analysis
are informal cohabitation, registered cohabitation/registered partnership, and marriage44. Which
institutions exist and who may enter into them and be recognized by the state varies
considerably. Furthermore, the legal ramifications in terms of rights, benefits, and obligations var
across as well as within these institutions. In general, this is an ordered list in which informal
cohabitation imparts the fewest legal consequences, and thus the least cultural value and
representation of commitment, and marriage imparts the greatest commitment as well as the
greatest legal consequences and highest cultural value. While this is always true within a state, I
find that the registered partnerships of some states provide far fewer consequences than the
registered cohabitation in others. Waaldijk (2004, 187) explains “in terms of legal consequences,
for same-sex couples, marriage means less in Belgium than registered partnership does in
Sweden and the Netherlands; and in these countries informal cohabitation means more than
legally registered partnership does, not only in Belgium, but also in France and Germany.” This
however is in part a function of the diversity of legal obligations and benefits marriage, the
paradigm, imparts across states45 and in part a function of the concessions process for achieving
any form of recognition in some countries.
Informal cohabitation, commonly referred to as common law marriage, provides some
legal consequences in some states, but these are generally minimal. Furthermore, informal
cohabitation is not recognized as granting standing in many states and the rights that do stem
44

For the purposes of the statistical analysis, the levels are coded for each state are a) lacking any form of
recognition, b) same-sex informal cohabitation recognized with some accompanying rights, c)registered partnership
with some of the benefits of marriage, d) registered partnership/civil union with nearly identical consequences to
marriage, or e) marriage. This recoding is in attempt to more accurately reflect the substantive differences in the law
and cultural significance of each institution in each state.
45
See Waaldijk (2004) for a comparative assessment of the legal consequences of heterosexual marriage across
states. He creates an index of consequences of marriage from 0-99 on which actual marriage consequences for the
states he analyzes range from 70 out of 99 points (the Netherlands) to 61 out of 99 points (Denmark).
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from informal cohabitation are often the result of jurisprudence rather than legislation. Informal
cohabitation is relevant here when certain rights and obligations accrue when two individuals
have shared a domicile for a specific period of time. For example, the Portuguese law on
informal cohabitation provides for common property, joint adoption and housing protections and
welfare pensions for the surviving partner in the event of death provided the two partners have
shared a domicile for at least two years. After 2001 Portugal extended the rights and obligations
of informal cohabitation to same-sex couples, with the exception of the ability to adopt. Common
law marriage in Hungary provides couples with even greater rights and privileges and common
law marriages between same-sex partners have been recognized since 1996. By contrast, the
United States national government recognizes only different-sex cohabiting partners and this
recognition is only available for those couples in the eleven states that recognize informal
cohabitation and only applies to marital provisions in the national tax code.
Registered partnership (and registered cohabitation) can be distinguished from informal
cohabitation in that it requires partners to notify the state of their intent to create an exclusive and
obligating agreement with each other that has accompanying rights, benefits, and obligation from
the state, whereas informal cohabitation requires no such registration and occurs simply by virtue
of cohabitation of duration as long or longer than the terms specified by the state. Additionally,
there is particularly wide variation in the legal consequences of registered partnerships ranging
from those nearly identical to marriage (for example, the Netherlands, Sweden, Iceland, and
Denmark) to those that offer only a small portion of the rights to which a heterosexual couple
would be entitled in marriage (for example, Belgium, Germany and France) (Boele-Woelki
2008; Merin 2002; Waaldijk 2001, 2002, 2006). Unlike informal cohabitation, registered
partnership is far more likely to be limited to same-sex rather than different sex couples. Since
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Denmark’s introduction of the registered partnership in 1989, a growing number of first
European and then more far reaching states have introduced partnership registration legislation
that aims specifically to improve the legal status of same-sex partners (Waaldijk 2004). Merin
(2002) explains that the rationale for different-sex partners being either included or excluded
from partnership registration as an alternative to marriage is related to the objective of
partnership registration itself. She notes that in the Netherlands and France different-sex couples
have the option of entering into a registered partnership because the heterosexual majority found
the legislation more palatable if it were presented as an expansion of partnership options in
general. Denmark and Norway on the other hand, specifically exclude opposite-sex couples from
entering into registered partnerships, rationalizing that this exclusion would help to preserve
marriage as the cultural paradigm. Germany and Sweden both limited partnership registration to
same-sex couples under the presumption that different-sex couples could just use the option of
marriage if they wanted the rights (Merin 2002).
The most important difference between informal cohabitation and registered partnership
for LGB activists is cultural difference. Registered partnerships denote a level of openness and
acceptability for same-sex partners that rights bestowed by virtual of cohabitation do not. It is
precisely because the registered partnership requires couples to present themselves to the
government in a formal way for the creation of a contract that binds together as partners, that this
is of greater important than the mere legal consequences. This process moves the same-sex
relationships out of its traditional position of invisibility and taboo and into a more visible and
acceptable light.
Marriage denotes the highest level of obligations, rights, and benefits of the relationship
recognition schemes, but in addition to these legal consequences marriage stands apart because
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of its history and implications for culture. The legal consequences of marriage vary across states
to such an extent that one entering into a registered partnership in the Netherlands would receive
more legal consequences than entering into heterosexual marriage in Denmark. Regardless of the
legal differences, the cultural role of marriage is nearly identical across states.
As the most expansive institution in terms of legal and cultural consequences, it is also
the most expansively regulated with regard to who, where, and how one may enter into a
marriage. In the United States it is common for a marriage to begin in a church with a religious
authority officiating and the ceremony resulting a state-issued marriage license, while in
Belgium a religious ceremony has no legal effect and cannot precede a civil marriage officiated
by a public officer. In addition to regulating where and how a marriage can be created, states
create rules regarding who may enter into a marriage with whom. The most obvious way in
which this is restricted in the context of this research is that some states mandate that the two
people who enter into a marriage be of different genders and this clearly the focal point of this
research. However, it is important to note that in particularly those states that allow two persons
of the same gender to enter into marriage, the nationality and residency of the persons becomes a
more stringent requirement.
The Netherlands
The Netherlands was the first state to recognize same-sex marriages, moving the western
world closer to marriage equality and providing all Dutch citizens with three options for
partnership recognition by the state: cohabitation, registered partnership, or marriage. Despite
popular assumptions regarding Dutch social liberalism, the path toward same-sex marriage was
not brief, nor did the Act on the Opening Up of Marriage create true marriage equality between
same-sex and different-sex couples. The path toward marriage equality in the Netherlands that
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began in the 1970s with a practice of recognizing same-sex partners for immigration is nearly
complete and certainly much further than most states, but it has nevertheless been a path and a
process.
By the 1970s the COC (Cultuur en Ontspannings-Centrum), the largest LGB organization
in the Netherlands and the oldest LGB organization in the world, was becoming more open, out,
and aggressive in the pursuit of rights. In the wake of the sexual revolution, partnership
recognition seemed like an odd goal and the COC leadership rejected it. As early as the 1970s
calls for recognition of same-sex partnerships were occurring all over Europe in tandem to the
attempts made in the United States to gain same-sex marriage via the courts, but the COC took
little interest. In essence the Dutch government took the lead at this early stage followed shortly
thereafter by the Friends of Gay Krant organization and eventually by the COC.
The Dutch government was among the earliest states to respond to the call for legal
recognition of partnerships between LGB persons with the Law of June 21, 1979, which
amended the Civil Code to allow cohabitating couples, either different-sex or same-sex, to enter
into an unregistered cohabitation arrangement comparable to common law marriage with a
limited set of legal rights accorded to partners. These legal rights were limited to areas of rent
law, social security, state pensions and death duties in the event of the death of partner and
income tax and immigration rules while both partners were living (Newton 2010, Waaldijk
2004). The opening up of an informal recognition of a same-sex partnership was a considerable
move forward, particularly at the time.
In 1984 the Dutch Nationality Act was passed, which allowed the foreign partner of a
Dutch national to upgrade her/his residency permit to Dutch citizenship after three years in a
permanent relationship regardless of whether the partner was of the same or opposite sex. While
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an important gain for Dutch nationals with foreign partners, this extension of immigration rights
had minimal impact among LGB persons in general. By the mid-eighties some LGB activists had
grown weary of the COC’s individualist approach and lack of attention to partnership
recognition issues. Furthermore legislation for a partnership registration scheme was making its
way through the nearby Danish government. Thus a group of contributors to Gay Krant who
formed the Friends of Gay Krant Foundation decided to test the ambiguous parameters of Dutch
marriage law by requesting a marriage license and then suing for the right to marry. The plan
was carried out in 1989 and the decision from the Amsterdam court in 1990 was to refer the issue
to the government (van Velde 2001).
In same year as the Amsterdam court ruling, the COC organized a conference to
challenge existing marriage and parental rights laws with the aim of equalizing marriage law and
opening up adoption to same-sex couples (Merin 2002). Additionally, the Friend of Gay Krant
Foundation engaged in a letter writing campaign to all 650 Dutch municipalities inquiring about
their willingness to marry a same-sex couple (van Velde 2001). In the wake of this conference
and the letter writing campaign, some Dutch localities started offering same-sex partners the
option to register. Such registrations were purely symbolic but did serve to raise awareness and
support for partnership recognition. The Friends of Gay Krant Foundation started a parallel letter
campaign to Dutch organizations, pension funds, and businesses such as the Dutch Automotive
Association, KLM airlines, and the Dutch railways asking them to recognize same-sex couples
who were registered in a marriage alternative (van Velde 2001). In 1992 the Dutch Government
Advisory Commission for Legislation had analyzed the issues surrounding same-sex partnership
recognition and the applicability of the Danish model to the Netherlands and issued a report
recommending such legislation (Merin 2002).
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In a fortuitous turn of events for LGB advocates across the Netherlands, the 1994 election
produced the “purple” cabinet, a coalition government that did not include the Christian
Democrats (van Velde 2001). A clear sign of the changing political tide, in June of 1995 the
Minister of Justice, Winnie Sorgdrager, announced plans to amend Dutch marriage laws
removing restrictions based on sexual orientation. The lower chamber of parliament dutifully
followed this imperative, passing a resolution that demanded the preparation of a marriage
equality bill and the Kortmann Committee was formed (Van Erp 2006, Merin 2002). Friends of
Gay Krant again organized to influence public opinion and the committee via television and
radio interviews with Gay Krant editor Henk Krol and reports from legal experts such as Kees
Waaldijk (van Velde 2001).
The Kortmann Committee was comprised of legal specialists who were charged with
studying the desirability and consequences of marriage, partnership registration, and adoption
rights for same-sex couples (Merin 2002). In their report they favored a dual registration system
that would be open to both same-sex and different-sex couples. Ultimately the bill that appeared
before parliament included only one type of registration and was limited to same-sex couples
only and could not pass. The Dutch parliament revisited the issue in 1997 and formulated the Act
on Registered Partnerships (Newton 2010, Waaldijk 2004, Merin 2002). This act was open to
both same-sex and different-sex couples and imparted many of the rights of marriage upon
registered partners (Newton 2010). The act was adopted and officially came into effect on
January 1, 1998.
Shortly after partnership registrations were established, the Dutch government announced
its intentions to act on the Kortmann Committee’s recommendations to amend adoption and
paternity laws in light of the recognition of same-sex partnership as constituting a stable, life-
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long relationship akin to marriage (Merin 2002). Unlike partnership recognition legislation in
other Nordic countries, the Dutch Act on Registered Partnerships did not include a categorical
exclusion to adoption rights; it merely failed to expand those rights (Rayside 2007). Furthermore,
the lower chamber of the Dutch parliament responded to the 1997 Act on Registered
Partnerships by renewing its call for same-sex marriage. This call was only buttressed by the
success of the Registered Partnership Act; in the first year of the act a total of 4,626 couples
chose to register, and of these 1,324 were lesbian couples, 1,686 were gay male couples, and
1,616 were different-sex couples (Waaldijk 2001). Thus the push for marriage equality continued
amidst the honeymoon for the enactment of partnership recognition.
As early as December of 1998, the Dutch government approved a new bill that would
open marriage to same-sex couples, which passed on to the Council of State for advisement.
Following the advisement by the Council, the government presented the bill to parliament in July
of 1999. In the same month a bill to abolish the exception for pension funds that wished to
exclude same-sex partners was also introduced, which would further reduce the differences
between married different-sex couples and registered couples in terms of legal rights. Waaldijk
(2001) makes particular note of these changes in his argument that it was precisely because of
the limited number of rights still held exclusively within the institution of marriage that made it
possible for the Netherlands to pass the Act on the Opening Up of Marriage.
The Act on the Opening Up of Marriage passed the lower chamber of parliament by a
landslide 190 to 33, in September of 2000. In December the upper house of parliament followed
suit passing the law by a vote of 49 to 26. On December 21, 2000 the Act on the Opening Up of
Marriage was signed by Queen Beatrix but it did not become effective until April 1, 2001. This
act officially opened up the existing institution of marriage to same-sex couples rather than
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creating a parallel institution, thus the Netherlands was officially the first country in the world to
recognize marriage between same-sex partners.
Opening up the institution of marriage came with caveats though. The upper house of
Parliament passed the marriage act with separate, but deemed necessary, additional legislation
curtailing the parental rights accorded to marriage when the partners are of the same sex.
Specifically, same-sex married couples are prohibited from adopting non-Dutch children, while
different-sex married couples may. This provision was justified by the need to protect Dutch
access to the international adoption market and fears that countries would limit access if it
became possible for same-sex couples to adopt (Rayside 2007, Patterson 2001). In 2006 the
adoption restrictions were removed, thus the remaining difference between different-sex
marriage and same-sex marriage is that in a different-sex marriage paternity of the male partner
is assumed when a child is born, whereas in a female same-sex marriage the non-birthing mother
is accorded joint custody and the option of adoption but her maternity is not assumed46.
As the first country in the world to open the institution of marriage to same-sex partners,
the Netherlands is held as one end of the spectrum of partnership recognition. Furthermore, the
path to marriage equality in the Netherlands provides insights into the preconditions that foster
the development of partnership recognition. As noted in chapter two, the openness of the
institutions of a state play an important role in filtering movement resources and developing
policy. Partnership recognition beyond informal cohabitation required the work of two national
LGB organizations who found an increased opportunity in the “purple coalition” of the midnineties to pass the Act of Registered Partnerships. Additionally, the role of prior policy proved
vital as the LGB movement was able to capitalize on previous laws recognizing unmarried

46

The evolution of Dutch adoption legislation will be addressed within the subsequent chapter regarding parental
rights.
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cohabitants that had been written in gender neutral language. The success of the registered
partnership as an institution for different-sex couples as well as same-sex couples drew further
attention to the fact that partnership registration was semantically, culturally, and legally
different from marriage and thus did not constitute full equality for same-sex couples. The push
to open marriage to same-sex partners continued and was successful in 2000, with marriage
available to both same and different sex couples in 2001. Since 2001, the Netherlands has
amended legislation that differentiated between same and different sex married couples to
achieve marriage equality. Thus the Netherlands demonstrates the iterative nature of policy made
in relation to social movement resources that gains traction as the political opportunity structure
opens.
The United States
While the pursuit of marriage equality dates as far back in the United States as it does in
the Netherlands, the legal narrative is considerably different. The vibrant feminist movement and
the gains for women’s rights it secured along with its ability to shift some of the traditional
thought about marriage relatively early should have paved the way for same sex marriage in the
United States (Rayside 2007). Nevertheless, the history of partnership recognition in the US
features far more setbacks than advances. Rayside (2007) provides a lens for understanding this
delay in terms of the formal and informal institutions that have served as impediments to the
development of policies favored by the LGB movement. Because the United States government
devolves competency over sexual activity and marriage to the state level, the national
government has had far less power to influence the LGB rights debate than in countries like the
Netherlands where parliament served an important function in paving the way for marriage
equality. Because marriage bequeaths substantial economic benefits in the United States,
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expanding marriage rights provides a rhetorical tool related to rising health care and welfare
costs that opponents of same-sex marriage can utilize in the US but have no basis in many other
countries with more substantial welfare states. Finally, Rayside (2007) claims that the greatest
distinguishing factor for the United States and greatest deterrent to same-sex partnership
recognition is that “the United States is home to an unusual array of well-funded organizations
on the religious Right that are prepared to place opposition to gay rights at the center of their
agendas and to mount concerted opposition to any political or legal recognition of sexual
diversity” (351-352). Even in the heavily Catholic countries of southern Europe Ido not find the
same willingness to forgo attention to all other issues and devote all resources toward fighting
against civil rights for LGB persons.
The narrative of same-sex marriage in the United States necessarily begins in and focuses
predominantly on the individual states because of their competency in regulating marriage. In
1970 two same–sex couples independently attempted to gain a marriage license; Tracy Knight
and Marjoire Jones sought a marriage license in Kentucky, while Richard Baker and James
Michael McConnell sought a marriage license in Minnesota47 (Newton 2010, Rom 2007). Both
couples were denied licenses and filed lawsuits. In both cases the state courts ruled against the
plaintiffs on the basis that the civil right to marriage48 did not extend to same-sex couples as
marriage was defined (customarily, Biblically, lexically) as between a man and a woman
(Grossman and Stein 2009). In 1975 the Boulder County Clerk issued marriage licenses to six
same-sex couples after she and the district attorney found that state law did not prohibit it. In

47

Baker and McConnell initially applied for a marriage license in Hennepin County, Minnesota where their request
was denied and this denial was the basis for the lawsuit that eventually went to the Minnesota Supreme Court. The
following year they applied again in Blue Earth County, Minnesota where they were awarded a license and married.
The Minnesota government contends their marriage was invalidated by the Supreme Court ruling.
48
Marriage as a civil right was established by Loving v Virginia 1967 in which the Supreme Court struck down antimiscegenation laws as unconstitutional.
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response, the state attorney general declared the issuing of the licenses illegal and in 1977 the
Colorado state legislature passed a law defining marriage as between one man and one woman
(Newton 2010). ). Remarkably, and unlike the efforts of the Dutch couples, which organized by
the Friends of Gay Krant, these couples pursued marriage equality without knowledge of each
other or the backing of a national organization. Until 1985 the priorities the LGB movement
leaders were clearly discrimination protections rather than partnership recognition (Newton
2010).
The rise of the AIDS epidemic drew movement leaders in the US to issues of partnership
recognition as couples were separated by hospitals that denied same-sex partners access to their
dying loved one. By 1985 discrimination protections became a secondary goal to AIDS
awareness, prevention, and research but through the lens of AIDS, partnership recognition
became a more fundamental part of the secondary agenda. As the height of the AIDS epidemic
within the gay community passed, a renewed interest in civil rights emerged, this time with
greater interest in partnership recognition (Newton 2010). In December of 1990 three same-sex
couples applied for marriage licenses in Hawaii and were, as expected, denied and subsequently
filed suit (Baehr v Lewin 1993). Like the couples who had tried in the 1970s, these couples did
not have the backing of national organization at the time of their initial lawsuit. At this time the
Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund was divided on pursuit of marriage equality and
when contacted by the couples voted to turn down the case (Pinello 2006). By 1993 the case
reached the Hawaii Supreme Court which ruled limitations on marriage to different-sex couples
violated Hawaii’s Equal Rights Amendment and remanded the case for a trial in which the state
would be required to prove that the different sex requirement of marriage was not a violation of
the Equal Rights Amendment (Grossman and Stein 2009).
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The Hawaii case brought both publicity and social movement action. While the Lambda
Legal Defense and Education Fund had refused to provide representation to the couples initially,
as the case reached the Hawaiian Supreme Court the organization opted to issue an amicus curiae
brief. This marked the beginning of support from the LGB movement’s legal resources (Pinello
2006).
While Baehr v Lewin (1993) did not actually open up marriage to same-sex couples in
Hawaii, it was perceived as a win for LGB rights, by both activists and opponents. The religious
Right backlash was so potent that 45 of 50 states had adopted legislation limiting marriage to
different-sex couples by 1994. Furthermore, in 1996 the Defense of Marriage Act was passed by
Congress and signed by President Clinton, thus stipulating that the federal government could
only recognize marriages between opposite-sex persons (Newton 2010). This ensured that the
rights, benefits, and obligations accorded marriage by federal law could not be applied to samesex couples who were legally married according the regulations of their state.
In 1997 Hawaii created a reciprocal beneficiary registration for same-sex couples, which
was the first state wide scheme for recognizing same-sex relationships. Again backlash quickly
followed with Hawaiian voters joining Alaskan voters in 1998 to pass amendments to the state
constitution that prohibited recognizing same-sex marriage (Hull 2006). Although Hawaii had
already passed legislation defining marriage as an institution between a man and a woman,
leaders of the religious Right, and mostly from the mainland, were concerned that marriage
legislation was not strong enough in light of the reciprocal beneficiary policy. Thus an
amendment to the state constitution made its way onto the ballot and was subsequently approved.
Ultimately Hawaii provided the LGB movement with important lessons on mobilizing and
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campaigning and initiated coalition building between the legal resource, political and cultural
movement organizations (Pinello 2006).
The following year, 1999, proved better for the LGB activists in the United States.
California established a domestic partnership registry and Baker v State of Vermont showed
promise for opening up marriage in Vermont. The California registry provided partners with
hospital visitation rights and extended health benefits to the partners of state employees, thus
leaving the vast majority of marriage rights and privileges beyond the grasp of same-sex couples
(Rom 2007). Vermont, on the other hand, was even more promising; the Vermont Supreme
Court ruled in Baker v State of Vermont that the Common Benefits Clause of the state
constitution required the state to either open marriage to same-sex couples or create a parallel
institution to marriage that would provide identical rights and benefits (Hull 2006). Unlike
Hawaii, Baker had the support of the Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund and
additionally the benefit of a public education and political campaign that had been underway
since the decision in Baehr v Lewin (Pinello 2006). The Vermont legislature passed a civil union
act the following year that provided same-sex partners with the benefits of marriage but reserved
marriage itself for different-sex couples (Tadlock, Gordon, and Popp 2007). Civil unions in
Vermont marked significant progress for American LGB persons, but the civil union law only
applied to citizens of Vermont and could not confer any of the federal benefits of marriage
because DOMA had gone into effect three years prior (Merin 2002).
Between 2000 and 2003 Nebraska and Nevada both joined Hawaii and Alaska in passing
constitutional prohibitions on the recognition of marriage between two persons of the same-sex.
In both states these constitutional provisions were in addition to statutes that had already defined
marriage as an institution available only to different-sex couples. In Nebraska the amendment
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also precluded the state from recognizing civil unions (Rayside 2007). While the LGB movement
was gaining traction and resources, the political climate of the United States markedly shifted in
this period. The George W. Bush administration was unequivocal in its animosity toward LGB
rights, thus the pursuit of partnership recognition would be forced to continue at the state level or
via the courts (Nicol and Smith 2010).
In 2003 the US LGB movement made three important gains but also suffered setbacks. In
Lawrence v Texas (2003) the United States Supreme Court overturned the remaining antisodomy laws that existed across the country, thus finally removing the possibility of denying
rights based on classifying homosexuals as criminals. Furthermore, in Goodridge v Department
of Public Health (2003) the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court ruled that the state had 180
days to begin issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples on the basis that issuing marriage
licenses exclusively to different-sex couples violated the state constitution. In Massachusetts the
Goodridge decision was a clear victory for the Massachusetts Gay and Lesbian Political Caucus,
which had been attempting to pass through the legislature since the early 1990s (Pinello 2006).
In California Governor Davis signed the Domestic Partner Rights and Responsibilities Act of
2003 into law, giving same-sex domestic partners most of the rights and privileges of differentsex marriage (Rom 2007). Unfortunately that same year also saw the introduction of HJ
resolution 56, a proposed amendment to the US constitution that would define marriage as union
between a man and woman and would prohibit states from adopting alternative legal regimes for
same-sex partners that would confer the rights of marital status (Tadlock, Gordon, Popp 2007).
President Bush supported the amendment and within four months of its proposal the number of
co-sponsors in the House had swelled to seventy-five (Shogren 2003).
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Throughout 2004 local officials began issuing marriage licenses or performing civil
marriage ceremonies for same-sex couples as acts of civil disobedience in defiance of state laws
that defined marriage as a union between two different sex individuals. While this was occurring
in New Mexico, Oregon, New Jersey and New York; San Francisco, California received by far
the most attention (Hull 2006). By the November 2004 election the religious Right had
responded by placing ballot initiatives in eleven states that would amend state constitutions to
limit marriage to different-sex couples and in many cases would also prevent the state from
recognizing civil unions or domestic partnerships (Rom 2007; Tadlock, Gordon, and Popp 2007;
Hull 2006).
As was intended and expected, the marriage licenses issued as acts of civil disobedience
were used in these states to initiate lawsuits pressing for marriage equality. In New Jersey this
resulted in the creation of the Domestic Partnership Act of 2006 after the state Supreme Court
made a similar ruling to that laid down in Baker v State of Vermont (1999). In New York the
court ruled against same-sex marriage but the state House of Representative began proposing
legislation for same-sex marriage recognition anyway. In Oregon a series of ballot initiatives
targeting the gay community had led forced Basic Rights Oregon to develop into one of the most
sophisticated LGB political organizations in the United States. Basic Rights Oregon moved the
Multnomah County Commission to grant marriage licenses to same-sex couples (Pinello 2006).
The legality of these marriage licenses eventually led a case to reach the Oregon Supreme Court,
which ruled that the issuing of the marriage licenses violated the Oregon constitution because the
county lacked authority. The decision did not rule specifically on whether or not the same-sex
couples should be afforded partnership recognition rights under the Equal Privileges and
Immunities Clause of the Oregon Constitution, which left an opening for LGB activists (Li &
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Kennedy v State of Oregon 2005). The state subsequently passed a domestic partnership bill that
provided broad rights akin, though not identical, to marriage (NGLTF 2011).
The individual state whose path toward partnership recognition had garnered the most
attention is certainly California. The city of San Francisco sued the state of California for the
right to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples whilst continuing to issue them illegally in
2004. The state Supreme Court ordered the city to cease issuing licenses until the court could
hold a hearing on the issue and eventually voided the licenses that were issued as a violation of
California state law (Lockyer v City and Country of San Francisco et al 2004). Then in 2008 the
California Supreme Court revised the issue in In re Marriage Cases and ruled that the state begin
issuing marriage licenses to same sex couples. The religious Right responded immediately with a
ballot initiative, Proposition Eight, which eliminated the right of same-sex couples to marry.
Proposition Eight passed in the November 2008 election but was immediately challenged by
LGB advocates. The California Supreme Court upheld Proposition 8 in 2009 (Strauss et al v
Horton 2009, Tyler et al v State of California 2009, and City and County of San Francisco v
Horton 2009). This ruling was further appealed the United States district court and in a 138 page
ruling Judge Walker struck down Proposition Eight as a violation of the due process and equal
protection rights of the US Constitution (Perry v Schwarzenegger 2010).
While much of the United States was focused on the tug-of-war over marriage occurring
in California, several states passed relationship recognition laws or decided court cases ranging
from those with limited benefits (Maine 2004, Maryland 2008, and Wisconsin 2009), to those
with full marriage equality derived from court decisions or legislation (Connecticut 2008, Iowa
2009, Vermont 2009, New Hampshire 2010, and Washington D.C. 2010). Additionally, several
states passed civil unions or domestic partnerships that are nearly identical to marriage (New
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Jersey 2007, Oregon 2008, Washington 2008, and Nevada 2009) and other states have declared
that they will recognize same-sex marriages performed in other states (Rhode Island 2007 and
Maryland 2010) (NGLTF 2011). This remains a minority of the states within the US, but it does
mark a trend away from constitutional bans and toward marriage equality at the state level.
Obama’s decision to no longer enforce DOMA does not change the federal definition of
marriage for purposes in the tax code or other benefits, privileges, or obligations. The decision to
longer enforce DOMA relates specifically to the position of the Department of Justice in court
cases challenging the constitutionality of DOMA. The federal government, specifically the
Department of Justice, no longer defends the constitutionality of DOMA in such court cases and
the official position of the administration is that section three of DOMA is unconstitutional
(Montopoli 2011).
In 2011, in addition to directing the Justice Department to no longer defend the Defense
of Marriage Act and declared his support for a bill proposed by Rep Dianne Feinstein to repeal
DOMA. Furthermore, New York and Illinois joined the previously mentioned states in
recognizing same-sex relationships with New York passing full marriage equality and Illinois
passing civil unions (NGLTF 2011). Hawaii also passed a civil union bill, but unlike the Illinois
and New York statutes, it did not go into effect until 2012 (National Conference of State
Legislatures 2011).
The United States LGB movement has suffered many obstacles to achieving partnership
recognition, the most obvious being the Defense of Marriage Act, passed by an alleged LGB ally,
and the constitutional bans on same-sex marriage that were passed in many states throughout the
early 2000s. Because the national government devolves responsibility for the regulation of
marriage to the states, the movement has necessarily focused on this level, the exceptions clearly
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being the desire to repeal DOMA and to prevent the Federal Marriage Amendment from passing.
Furthermore, the LGB movement in the United States responded to the state by state strategy of
the religious Right by facilitating organized responses at the state level. Although these
responses were coordinated and relied on resources from national organizations, the focus
remained at the state level. As political opportunities have opened up in the form of either
elected officials or the courts, the LGB movement has seized them and now nineteen states and
the District of Columbia have some form of state-wide partnership recognition that is available to
same-sex couples.
The European Union
Every country in the European Union recognizes and regulates couples through the
institution of civil marriage, but amongst the member states there is no clear consensus on this
institution. The regulations vary widely across the states regarding who may marry, who has the
authority to perform or establish a legal marriage, and what the consequences, rights, and
obligations of marriage will be (Waaldijk 2004). Despite these inconsistencies, the EU
recognizes “spouse” in areas of EU law such as family reunification and free movement of
persons while leaving competency for how a “spouse” will be defined largely up to the states.
Since the Dutch government opened the institution of civil marriage to same-sex couples, this
issue of how states with varying marriage policies should acknowledge marriages has become
increasingly important. In response to this growing tension as well as the focus of LGB
organization on marriage equality, the International Gay and Lesbian Association Europe
(ILGA-Europe) creates an annual report on the status of LGB rights in member states that
includes disparities in marriage equality across states. This report is intended for dissemination to
European Union officials, as well as organizations and the governments in member states. The
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clear intent of these reports is to encourage all states to improve their ranking on LGB issues and
pressure laggard states within the EU to make significant policy changes (ILGA-Europe 2012).
The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights addresses the issues of family life (including
family reunification and migration within the EU as a unit), privacy, marriage, and
discrimination. Article 7 of the EU Charter establishes the right to privacy and a family life as a
fundamental freedom, but Article 9 places marriage explicitly within the jurisdiction of
individual states. This tension is exacerbated by Article 21, which prohibits discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation (Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 2007). Thus
far the European Court of Justice has interpreted these clauses as protecting the fundamental
right to heterosexual marriage rather than requiring states to extend marriage or a marriage-like
institution to same-sex couples. In both Rees v United Kingdom (1986) and Cossey v United
Kingdom (1990) the ECJ ruled against couples seeking to marry who were defined as of the same
gender.49 Neither of these cases dealt specifically with issues the European Union has clearer
competency in, namely freedom of movement and family reunification, that pertain to defining a
family, marriage, or partnership.
Leading the ongoing discussion on family law in the European Union is the impact of the
freedom of movement principle on cross-state recognition of partnerships (Patterson 2001,
Waaldijk 2004, Rayside 2007, Boele-Woelki 2008). This principle was established by article 18
of the Treaty Establishing the European Community and under Article 10 of the council
Regulation 1612/68 which includes the right to be accompanied by their married partner when
they emigrate from one member state to another. The Free Movement Directive allows an EU
citizen’s registered partner to move and reside with them under the same guidelines as a spouse
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Both of these cases involved a female-to-male transsexual who wished to marry his female partner, thus these
cases indicate that the issue is sex rather than gender when defining marriage and spouse.
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if the host State treats registered partnerships equivalently to marriage. Additionally, this
directive “obliges Member States to facilitate entry and residence to unregistered partners who
are in a durable relationship” without regard for whether the partnership involves two persons of
the opposite sex or two persons of the same sex (European Union Agency for Fundamental
Rights 2008, 2). Though this latter provision is less clear or concrete and requires that the
couples show proof that the relationship is durable, it does provide potential protection to samesex couples from countries in which partnership recognition is limited to informal cohabitation
policies.
The European Court of Justice (ECJ) has interpreted “spouse” in the Free Movement
Directive to apply exclusively to the marital relationship in State of the Netherlands v Ann
Florence Reed (1986). This ruling was initially interpreted as a defeat for LGB activists, but in
light of registered partnerships that approximate a “marital relationship” the precise impact of
this ruling became less clear. Cases heard by the ECJ, subsequently have not addressed the
impact of the same-sex partnerships now available in some states. At the time of this writing,
there is a pending case in the European Court of Human Rights, Van Gastel v the Netherlands,
which will test the extensions of partnership recognition from a member state to one of its
protectorates. As of this writing there is not a ruling and it is unclear how the precedent this case
will establish will impact immigration between European states. Furthermore, while there is
significant overlap between EU membership and the European Convention on Human Rights,
there is no perfect correlation, so any judgment would be further constrained to those states that
are members of the ECHR. ILGA-Europe has produced Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender
Families and the Free Movement Directive: Implementation Guidelines that provides activists
with resources to understand the implication of the Free Movement Directive in concert with the
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Equal Treatment Directive. This includes not only background information but also a guide for
measures that activists and advocates can take in the event that the legislation in their state does
not meet the criteria of these directives. This indicates that while ILGA-Europe encourages LGB
organizations in member states to rely on EU legislation and options for a litigation and public
awareness strategy, the primary focus remains on domestic policy rather than influencing further
measures at the EU level, aside from alternative litigation through the European Court of Justice
(Bell 2005, Bonini Baraldi 2008).
As the law currently stands, an EU citizen has the right to stay in another member state
for three months, after which time they must seek immigration status as a worker, a student, a
person of independent means, or the spouse of a citizen who has legally immigrated or is a
citizen of the host state. If the member state does not recognize same-sex partnerships, then a
same-sex spouse or partner must qualify for immigration based on one or more of the other
criteria: student, worker, or person of independent means (European Union Agency for
Fundamental Rights 2008).
As mentioned above, if a host State recognizes partnerships in a scheme equivalent to
marriage, then it must recognize the rights of a partner’s “spouse” to immigrate. This however,
means that a test could only arise when a same-sex spouse attempted to use the Free Movement
Directive to reside in a member state that does not provide any recognition for same-sex partners,
for example Latvia. In this situation Latvian LGB activist are encourage to use the publication
available from ILGA-Europe to create a plan of action to reform current laws regarding same-sex
partnerships. Thus far member states with some form of partnership recognition have chosen to
default to recognizing Dutch marriage and partnership as having the same legal consequences as
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their own partnership scheme50 (Boele-Woelki 2008). The proliferation of partnership schemes
within the EU--seventeen of the member states currently have some form of same-sex
partnership recognition--combined with the policy of reciprocal recognition has thus delayed the
development of a test case. Furthermore, Patterson (2001) contends that the ECJ could recognize
same-sex partners as spouses and thus clarify this issue as well as stipulate recognition across
member states, but that social realities, particularly the staunch opposition of newer member
states from the Eastern bloc, constitute a significant barrier to such a ruling.
The Family Reunification Directive and the Qualification Directive both address
migration policy for third country nationals and thus are another area of EU law in which
recognition of same-sex partnerships could be addressed. The Qualification Directive pertains
explicitly to issues of asylum status, which is extended to individuals who are at risk of
persecution based on their sexual orientation in their home state. EU member states who offer
asylum, even on the basis of sexual orientation, are not obliged to allow the same-sex partner of
the asylum seeker to also immigrate (European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights 2008).
Similar to the Free Movement Directive, recognition of marital status is contingent upon the host
state, so even if the host state allows spouses of asylees to immigrate, same-sex spouses may be
excluded. While European Court on Human Rights as well as the ECJ have heard cases
regarding the extradition of homosexuals who have sought asylum status, there has yet to be a
case in which the same-sex partner or spouse of an asylee has been denied immigration or
residency rights. It is unlikely, though possible that such a case could expand the recognition of
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France is an exception to this trend. The French government recognizes Dutch marriages between same-sex
partners as marriage despite the fact that the French government does not allow same-sex couples to marry in France
and currently defending this policy before the European Court of Human Rights (Chapin v Charpentier case
communicated).
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same-sex partners to member states that currently do not recognize such partnerships, but the
precedent would likely be constrained to issues of asylum and refugee status.
The Family Reunification directive addresses the immigration and residency rights of
third country nationals whose spouse currently resides in the European Union and is also a third
country national. The Directive requires member states to allow spouses to be reunited in cases
in which a third country national is lawfully residing in the member state (European Union
Agency for Fundamental rights 2008). As with the previously mentioned directives, the
recognition of same-sex spouses/partners is at the discretion of the host state. Because both the
Family Reunification Directive and the Qualification Directive apply to third country nationals,
the three month residency period available to EU citizens who do not or cannot obtain
immigration status does not apply.
The European Union has continuously sought to improve the mobility of labor within the
EU community. While recognizing the importance of facilitating the migration of family units
rather than merely individuals, EU law has failed to address family units that consist of same-sex
partners. Because of the opposition to such recognition from Eastern bloc states, it has been
assumed that the progress in this area is more likely to occur through the European Court of
Justice rather than the Parliament. LGB advocates and activist in member states have been
encouraged to utilize ILGA-Europe publications as a foundation of resources to attempt to
change existing policies in member states based on EU directives that promote marriage equality
but considerable less pressure has been applied since the passage of the Equal Opportunity
Directive (ILGA-Europe 2012). The European Parliament passed a resolution in 2006 that
criticized the persistence of homophobia in some member states and called for action against
those states that do not provide any form of recognition to same-sex couples (Newton 2010,
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Boele-Woelki 2008, Belien 2006). While this resolution was an important statement of support
for LGB rights, because it was a nonbinding resolution it does not change the legal situation in
any of the member states or the in the EU as a whole. The European Commission has reiterated
the importance of extending LGB partnership rights to the free movement of labor within the
European Union, but thus far there have not be legally binding changes.
The legal developments in the field of partnership recognition are considerably different
when the Netherlands is compared to the United States and then both are further analyzed
relative to the European Union. Dutch policy has moved incrementally toward full marriage
equality since the 1970s and since 2001 has permitted same-sex couples to marry with nearly
identical rights to different-sex couples. In the Netherlands the incremental extensions of
partnership rights were driven by parliamentary support for the expansion of cohabitation rights
and LGB rights as well as significant efforts on the part of Friends of Gay Krant. The US by
contrast has seen national policy move largely in the opposite direction until very recently.
Same-sex couples initially used the courts to press for marriage equality and the United States
government responded first by passing legislation that limits the definition of marriage to
different-sex couples and then calling for an amendment to the Constitution that would prohibit
individual states from recognizing same-sex partnerships. Only in the last three years and
following the adoption of some form of partnership recognition in several states, did the national
government begin to reconsider its policy toward same-sex couples. LGB resources have largely
developed a state-by-state strategy based on the necessity to form opposition to the religious
Right’s state-by-state campaign to add constitutional amendments in the individual states
banning marriage quality. The European Union has attempted to avoid the political fray
regarding same-sex partner recognition. Although the Charter of Fundamental Freedoms
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guarantees a right to private life, marriage, and freedom from discrimination based on sexual
orientation, the European Union has left the parameters for marriage up to member states. EU
directives that address the recognition of marital or family status across member states for
migration purposes would indicate a need for a more universal standard of the partnerships that
would be recognized, but this too has been left for the member states themselves to individually
decide. Where the Netherlands has been proactive, the United States has been reactive and the
European Union has predominantly remained inactive. In recent years the European Parliament,
and to a lesser extent the United States, have sought to move in the direction of the Netherlands.
51

As research continues it is likely that these characterizations as reactive and inactive will

change, but for the duration under analysis here the characterizations hold.
Institutions, Resources, & Recognition
Recognition of a committed, durable relationship is important not only culturally, but
legally as western democracies afford these relationships rights, benefits, and obligations that are
difficult or impossible to obtain without state recognition. LGB advocates have fought since the
1970s to acquire this recognition through pursuit of cohabitation benefits, partnership registries,
and, ideally, civil marriage. Amongst the states in this study the speed and level of success has
varied considerably and this variation is attributed to differences in resources of the LGB
movement and the political context in which these resources operate. The formal structures of
government as well as the informal institutions create a political context that can either promote
changes in relationship recognition in favor of LGBs, as was the case in the Netherlands, or can
deter legislation recognizing same-sex relationships. Same-sex partners are anticipated to receive
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The improvements in partnership recognition in the United States have been nearly entirely at the state level or
lower. As of this writing the most recent gain has been Obama’s decision not to enforce DOMA. While the LGB
community has certainly seen this move as progress, it has also been seen as disappointed in comparison to
expectations.
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greater legal relationship recognition more quickly in states where the political context is more
amenable and the LGB movement has greater resources to devote to creating political change.
While partnership recognition is a current and prominent goal for LGB organizations and
advocates, this has not always been the case. Resource mobilization theory explains social
movement organization action and inaction as rational behavior in response to the weighing of
costs to benefits and the probability of success (Jenkins 1983, Valocchi 1993). While individual
lesbian, gay and bisexual couples have sought recognition since the beginning of the modern
movement, LGB organizations have often picked up the call for marriage equality more slowly.
Waaldijk (2001) explains this as a natural phenomenon and represents partnership recognition as
a right that is pursued after other more basic rights are achieved. LGB organizations acting
rationally would interpret the probability of marriage equality low if discrimination based on
sexual orientation is legal or homosexual behavior is illegal. Once these rights are achieved,
partnership recognition can move to a more prominent place on the organization agenda and
more resources will be diverted to that goal.
The role of prior policy in determining the use of movement resources is incorporated as
a component of the institutional filters that may accelerate or impede policy change. In addition
to the informal institutions modeled in chapter 3, in this analysis I include the existing level of
anti-discrimination policy with the expectation that prior policy matters. As explained in chapter
two, policy is an iterative process such that prior policy that is favorable toward LGB rights will
make future policy more probable. In terms of the model, this means that states in which the
duration to discrimination policy change was short should also develop partnership recognition
policies more quickly. Furthermore, it is expected that the more complete the discrimination
protection, the more quickly a form of partnership recognition will be made available. As was
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previously mentioned, the Eastern bloc countries have taken a notably staunch position against
the recognition of same-sex couples as equal to or even similar to different-sex couples. As a
result a control for Eastern bloc countries was included in the informal institutions models.
Informal institutions are important to the deployment and effectiveness of movement
resources, but they are only a portion of the political opportunity structure. The formal structures
of government may impede the development of favorable policy even where movement
resources are available and the informal institutions would seem amenable. Conversely, formal
institutions could be designed such that partnership recognition occurs earlier than would be
anticipated based on the LGB organizations and publications or the informal institutions of the
time. The formal institutions analyzed here will be the same as those from the previous chapter
with the same expectation as outlined in chapter two and discussed in reference to the findings in
chapter three.
Research Design
As social movement resources increase, the probability a state will adopt policies meeting
the movement’s demands also increases depending on the political context in which these
demands are made. The formal structures of government and the informal institutions that
comprise the social norms in a state will impact how effective a social movement is in achieving
policy goals.
The formal institutions expected to influence the impact of movement resources on policy
adoption are the electoral system, executive structure, federalist structure and membership in
supranational institutions. Majoritarian electoral systems are hypothesized to decrease the
probability of policy adoption, thus LGB movement resources in a proportional representation
system should increase the probability of policy adoption. Presidential systems are less amenable
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to minority rights, thus mixed electoral systems should adopt partnership recognition policies
sooner than presidential systems. Relatedly, increases in LGB movement resources in states with
a mixed executive should increase the probability of partnership recognition over the same
resources in a presidential system. Federalism is likely to encourage the LGB movement to
diversify its policy strategy across subnational units and thus make national policy adoption less
likely. The duration until policy adoption in federalist states should be longer than in unitary
states with the same levels of LGB resources. Supranational institutions, specifically the
European Union and the European Convention on Human Rights, support minority rights, hence
it is expected that the duration until policy adoption to be shorter in states that are members of
these institutions compared to states that are not.
The informal institutions expected to influence the probability of policy adoption and
thus the duration until the LGB movement is successful are diversity, economic distress,
urbanization, and amenable public officials. Diversity is operationalized as ethnic
fractionalization with the expectation that more diverse states are also more likely to adopt
minority rights policy. More diverse states with LGB resources will thus adopt partnership
recognition policy sooner than less diverse states with similar levels of resources. I measure
economic distress via change in GDP and unemployment. When GDP increases, I expect lower
feelings of economic distress, a greater probability of minority rights policies being adopted and
thus shorter duration until partnership recognition policies are adopted. The converse then is true
of unemployment, when unemployment increases the probability of LGB rights policy decreases.
Thus the LGB movement will be more effective in states where the change in GDP is positive
and greater and unemployment is low. Urbanization increases exposure to diversity and makes
minority rights policies more likely, thus LGB movements in states with higher levels of
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urbanization are more likely to be successful in pushing partnership recognition policies.
Amenable public officials are important to achieving policy goals, with regard to the LGB
movement it is expected that women and leftist party members to be more open to adopting LGB
rights. As the percentage of women in parliament increases, the probability that a partnership
recognition policy will be adopted also increases. Similarly, when the executive branch of
government is controlled by a leftist leaning party, partnership recognition policy is more likely.
The Netherlands provides evidence of the importance of amenable public officials as the
movement credits the “purple coalition” with progress made toward marriage equality. The
United States also provide evidence of importance of amenable public officials, particularly in
the executive, as the lack of Presidential support has been detrimental to national gains and
encourage a strategy of responding to anti-gay pressures at the state and local level.
As mentioned previously, partnership recognition can take many forms ranging from
rights accorded to informal cohabitants to all of the rights, obligations, and privileges of
marriage. Using timelines created by Waaldijk (1999), Rayside (2007), the ILGA World Legal
Survey, and news articles from major wire services as English translations of national
newspapers, I coded the partnership recognition policy for thirty-five advanced industrialized
democracies from 1971 to 2005. Policies were divided into four categories: informal
cohabitation, registered partnership with some of the legal consequences of marriage, civil
unions/partnership registration with nearly all of the legal consequences of marriage, and civil
marriage/civil unions with all of the consequences of marriage. Because only four states had
adopted a policy that could be included in the last category, partnership recognition with nearly
all of the consequences of marriage and full marriage equality were collapsed into a single
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category. Because the models are analyzed using event history models, the resulting dependent
variable has the category value only for the year of adoption and is zero for all other years.
Event History Modeling
Event history modeling is used to analyze the duration until partnership recognition is
developed in advanced industrialized democracies. The complete model, as visually depicted in
chapter two, anticipates formal and informal institutions acting as filters on movement resources
to impact the duration until a policy is adopted. Because the use of duration analysis is
predicated upon time dependency being fundamental to policy adoption, the analysis begins with
an examination of this assumption. Additionally, it is necessary to examine the relative model fit
of multiple parameterizations of the hazard as there are three, the gamma, Weibull, and
Gompertz that are all indicated by the theory. For the analysis of the relationship between
resources filtered through institutions and the duration until policy adoption, a series of models is
used to avoid the issue of multicollinearity that would arise if multiple interaction terms with the
same constituent terms were incorporated into a single model (Brambor, Clark, and Golder
2005). There are two distinctive sets of models, one examining formal institutions and one
examining informal institutions, because I have theorized formal and informal institutions as
having distinctive filtering effects.
Fundamental to the use of duration analysis to test this theory is the assumption of time
dependency, hence the analysis begins by testing the validity of this assumption. As in the
previous chapters, I examine the Kaplan-Meier estimate which provides a non-parametric
analysis of the survivor and hazard functions without the inclusion of independent variables that
impact the hazard. The survival estimate shown in Figure Y below indicates the probability that a
state will not adopt a policy over time, survival in this analysis indicating a failure to adopt a
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policy. In the early years of the dataset the probability a state will not adopt partnership
recognition policy is persistently high, but as mentioned previously this is as expected. States are
unlikely to adopt partnership recognition policies prior to the adoption of anti-discrimination
policies. The smoothed hazard function in Figure Z below shows a steady increase in the
probability a state will adopt a policy providing legal recognition to same-sex partners beginning
about 12 years after entering the dataset.
Figure Y
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Because I am using parameterized duration models and there is more than one baseline
hazard function that fits the assumption that the probability of a policy being adopted increases
over time, it is also necessary to test the model fit of the theoretically appropriate
parameterizations for each model. As mentioned above, three parameterizations of the baseline
hazard are appropriate when assuming a monotonically increasing hazard, the gamma, the
Weibull and the Gompertz. The baseline hazard should be monotonically increasing because the
probability of policy adoption is increasing over time for all states until the adoption of the
highest level of policy (see Chapters Two and Three). While the Kaplan-Meier provides a
baseline hazard estimate, this is based solely on the number cases that have yet to adopt any form
of partnership recognition and time. Because it does not incorporate independent variables that
will impact the duration until policy adoption, I should not assume the appropriate parameterized
baseline will be identical.
As in the previous chapters, the gamma distribution was dismissed as inappropriate
because it is incompatible with the inclusion of a frailty parameter, which is an additional
parameter to account for the impact of previous policy independent from the impact of the
independent variables. Both the Weibull and the Gompertz accommodate the incorporation of a
frailty measure and are appropriate when the probability of policy adoption is monotonically
increasing and thus correspond to the theory. I use the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and
Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) measure of model fit to adjudicate between the two and
find that while the results are nearly identical, the Gompertz is slightly preferable.
Results
Policy making in response to social movement demands is an iterative process that
requires consideration of how the impact of the movement’s resources is mitigated by the
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broader political context. In advanced industrialized democracies the formal structures of
government and informal institutions of society create the environment in which social
movement resources function and these institutions may serve to propel or hinder movement
success. Thus predictions for when policy change will occur in response to social movement
demands should incorporate the interaction between movement resources with formal and
informal institutions.
Here I examine how the formal and informal institutions in a state interact with the LGB
movement resources to determine when partnership recognition policies will be adopted. I begin
by examining a series of models looking specifically at the interaction between LGB movement
resources, measured as the numbers of organizations and publications in a state, and the formal
institutions that comprise the structure of government. This is followed by a separate series of
models that analyze the interaction between LGB movement resources and the informal
institutions that indicate the social context in the state. A series of models is used due to the
multicollinearity that would arise if more than one interaction term containing the same
constituent term were included in a single model. Formal institution interactions and informal
institution interactions are modeled separately because I have theorized distinctive filtering
affects.
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Table 5.1
Gompertz Parameterization of Formal Institutions Models for Partnership Recognition
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
PR
Executive Model
Federalism Model
EU Model
Model
organizations
1.293**
0.977
1.119**
1.118**
(0.129)
(0.278)
(0.0511)
(0.0585)
print
0.829**
0.931
0.887*
0.867
(0.0745)
(0.0533)
(0.0569)
(0.0783)
proportional
10.64**
3.004
5.358**
3.066
(12.19)
(2.424)
(4.128)
(2.471)
mixedelectoral
5.171*
2.927
4.199*
2.739
(4.834)
(2.485)
(3.213)
(2.357)
execmixed
0.738
0.397
0.464
0.920
(0.673)
(0.761)
(0.432)
(0.829)
federalist
1.438
1.582
3.011**
1.677
(0.750)
(0.795)
(1.605)
(0.867)
eumem
0.826
0.829
0.917
0.779
(0.381)
(0.385)
(0.430)
(0.379)
europcon
1.036
0.973
1.185
0.805
(0.695)
(0.634)
(0.773)
(0.532)
antidisc1
0.805
0.772
0.718
0.882
(0.568)
(0.536)
(0.512)
(0.623)
antidisc2
1.269
1.296
0.991
1.289
(0.619)
(0.616)
(0.491)
(0.627)
pr_orgs
0.826*
(0.0931)
pr_pubs
1.143
(0.135)
mexec_org
1.118
(0.307)
fed_org
1.041
(0.0806)
fed_pubs
1.166*
(0.104)
eu_org
0.961
(0.0762)
eu_pubs
1.102
(0.123)
echr_pubs
gamma
chi-squared θ
N
Chi-squared

0.122
9.5e-7
854
13.10

0.121***
0.000
854
10.68

0.136***
3.1e-7
854
16.93

0.122***
0.000
854
11.23

* p 0.1 ** p 0.05 *** p 0.001
Note: hazard ratios reported based on Gompertz parameterization; standard errors in parentheses
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Model 5
ECHR Model
1.096**
(0.0459)
0.906
(0.0725)
2.983
(2.572)
3.001
(2.667)
0.845
(0.744)
1.603
(0.808)
0.836
(0.390)
0.857
(0.602)
0.783
(0.544)
1.312
(0.624)

1.022
(0.0820)
0.122***
0.000
854
10.20

Table 5.2
Gompertz Parameterization of Informal Institutions Models for Partnership Recognition
Ethnic
GDP
Unemploy.
Urban
Women
Exec. Party
organizations
1.083
0.995
0.960
1.155
0.976
1.012
(0.0981)
(0.0670)
(0.105)
(0.145)
(0.109)
(0.0569)
print

0.943
(0.0587)

0.940
(0.0644)

0.956
(0.0505)

0.948
(0.0538)

0.941
(0.102)

0.955
(0.0502)

fe_etfra

5.614
(14.19)

1.698
(2.459)

0.634
(0.896)

0.444
(0.635)

0.523
(0.740)

0.579
(0.816)

changegdp

1.000
(0.000116)
0.995
(0.0623)
2.089
(1.341)
1.066**
(0.0275)

1.000*
(0.000193)
0.991
(0.0610)
2.066
(1.352)
1.066**
(0.0286)

1.000
(0.000114)
0.967
(0.0975)
2.170
(1.452)
1.067**
(0.0280)

1.000
(0.000113)
1.019
(0.0634)
5.526
(5.842)
1.056**
(0.0283)

1.000
(0.000115)
1.021
(0.0645)
2.227
(1.492)
1.045
(0.0461)

1.000
(0.000114)
1.014
(0.0625)
2.280
(1.503)
1.066**
(0.0279)

leftexec

3.51e-08
(0.000108)

7.09e-09
(4.36e-05)

1.71e-08
(7.79e-05)

2.42e-08
(8.45e-05)

8.25e-09
(5.39e-05)

5.15e-08
(0.000218)

eastbloc

0.309
(0.374)

0.296
(0.359)

0.350
(0.425)

0.315
(0.389)

0.323
(0.388)

0.320
(0.386)

antidisc1

2.113
(1.657)

2.948
(2.425)

2.193
(1.731)

1.543
(1.325)

2.141
(1.684)

2.226
(1.754)

antidisc2

0.447
(0.292)

0.659
(0.418)

0.554
(0.346)

0.464
(0.291)

0.555
(0.344)

0.540
(0.336)

ethnic_org

0.786
(0.183)

unemployed
urbdummy
m_wominpar

gdp_org

1.000
(3.19e-05)

gdp_pubs

1.000
(3.37e-05)

unemp_org

1.007
(0.0117)

urbdum_org

0.861
(0.111)

women_orgs

1.003
(0.00596)

women_pubs

1.001
(0.00474)

left_org

1.030
(890.4)

left_pub

0.950
(920.6)

gamma
chi-squared
N
chi-squared

0.118***
5.5e-8
652
25.13**

0.114***
0.000
652
34.26***

0.119***

0.134***

0.107**

0.114***

652
24.43**

652
25.27**

652
24.43**

652
24.05**

Interactions Between Formal Institutions and Movement Resources
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A government’s structural form impacts the probability partnership recognition policy
will be adopted in the state. I have hypothesized that the electoral system, type of executive,
federal or unitary system in a state as well as a state’s membership in international institutions
can either accelerate or impede policy change in favor of greater recognition of same-sex
partners. Table 5.1 and the subsequent discussion below indicate some support for the
significance of direct as well as interaction effects for formal institutions. Furthermore, these
models indicate the importance of LGB organizations in determining the probability a state will
adopt partnership recognition policies.
It was assumed that the probability of partnership recognition policy adoption would be
increasing over time and thus chose a Gompertz model with the expectation that the shape
parameter would indicate an increasing hazard rate. Gamma, the shape parameter for the
Gompertz model is positive and statistically significant across all five of the formal institutions
models. Additionally it had been anticipated that prior partnership recognition policy adoption
would increase the probability of subsequent policy adoption beyond the expectations based on
changes in the independent variable, which is incorporated into duration models through the
inclusion of a shared frailty parameter. As was the case in the previous chapters, the frailty
parameter is found to be statistically insignificant in all five formal institutions models. The prior
existence of a partnership recognition policy failed to contribute explanatory value beyond the
effects captured by the independent variables.
LGB movement resources were measured in terms of movement strength, operationalized
as the number of national organizations, and ability to disseminate information, operationalized
as the number of national publications. The findings indicate that in four of the five formal
institutions models, the number of LGB organizations in the state is statistically significant and
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improves the probability of policy adoption. In contrast, the number of LGB publications reduces
the probability of partnership recognition policy adoption in all five models, though this finding
is only statistically significant in two of the models. The direct effect of LGB movement
resources must be interpreted cautiously because they are included in the interaction terms in
each model.
The findings from the formal institutions models with statistical significance for the
effects of LGB organizations indicate that the probability of a state with one national LGB
organization adopting a partnership recognition policy is 9.6% to 29.3% higher than in a state
without a national LGB organization. Because model five does not include an interaction term in
which organizations is a constituent term, these results from model five are used to interpret the
specific impact of organizations on partnership recognition policy adoption. As the number of
organizations in a state increases, the probability the state will adopt a policy recognizing samesex relationships increases. For example, in 1972 a state with values identical to Austria, which
did not have any organizations, would be predicted to adopt a partnership recognition policy 32
years later, or in 2004, while a state with values identical to Switzerland which had one
organization that same year, would be predicted to adopt a partnership recognition policy 30
years later or in 2002.52 Table 5.1 shows the change in probability and median predicted time
until policy adoption for all the cases in the dataset. Figure Z provides a visual comparison of the
hazard ratios for zero, seven, and fourteen organizations based on all the cases.

52

Austria adopted a cohabitation policy in 2003; Switzerland adopted a civil union policy in 2004.
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Table 5.3
Number of
Change in
Organizations Probability of
Policy53
0
-1
9.6%
7 (mean)
90.16%
14 (+1 s.d.)
261.61%
35 (max)
2386.58%

Median Predicted
years until
policy adoption
37.847
37.102
32.654
27.545
13.577

Figure A1
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The number of the LGB publications in a state is negatively related to the probability of
policy adoption in all of the formal institutions models. This finding is only significant two
models, both of which include an interaction term for which publications is constituent term.
Based on model 1, a publication reduces the probability of partnership recognition by 17.1% in
states with a majoritarian electoral system, but increases the probability of policy adoption
14.3% in a proportional representation system. Similarly, model 3 shows that a national LGB
publication reduces the probability of policy adoption by 17.3% in unitary states but increases
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Change in probability compared to a state with zero LGB national organizations calculated via exponentiating
coefficient multiplied by the number of organizations.
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the probability of policy adoption by 16.6% in federalist states. These findings will be discussed
more thoroughly below in the relevant discussions of the formal institutions.
Proportional representation should facilitate policy change demanded by social
movements, thus I expect the interaction to be both positive and statistically significant. A
proportional representation system increases the probability a state will adopt same-sex
partnership recognition and this finding is statistically significant in both the proportional
representation interaction model, as well as the federalism interaction model. Using the results
from model 3, in which proportional representation is statistically significant and not a
constituent term, I find that states with a proportional representation system are over four times
more likely (an increase of 419.9%) to adopt a partnership recognition policy than states with a
majoritarian system. Figures A1 and B1 below show the predicted year of partnership policy
adoption relative to the actual adoption of a partnership policy by electoral system. The estimates
for proportional representation systems show an increase from 1990 through 2005 at which point
the probability of adoption begins to decline; this corresponds to the increase in policy adoptions
that occurred in 2000. The predicted year for policy adoption in majoritarian systems is
comparatively more flat and does not correspond as closely to observations of actual policy
adoption. The average until partnership recognition policy adoption if all states had a
proportional representation system would be 29 years whereas the predicted duration until
adoption if all states had a majoritarian system would be 41 years. Thus I incorporate this into
the dataset based on the year of entry for each state. The average predicted year for adoption if
all states had majoritarian system would be 2017 rather than 2004 if all states had a proportional
representation system.
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Figure B1
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Figure C1
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When I examine the interaction effects of LGB movement resources and proportional
representation I find that the interaction between organizations and a proportional system
decreases the probability of policy adoption and is statistically significant while the interaction
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between publications and a proportional system increases the probability of partnership
recognition but is not statistically significant. As Figure D1 below shows, the probability of
policy adoption is greater and increases more rapidly if a state with proportional representation
has one organization rather than seven organizations based on the hazard ratio for the interaction
term.54
Figure D1
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A mixed electoral system also improves the probability of partnership recognition policy
adoption compared to a majoritarian system in all five formal institutions models and is
statistically significant in two of the models. Mixed electoral systems are more likely to adopt
partnership recognition policies and their probability increases more rapidly over time compared
to majoritarian states (see Figure E1). Using the results from model 3, I find that the predicted
year of policy adoption would be ten years earlier if all states had mixed electoral systems
compared to the predicted year of adoption if all states had a majoritarian system. This
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Seven organizations is chosen as the comparison because it is the nearest whole number to the mean number of
organizations in the data (6.79).
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corresponds to the expectation that mixed electoral systems are more amenable to LGB rights
policy adoption than majoritarian systems.
Figure E1
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I hypothesized that the structure of the executive impacts the probability of LGB rights
policy adoption with presidential systems being less likely than their mixed executive
counterparts to adopt LGB rights policy. With regard to partnership recognition, I find that the
direct impact of a mixed executive is to decrease the probability of policy adoption but as
organizations in a mixed executive system increase, the probability of partnership recognition
increases. This supports the theoretical understanding of the interactive nature of institutions, but
the findings for the direct and interactive effects are all statistically insignificant.
Federalism should reduce the likelihood of national LGB partnership recognition because
pursuit of policy at lower levels of government may be more appealing and used to facilitate
policy diffusion within a state where federalism is stronger. While it was anticipated that
federalism would reduce the probability of national partnership recognition, the findings show
that across the models federalism improved the probability of policy adoption. When federalism
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is modeled as a filter for LGB movement resources, the findings indicate that that interactions
and direct effect are all positively related to policy change. Furthermore the direct effect as well
as the interaction with LGB national publications is statistically significant. When publications
and organizations are absent in a state, federalism increases the probability of policy adoption
increases by 201.1% over a unitary state (Figure F1). In 1972 a unitary state without a LGB
national publication, such as Austria, is predicted to adopt a partnership recognition policy in
2004, 33 years after entering the dataset. In contrast, that same year a federalist state without a
national LGB publication, Belgium for instance, is predicted to adopt a policy in 1996, 25 years
after entering the dataset. Within a federalist system, a state with a national publication is16.6%
more likely to adopt a partnership policy than a federalist state without a publication. Thus a
federalist state with one publication in 1972, for example Canada, is predicted to adopt a
partnership recognition policy 39 years later after entering the dataset or 2010 while a federalist
state with two publications that same year, for example the United States, is predicted to adopt a
policy 32 years after entering the dataset, 2004.
Figure F1
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International institutions that promote human and civil rights should improve the
probability of LGB rights policy adoption. The results are mixed in terms of the European Union
and European Convention on Human Rights increasing or decreasing the probability of policy
adoption. The European Union decreases the probability of partnership recognition across all
five formal institutions models, while the European Convention on Human Rights increases the
probability of partnership recognition in two models and decreases the probability in three
models. Neither of these supranational institutions is statistically significant in any of the models.
Furthermore, the interactions between these institutions and LGB movement resources are also
statistically insignificant, though the interaction with publications does have the expected effect.
Across the formal institutions models I control for the prior existence of antidiscrimination policies with the expectation that partnership recognition is less probable in states
that lack such protections. General antidiscrimination provisions that fail to explicitly include
LGB persons are negatively related to the probability across the models while the presence of an
anti-discrimination policy that explicitly includes LGB persons increases the probability of
partnership recognition in four of the five formal institutions models. The findings for both types
of discrimination policy are statistically insignificant in all of the models, which is surprising
given the expectations especially in the context of the previous literature.
Across the models for formal institutions the findings show mixed support for the theory
and implied hypotheses regarding the relationship between formal institutions and LGB
movement resources to partnership recognition policies. While the findings for organizations and
the electoral system support the expectation regarding the direction and importance of their
impact, the interaction terms in which they are constituent variables do not support the theory.
The findings for federalism are surprising with regard to their impact on the probability of
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policy, though not in their importance on the probability of policy adoption. Supranational
institutions had neither the importance nor the impact anticipated, but this finding is similar in
some ways to the findings in the previous chapter. Prior discrimination policy should be a
necessary precondition to partnership recognition according to Waaldijk (1999), but the models
do not find support for this at least in terms of a direct relationship between anti-discrimination
policy and partnership recognition. As was mentioned in Chapter Three, it is possible that formal
institutions, as well as LGB resources when modeled with formal institutions, serve to shape the
nature and tactics of the LGB movement rather than filter these resources’ effectiveness in
influencing policy changing.
As was mentioned previously in Chapter Three, the results indicating that direct effects
matter while interaction effects do not have important implications for the theory. Although the
political opportunity structure literature supports modeling formal institutions as filters on social
movement resources, it can also imply that the formal institutions structure the movement rather
than filter its effects. The findings here suggest that the latter is the case with regard to LGB
rights. The implications for this alternative specification of the model are discussed more
thoroughly in Chapter Six.
Interaction Between Informal Institutions and Movement Resources
Informal institutions are also theorized to be an important filter on the probability of
policy success for a social movement. As the social climate impacts the position of elected
officials in advanced democracies, it also impacts the possibility the state will adopt LGB rights
policies. Unlike the findings in previous chapters, when examining the impact of the interactions
between LGB movement resources and informal institutions on the probability of partnership
recognition, the findings fail to support filtering effects and produce limited support for the role
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of informal institutions themselves. The findings do, however, provide additional evidence
supporting the importance of women in parliament. Furthermore, they are consistent with
previous results regarding the monotonically increasing probability of policy adoption, which
supports theory.
In the six models of informal institutions interacting with movement resources, the shape
parameter for the baseline hazard, gamma, is found to be consistently positive. This indicates
that the assumptions of monotonically increasing probability of policy adoption are valid. Recall
that I had also theorized that prior adoption of a form of partnership recognition would increase
the probability of additional partnership recognition policies being adopted. To assess this a
shared frailty parameter was included, but this measure is statistically insignificant. This is likely
because changes in the independent variables in the informal institutions themselves capture the
same impact frailty otherwise might have explained.
Of the informal institutions and interaction examined, only change in GDP and the
percentage of women in parliament are statistically significant. The statistical significance found
is for the direct effects of these variables rather than the interaction between the informal
institutions and movement resources. Unlike the formal institutions models neither the
movement resources themselves nor the interaction terms are statistically significant in any of
the models examined.
Ethnic fractionalization should improve the probability a state will adopt policies
providing for the civil rights of minorities groups, including LGB individuals. This includes
increasing the probability a state will adopt some for same-sex partnership recognition policy.
While the expectation was an increase in the probability of policy adoption, the findings
regarding the impact of ethnic fractionalization are mixed. In two of the models ethnic
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fractionalization increases the probability of partnership recognition while in the remaining four
models I find a negative relationship between ethnic fractionalization and policy adoption. These
findings are statistically insignificant in all of the models, thus I cannot be confident in either a
positive or a negative relationship between ethnic diversity and partnership recognition policy
adoption. Similarly, the finding for the interaction between ethnic fractionalization and national
LGB organizations is contrary to expectations. Increases in organizations in more diverse states
decrease the probability of policy adoption according to the model, but this is also statistically
insignificant and thus unreliable.
In the model examining the interaction between changes in GDP and LGB movement
resources I find that change in GDP is statistically significant while the interactions are not.
Because the hazard ratio for change in GDP is one across the models, including model 2 in
which change in GDP is statistically significant, I conclude that changes in GDP in constant US
dollars make policy adoption neither more nor less likely. When I examine the findings further
however, I find increases in the change in GDP produce increases in the probability of
partnership recognition though the change in the probability is extremely small. When the
change in GDP is at its minimum, which is negative, the probability of partnership recognition is
lower and increases more slowly over time than when changes in GDP are higher. Figure G1
also shows change in GDP at its mean and one standard deviation above the mean.
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Figure G1
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Unemployment should be negatively related to the probability of partnership recognition
policy adoption as higher unemployment is likely associated with higher levels of economic
distress and thus less support for minority rights. Three of the informal institutions support this
hypothesis but three of the models find a positive relationship between unemployment and the
probability of same-sex partnership recognition. Also contrary to the hypothesis, the interaction
between unemployment and LGB organizations is also positive and thus the probability of policy
adoption increases as LGB organizations increase in states with higher unemployment.
Confidence in these findings is lacking from all of the six models however because the models
do not reach statistical significance for unemployment and unemployment interaction.
Similar to expectations for ethnic fractionalization, it was hypothesized a higher level of
urbanization would make same-sex partnership recognition policy more likely to be adopted.
Across the models for informal institutions the findings show that states in which urbanization is
above the mean are more likely to adopt policy than states in which the level of urbanization is
below the mean. Unfortunately this finding is not statistically significant in any of the models. It
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was also expected that increases in the number national LGB organizations would increase the
probability of policy adoption in states with urbanization above the mean. However, the
interaction model shows that LGB organizations decrease the probability of partnership
recognition in states with higher levels of urbanization, but this finding is also statistically
insignificant.
As was the case in the previous chapters, the findings support the hypothesis that the
percentage of women in parliament is positively related to the probability of LGB rights policy
adoption. Increasing the percentage of women in parliament from zero to just 1% increases the
probability partnership recognition by 4.5% to 6.7%. In five of the six informal institutions
models this relationship between women in parliament and partnership recognition policy
adoption is also statistically significant. The average duration until the adoption of a same-sex
partnership recognition policy is one year earlier when we assume 1% of the parliamentary seats
in every state are held by women. If however, the percentage of parliamentary seats held by
women were increased to the mean, 13.552 across all states, the duration until policy change
decreases by eight years over the average if zero parliamentary seats were held by women in any
of the states. States with a higher percentage of parliamentary seats held by women are more
likely to adopt a same-sex partnership recognition policy and the probability of policy adoption
increases more rapidly over time compared to states with fewer women in parliament (see Figure
H1).
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Figure H1
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Although direct effects of the percentage of women in parliament are statistically
significant, the interactions between women in parliament and LGB organizations and
publications are not statistically significant. When examining the interaction between women in
parliament and the number of national LGB organizations the findings indicate that, as expected,
it is positively related to the probability of policy adoption. Similarly, the interaction between
women in parliament and the number of national LGB publications was found to be positively
related to the probability of same-sex partnership recognition.
In chapters three and four the party leaning of the executive was measured using two
dummy variables for centrist and rightist party control leaving leftist party affiliation as the null
category. Because of the greater executive leadership often needed to pass partnership
recognition for LGB persons, in this model the effect of leftist party control of the executive was
examined directly. Leftist parties are more amenable to minority rights including LGB rights,
thus it was expect states to be more likely to adopt partnership recognition policy when the
executive is of a leftist party. Contrary to these expectations, leftist control of the executive
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reduces the probability of policy adoption, though this finding is statistically insignificant. When
organizations increase in the context of a leftist executive the finding supports the theory that a
leftist executive will be more open to the LGB movement. The interaction between organizations
and leftist executive increases the probability the state will adopt a partnership recognition
policy. Publications in the same context of a leftist executive reduce the probability of policy
adoption however. Neither of these interactions is statistically significant, thus I do not have
confidence in these findings.
The consistency of the findings for women in parliament in this chapter with those in
Chapters Three and Four support the theoretical expectations and suggest directions for future
research. The literature on tolerance levels of women compared to men suggested that women in
parliament were more likely to be amenable to minority rights, particularly LGB rights,
compared to their male counterparts. Women in parliament may also be serving as a proxy here
for post-materialism in the state, which should also improve the probability of LGB rights policy
adoption. If this is the case, then it suggests that LGB rights are potentially on the agenda for
those with post-materialist values but are lower on this implicit agenda than other minority
rights, notably women’s rights. Thus future research should examine LGB rights policy adoption
within the context of the adoption of other policies that can be identified as related to postmaterialist values.
As mentioned previously, the prior adoption of policies prohibiting discrimination is
often seen as a necessary precursor to the development of partnership recognition. Thus a control
for the adoption of a general anti-discrimination policy that could be interpreted to protect LGB
individuals as well as the adoption of an LGB specific anti-discrimination policy was included. It
was expected LGB specific anti-discrimination policies to have a greater positive effect on the
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probability of partnership recognition than general discrimination prohibitions, but the findings
show that general prohibitions increase the probability of policy adoption by 54.3% to 194.8%
while LGB specific discrimination prohibitions decrease the probability of policy adoption by
34.1% to 63.3%. Also surprising was the lack of statistical significance for either antidiscrimination policy.
Informal institutions were theorized to be an important filter on the effectiveness of the
LGB movement in achieving policy goals regarding partnership recognition. Across the models
the findings fail to support for such an interaction effect. The findings indicate that much like the
models of anti-discrimination policy and military personnel policy, the percentage of women in
parliament plays an important role in determining when a state will adopt partnership recognition
policy. Additionally, the findings do indicate some support for increases in GDP improving the
probability of a state adopting partnership recognition policy.
The eleven models examined above provide important insights into the validity of the
current theory as well as provide implications for future theory development. Formal and
informal institutions were theorized to serve as filters on the ability of a social movement to
achieve policy gains. While the findings show some support for interaction effects between
movement resources and the formal structures of government, the impact of informal institutions
in these models is exclusive direct effects. This is notably different from the findings in previous
chapters in which formal institutions had only direct effects and informal institutions produced
both direct and filtering effects.
Similar to the findings from the previous chapters, findings indicate that the impact of the
electoral system on the probability of policy adoption is significant and supports the theory that
majoritarian systems are less likely to adopt LGB rights policies than states with proportional
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representation or mixed electoral systems. Furthermore, the findings show that the percentage of
women in parliament improves the probability of policy and is statistically significant as was the
case in the previous chapters. Further discussion of the implications of the comparative findings
across chapters can be found in Chapter Six.
Conclusion
When a state will adopt a policy providing legal recognition to same-sex partners is a
function of the resources of the LGB movement and their interaction with the formal and
informal institutions in the state. These formal and informal institutions make up the political
context that can serve to either impede or encourage social movement success defined as the
achievement of policy goals. The foundations of this theory are a combination of resource
mobilization theory, political opportunity structure modeling, the process model of policy
making, and the policy diffusion literature. The eleven models presented above examine the
applicability of this theory to the adoption of partnership recognition policies for LGB persons
using event history modeling. The findings from these models provide mixed support for the
theory, validating some hypotheses while indicating possible reconsideration of others. Formal
institutions, specifically the electoral system and federalism, serve as filters on LGB movement
resources but also directly impact the probability of policy adoption. Informal institutions
directly impact the probability of partnership recognition, but do not appear to mitigate the
impact of movement resources on policy adoption.
In order to illustrate the differences between a leader and laggard state with regard to
partnership recognition, I examined the policy developments in the Netherlands and the United
States earlier in the chapter. Furthermore the position and applicable policies of the European
Union that impact many of the cases in the study was also examined. Although these two states

212

represent extremes in the dataset—the Netherlands has adopted full marriage equality while the
US has adopted policy prohibiting federal recognition of marriage equality—the states in the
data are narrowly defined and thus even the extremes remain characteristic of the sample. When
examining the implications of the findings for the theory, it will be helpful to also reevaluate
how the findings compare to the observations from the two illustrative cases.
LGB movement resources were measured as the number of national organizations,
indicating movement strength, and the number of national publications, which would indicate the
ability of the movement to disseminate information. The results for the direct effects of
movement resources are mixed. In seven of the eleven models it was found that LGB
organizations increase the probability of policy adoption, but in the remaining four models the
opposite effect can be observed. The results for organizations are only statistically significant for
four models, but these four models all show organizations increasing the probability of
partnership recognition policy adoption. In contrast, the number of publications reduces the
probability of policy adoption in all eleven models and this finding is statistically significant for
only two of the models. While an attempt to include only publications that served to disseminate
political and/or cultural information was made in the data collection, it is possible that some
publications included served little or no political purpose.55 To the extent that publications whose
primary purpose was to facilitate sexual relations between LGB persons were included in the
dataset, this measure may capture apolitical aspects of the LGB community. The findings for
publications parallel the observations in the illustrative cases. The United States consistently had
more LGB national publications than the Netherlands, yet the Dutch have been far more
progressive in their adoption of partnership recognition policies. While the United States may
55

While publication content was validated via internet searches whenever possible, publications from the 1970s and
1980s that are no longer in circulation were included in the dataset provided their existence was validated but their
primary purpose could not always be discerned.

213

have more publications, it is also the case that many of these publications are narrowly tailored
to specific sub-communities with the broader LGB movement (the Advocate would be a notable
exception in its broader readership base).
The models examining the impact of formal institutions support the hypothesis that
proportional representation and mixed electoral systems will increase the probability of
partnership recognition compared to majoritarian systems. This corresponds to the observations
for the Netherlands, a proportional representation system that was also an earlier adopter of
policies recognizing same-sex partners, and the United States, a laggard state with a majoritarian
electoral system.
Contradictory to the expectations were the findings for the interaction between
proportional representation systems and LGB movement resources. Organizations and
publications pursuing policy adoption in a state with a proportional representation system should
experience greater success than their counterparts in states with a majoritarian system. While I
find this to be the case with regard to LGB publications, I find the opposite with regard to
organizations. Based on the results from the interaction model, it may be the case that the impact
of a proportional representation system without any LGB organizations renders the impact of
adding organizations less relevant.
Presidential systems were hypothesized to be less likely to adopt LGB rights policies than
mixed executive systems, but across the models for formal institutions I find that mixed electoral
systems are less likely to adopt partnership recognition policy than presidential systems. This
finding is mitigated by the fact that increases in organizations in a state with a mixed executive
increase the probability of policy adoption over similar increases in a presidential system. This
indicates a mixed executive system makes policy adoption more likely when there are
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organizations to apply pressure to the executive, but not in the absence of social movement
pressures. The impact of the structure of the executive or its interaction with the number of
organizations in a state should not be overestimated as neither is statistically significant. This is
possibly a function of the greater importance of the legislature and thus the electoral system in
general in the policy making process.
Amongst the most surprising findings was the impact of federalism on the probability of
policy adoption. I had hypothesized that federalism would make national LGB policy adoption
less likely because it would encourage movement resources to be diverted toward policy change
at the subnational level. The illustrative cases supported this hypothesis as I have observed
national policy change in the Netherlands, a unitary state, and subnational policy developments
in the United States, a federalist state. The findings that federalism increases the probability of
national policy adoption may be evidence of policy diffusion that promotes national policy
action. Spain, for example, experienced the adoption of partnership recognition at lower levels of
government prior to 2005 when the Spanish national government passed a marriage equality
policy. It may be that policy diffusion at the subnational level serves as an impetus for national
policy change, thus future research should examine how policy trends at the subnational level
impact the probability of national policy.
I expected membership in the European Union to increase the probability that a state
would adopt partnership recognition policies, but as described above, I find that European Union
membership decreases the probability of policy adoption. This is less surprising in the context of
the previous discussion of the European Union policy on partnership recognition. The EU has
been notably reluctant to pass a directive that would address same-sex partnership recognition
and existing policies on family reunification have not been interpreted to require that states
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recognize same-sex partners as family. Recent expansions of the European Union to Eastern bloc
states that staunchly resist LGB partnership recognition has further reduced the probability of the
European Parliament enacting policy that would require states to recognize same-sex
partnerships.
It was also expected that states that have signed the European Convention on Human
Rights would be more likely to adopt partnership recognition policies, but I find the impact of
the ECHR to be inconsistent across the models. States that are subject to the ECHR are more
likely to adopt partnership recognition policies in two of the models but the other four models
indicate that ECHR states are less likely to adopt partnership recognition policy. Article 12 of the
convention states that the right to marry is a human right that should not be infringed, but also
states that it is right of “men and women” and this has been interpreted as the right of a man to
marry a woman and vice versa rather than a human right for all men and women to marry
whomever they choose. Thus, while the ECHR has been a progressive force in mandating that
states remove discriminatory policy toward LGB persons in the military and has promoted the
adoption of anti-discrimination policies, the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human
Rights has declared unequivocally that marriage rights decisions are to be left to the states. Based
on the lack of dissenting opinions regarding Article 12 in Schalk and Kopf v Austria 2010, it
unlikely that states will see the ECHR as promoting the adoption of partnership recognition
policy. This indicates that the theory may need to be more nuanced in its expectations of the
impact of the ECHR based on the specific policy rather than regard the ECHR as generally
improving the probability of LGB rights policy adoption.
I theorized that ethnic fractionalization would increase the probability of partnership
recognition policy adoption because increased diversity should promote the adoption of minority
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rights policies generally. While previous chapters have found support for the theory, in the six
models for partnership recognition the findings are inconsistent. Ethnic diversity increases the
probability of policy adoption in two of the models but decreases the probability of partnership
recognition in the other four models and when multiplied by the number of organizations in the
state. Furthermore, unlike the findings in Chapter Three, these findings for ethnic
fractionalization are statistically insignificant. It may be the case the ethnic diversity is more
closely related to policies regarding discrimination that effect all minority groups, but is less
relevant to partnership recognition because of the lack of barriers to marriage based on ethnicity.
For instance, United States is an ethnically diverse state, but arguments that modern LGB
marriage inequality is comparable to the anti-miscegenation laws of the past have not been able
to gain traction within ethnic minority communities. Thus the diversity of the United States has
not improved the probability of partnership recognition policy adoption.
Our results for the impact of changes in GDP across the models appear to be nonexistent,
though this hazard ratio of one is statistically significant in one model. When I examine these
findings visually however, I see that increases in GDP improve the probability a state will adopt
a partnership recognition policy as hypothesized. The impact of GDP in constant United States
dollars is very small, but positive and statistically significant. If I were to measure changes in
GDP on a different scale, the impact of changes in GDP on policy adoption would appear larger,
though this would not affect the statistical significance in any of the models.
Unemployment was hypothesized to decrease the probability a state would adopt LGB
rights policy because economic distress tends to discourage the adoption of minority rights
policies. In the assessment of the duration until states adopt a partnership recognition policy I
find that unemployment decreases the probability of policy adoption in three models, but
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increases the probability in the other three. When organizations are working in the context of
higher unemployment I find, as hypothesized, that policy is less likely to be adopted. The
inconsistency of the findings for unemployment may be a function of the relationship between
the economic benefits of partnership recognition and feelings of economic distress in society.
State recognition of a partnership provides economic benefits ranging in scope by both state and
type of recognition policy. When unemployment and thus economic distress is high, there will be
less support from the general public to extend economic advantages to new groups. These same
periods of economic distress are also when LGB persons may become more aware of the
magnification of economic hardship that occurs when one’s relationship is not recognized by the
state and thus may be more inclined to mobilize. Because both of these responses occur
simultaneously, it is difficult to tease apart the impact of unemployment on the probability of
partnership recognition policy adoption.
States with higher levels of urbanization are more likely to adopt LGB rights policies
than states with lower levels of urbanization. As anticipated I find that states where urbanization
is above the mean are more likely to adopt partnership recognition policy than states where
urbanization is below 72.85%. Surprisingly, this is statistically insignificant. The lack of
statistical significance is likely related to the number of observed policy adoptions in the dataset.
Extending these data by five additional years, to 2010, would increase the number of partnership
recognition policies and thus increase the probability of finding statistical significance. Thus I
anticipate that future research will also find urbanization to be positively related to partnership
recognition but will further find this relationship to be statistically significant.
As previously discussed, I find that the percentage of parliamentary seats held by
women is both positively related to partnership recognition policy adoption and statistically
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significant as hypothesized. When LGB movement resources increase in the context of a greater
number of women in parliament, the probability of policy adoption also increases, though these
findings are not statistically significant. The findings for women in parliament correspond to
both the theoretical expectations as well as the observations from the two illustrative case
studies. The Netherlands has a consistently greater proportion of its parliamentary seats held by
women compared to the United States and has also adopted every form of partnership
recognition including marriage for same-sex couples whereas the United States has defined
marriage as exclusively heterosexual at the national level.
Perhaps the most surprising findings of this chapter are the results for the party of the
executive which are neither statistically significant nor in the anticipated direction. Leftist
control of the executive should increase the probability a state will adopt a policy recognizing
same-sex partnerships, but the results show that such states are much less likely to adopt a policy
than states with a centrist or rightist executive. These findings for the executive are likely driven
by the categorization of the executive in the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, and
Lithuania when each adopted to define marriage as exclusively heterosexual. Furthermore, of the
partnership recognition policy adoptions that occur in the dataset, only three occur when the
executive is categorized as leftist.
I controlled for the prior adoption of anti-discrimination policy across all eleven models
and find that existence of a general or a LGB specific anti-discrimination policy in a state does
not significantly impact the probability of partnership recognition policy adoption. In the formal
institutions model a general discrimination prohibition decreases the probability of policy
adoption while a LGB specific discrimination policy increases the probability a state will adopt a
partnership recognition policy. In the informal institutions models I find the converse; general
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anti-discrimination laws increase the probability of a state adopting partnership recognition
policy while LGB specific discrimination laws decrease the probability of policy adoption. This
would seem to validate the separation of formal and informal institutions models as each set of
models has different implications for our understanding of the relationship between
discrimination prohibitions and the probability of partnership recognition.
Formal and informal institutions were theorized to serve as important filters on social
movement demands for policy adoption. Using a series of five duration models I examined how
the interactions as well as direct effects of formal institutions and movement resources impact
the probability of partnership recognition policy adoption. I find some support for the hypotheses
that the electoral system and federalism would interact with LGB movement resources to impact
the probability of policy adoption. I also find LGB organizations and the electoral system have
significant direct effects on the probability of policy adoption independent of each other. In the
six informal institutions models I fail to find support for the expectation that informal institutions
would serve as filters on movement resources and find instead support for the direct effects of
informal institutions. In particular I find that the percentage of women in parliament, as in
previous chapters, is positively and significantly related to the probability of policy adoption.
States provide legal recognition to some relationships and such recognition imparts upon
the relationship rights, obligations, and privileges for the parties involved as well as the state.
LGB persons seek partnership recognition not only for the economic and legal and benefits that
recognition by the state would provide, but also for the symbolic value such acknowledgement
would provide. States that recognize same-sex partnerships signal to society that LGB persons
and their relationships are valid. When this recognition provides equality with heterosexual
relationship recognition, the state indicates that LGB persons are equal under the law and their
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relationship as acceptable as heterosexual relationships. States have been reluctant to provide
such recognition to same-sex couples largely because of the cultural norms in place that provide
primacy to heteronormative notions of family.
When a state will move to partnership recognition outside heteronormative standards is a
function of formal and informal institutions creating a policy context in which the LGB
movement is more or less likely to achieve policy success. I have used a series of event history
models to analyze this theory and its associated hypotheses for thirty-five advanced democracies
from 1971 to 2005. I find that while there are some interaction effects between movement
resources and formal institutions, in general the direct effects of movement resources and
institutions are more significant than the interactions between the two in determining the
probability a policy will be adopted. These findings partially correspond to the findings from
Chapters Three and Four. In the subsequent chapter I will explore how the findings from this
chapter as well as the previous two chapters fit together to provide both support for some aspects
of the theory as well as cause for reconsideration of others.
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Chapter 6 Conclusion
When do social movements achieve success? This dissertation has sought to respond to
this question via analysis of the transnational LGB movement. The research here contributes to
several important areas of political science research including the social movements literature,
public policy literature, and the growing, but still new, literature on LGBT politics. Furthermore,
the findings presented in chapters three through five have both practical and theoretical
implications which will be discussed below.
Social movements, particularly social movements organized around minority rights,
pursue policy changes that will provide members of the movement with more equitable access to
the polity. The LGB movement is no exception in its pursuit of public policies to benefit LGB
persons. Here I have chosen three policy areas that are or have been goals of the LGB movement
in advanced industrialized democracies: anti-discrimination policies, access to military service,
and partnership recognition. These represent goals that have been achieved in some, but not all
advanced democracies. Furthermore, these three policy areas align with Waaldijk’s (1999)
proposed evolution of policy goals for LGB persons. This dissertation addresses LGB policies in
the order indicated by Waaldijk’s (1999) analysis which expects anti-discrimination policies to
precede policy expansion to other rights. Thus, anti-discrimination policies were discussed first,
followed by military personnel policy, and then partnership recognition with the expectation that
anti-discrimination laws increase the probability of subsequent policies being adopted.
The literature on LGBT rights has often been dominated by qualitative comparisons
across just a few countries, anecdotal or historical research seeking to provide voice to the
movement, or quantitative analysis that is limited to issues within a single state. This research
contributes to that literature via its scope. By examining policy developments in thirty-five
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advanced industrialized democracies from 1971 to 2005 in the context of theories from both the
social movement literature as well as the policy literature, this study helps advance the
integration of LGB rights research into the broader canon of political science research.
To understand when a social movement will achieve policy success, one must be
grounded in social movement theories broadly. Here I draw on resource mobilization and
political opportunity structure to inform the selection of explanatory variables for social
movement success. Both resource mobilization and political opportunity structure explain why a
social movement is successful in one context and unsuccessful in another. Resource mobilization
proposes that movement resources will coalesce when and where the benefits and probability of
success is greater (Tilly 1978). Political opportunity structure contributes to this idea by
explaining how the political environment alters the probability of success (Van Der Heijden
2006).
When resource mobilization theory and political opportunity structure are incorporated
into policy theories, it becomes clear that policy adoption is also contingent on time. Models of
success must account for both incremental as well as sudden change. Furthermore, in a crossnational comparison such as this one, it is imperative that considerations of proximity be
included according to the policy diffusion literature. States that are close in proximity are more
likely to experience policy diffusion than those that are disparate physically, ideologically,
and/or historically.
This research sheds light on how resource mobilization, political opportunity structure,
and policy theories combine to create a broader formulation of how formal and informal
institutions interact with movement resources in the process of policy adoption and change. The
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theory here has argued for operationalization of institutions, both formal and informal, as
mitigating factors on the connection between movement resources and policy adoption.
Political opportunity structure developed into the dominant paradigm for social
movement research during its rapid growth from the 1970s onward. As discussed in Chapters
One and to a greater extent Two, this paradigm describes systems as open or closed to social
movements. In the context of analyzing social movement success, the open or closed nature of
the political opportunity structure has been conceptualized as a filter either impeding or
facilitating success (Kitschelt 1986, Hilson 2002). Gamson and Meyer’s (1996)
conceptualization of political opportunity distinguishes cultural (informal institutions) and
institutional (formal institutions) features from one another as the basis for the division of
models. Relying on this distinction, the probability of policy adoption for each policy was
analyzed in two series of models, one series which examines the interaction terms for formal
institutions and another series of models examining the interaction terms for informal
institutions.
The findings here suggest that formal institutions are important determinants of the
probability of policy adoption, but the evidence does not support an intervening role for formal
institutions. Formal institutions remain important, but independent from movement resources
suggesting policy diffusion via similar institutions more accurately depicts the influence of
formal institutions on LGB policies. The demands of the LGB movement are often framed as
altering cultural norms and thus political structures may be relevant in the extent to which they
facilitate changing social norms generally, but increases in the size of the movement do not
impact the level of recalcitrance, or lack thereof, inherent to some structures. For example,
majoritarian systems may be less likely to respond to any movement, regardless of size, that is
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perceived to be too far outside of the social norms for fear of losing the median voter. Thus the
electoral system is important but the interaction between the movement and the electoral system
is not. Similarly, a federalist structure may provide opportunities for national governments to
observe policies at a lower level and make adoption decisions based on the experiences in these
policy laboratories. If national policy is guided by the success or failure of state policies, then the
size of the national LGB movement is less relevant than state level LGB organizations and their
success in achieving change at that level.
Informal institutions provide evidence of both independent as well as filtering effects.
Informal institutions reflect changing cultural norms such as the reduction of gender norms and
increases in post-materialism reflected in the election of women to political office. Because
informal institutions vary much more over time, in accordance with cultural shifts, than formal
institutions, which are essentially static, this suggests that social movements are better served
when resources are devoted to social changes rather than aimed at changing institutions.
Below I will review the hypotheses and reexamine the results across chapters to provide
revised specifications of the model updated by the findings. Additionally I argue that efforts to
change gender norms are the most efficient use of LGB resources, regardless of the specific
policy goal.
Review of Hypotheses
The preceding three chapters tested eleven hypotheses in the context of three different
substantive policy areas. The findings together provide important insights into how the impact of
the explanatory variables is both consistent and variable across these related policy areas. The
lack of support for some hypotheses demonstrates the difficulty of modeling new policy areas
related to a social movement still in its relatively early stages. As the movement develops,
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professionalizes, and expands over time beyond LGB identifiers to an increasing number of
allies, additional policy adoption will become more likely and a greater number of data points
will yield more reliable results.
It is also arguable that the unpopularity and historical lack of tolerance toward the LGB
community contributes to the difficulties of analyzing policy progress over the course of a short
period of time. Public opinion and policy has until very recently been at best intolerant of LGB
persons and at worst actively persecutory, thus LGB policy adoption has been slow to develop.
As social acceptance increase, which is occurring particularly rapidly as of this writing, it is
possible that variables currently insignificant but commonly associated with minority rights
policy adoption will be significant in future models.56 This also contributes to the inconsistencies
in findings across policy areas as equality begins narrowly defined in economic nondiscrimination terms and subsequently expands to cultural equality. Table 6.1 and 6.2 below
summarize the findings across chapters by hypothesis. These findings are briefly reviewed for
each hypothesis with implications for formal and informal institutions as sets of hypotheses
discussed at the end of each subsection. Although the results for each of the hypotheses is
reviewed, greater attention is devoted to those findings that are statistically significant and have
important implications for the theoretical understanding of LGB policy adoption and practical
repercussions for LGB movement behavior.
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For example, in the United States public opinion has shifted from only 30% of Americans agreeing with marriage
equality in 2004 to 46% in 2010 (Teixeria 2011). Similarly, in Ireland only 41% of those polled in 2006 agreed with
marriage equality (Eurobarometer 2006). By 2012, public support for marriage equality in Ireland had risen to 73%
(Grey 2012).
Given that MySpace launched in 2003, Facebook launched in 2004, Youtube launched in 2005, and Twitter was
started in 2006, it would be interesting to research the extent to which the rise of social media has accelerated social
acceptance.
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Table 6.1
Formal Institutions Models: Ratio of Models Supporting the Hypothesis
Chapter 3:
Chapter 4:
Chapter 5:
Anti-discrimination
Military Personnel
Partnership
Recognition
Social Movement
Resources
Organizations
4/5 (0/5)
5/5 (0/5)
4/5 (4/5)
Publications
0/5 (3/5)~
0/5 (0/5)
0/5 (2/5)~
H1: Electoral
System
H1a: PR Direct
0/5 (5/5)~
5/5 (0/5)
5/5 (2/5)
Effects
H1b: PR Interaction
2/2 (0/2)
0/2 (0/2)
1/2 (1/2)~
H1c: Mixed
0/5 (4/5)~
2/5 (0/5)
5/5 (2/5)
Electoral Direct
Effects
H2: Executive
Structure
H2a: Direct Effects
0/5 (1/5)~
2/5 (0/5)
0/5 (0/5)
H2b: Interaction
1/1 (0/1)
0/1 (0/1)
1/2 (0/2)
H3: Federalism
H3a: Direct Effects
2/5 (0/5)
0/5 (1/5)~
0/5 (1/5)~
H3b: Interaction
1/2 (0/2)
1/2 (0/2)
0/2 (1/2)~
H4: European
Union
H4a: Direct Effects
0/5 (0/5)
5/5 (0/5)
0/5 (0/5)
H4b: Interaction
1/2 (0/2)
1/2 (0/2)
1/2 (0/2)
H5: European
Convention
H5a: Direct Effects
5/5 (4/5)
0/5 (0/5)
2/5 (0/5)
H5b: Interaction
1/1 (0/1)
0/1 (0/1)
1/1 (0/1)
AntiDiscrimination
General Prohibition
-5/5 (5/5)
0/5 (0/5)
LGB Prohibition
-5/5 (5/5)
5/5 (0/5)
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Table 6.2
Informal Institutions Models: Ratio of Models Supporting the Hypothesis
Ch 3: AntiCh 4: Military
Ch 5: Partnership
Discrimination
Policy
Recognition
Social Movement
Resources
Organizations
3/5 (1/5)~
4/5 (1/6)
3/6 (0/6)
Publications
2/5 (0/5)
1/5 (1/6)~
0/6 (0/6)
H6: Women in
Parliament
H6a: Direct Effects
4/5 (4/5)
6/6 (6/6)
6/6 (5/6)
H6b: Interaction
2/2 (1/2)
1/2 (0/2)
2/2 (0/2)
H7: Party of
Executive
H7a: Rightist Exec.
1/5 (0/5)
6/6 (0/6)
-Direct Effects
H7b: Rightist Exec.
1/2 (0/2)
1/2 (0/2)
-Interaction
H7c: Centrist Exec.
1/5 (05)
0/6 (0/6)
-Direct Effects
H7d: Leftist Exec.
--0/6 (0/6)
Direct Effects
H7e: Leftist Exec.
--1/2 (0/2)
Interaction
H8: Change in
GDP per capita
H8a: Direct Effects
0/5 (0/5)
0/6 (0/6)
0/6 (1/2)^
H8b: interaction
0/5 (0/5)
0/2 (0/2)
0/2 (0/2)
H9:
Unemployment
H9a: Direct Effects
0/5 (3/5)~
3/6 (0/6)
3/6 (0/6)
H9b: Interaction
0/1 (0/1)
0/1 (0/1)
0/1 (0/1)
H10: Urbanization
H10a: Direct Effects
0/5 (2/5)~
6/6 (6/6)
6/6 (0/6)
H10b: Interaction
-½ (1/2)~
0/1 (0/1)
H11: Ethnic
Fractionalization
H11a: Direct Effects
5/5 (5/5)
0/6 (0/6)
2/6 (0/6)
H11b: Interaction
0/1 (1/1)~
1/2 (0/2)
0/1 (0/1)
AntiDiscrimination
General Prohibition
-6/6 (6/6)
6/6 (0/6)
LGB Prohibition
-6/6 (6/6)
0/6 (0/6)
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Formal Institutions Hypotheses
H1: Policy adoption will occur more quickly in states with more movement
resources and either a proportional or mixed electoral system than in states with a
majoritarian system.
Across the three substantive policy chapters, the results for the electoral system indicate
that direct effects are more important than interaction effects and the direction of the impact
varies by policy type. A proportional representation system increases the probability of
partnership recognition policy adoption but decreases the probability of anti-discrimination
policy compared to a majoritarian system. The direct effects of proportional representation on
military policy were not statistically significant. The direct effects of a mixed electoral system
are similar: the probability of policy adoption decreases with regard to anti-discrimination policy
and is statistically significant across all five models, but increases with regard to partnership
recognition and statistically significant in two models. Furthermore, the findings for the direct
effects of a mixed electoral system on military policy are insignificant.
A possible explanation for the differences between the findings for anti-discrimination
and partnership recognition policy adoption is the scope of the norm of equality within
democratic systems and the electoral mandate generated by a majoritarian system. Norms of
equality of economic opportunity existed in democracies longer than more expansive
understandings of equality that include access to social institutions. Thus an electoral mandate
for equal treatment of minorities, including LGB persons, with regard to economic opportunity
in a majoritarian system is more feasible than a mandate promoting the adoption of partnership
recognition policy.
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Another explanation is the prevalence of larger more inclusive welfare states where the
electoral system is either proportional representation or mixed. Partnership recognition has
proceeded from minimal rights based on cohabitation to nearly full marriage equality in gradual
steps in most states. Where access to social services is not directly linked to marriage, it may be
easier to pass legislation extending cohabitation rights. Although a majoritarian system does not
preclude a large welfare state, amongst the cases used in this analysis the size of the welfare state
also varies in conjunction with the electoral system. This same connection does not hold for antidiscrimination policy adoption, thus a proportional representation system or a mixed system
improves the probability of partnership recognition policy adoption but does not improve the
probability of anti-discrimination policy. Future research should include a measure of the welfare
state to differentiate between the effect of the electoral system and the impact of the welfare
state.
H2: Policy adoption will occur more quickly in states with more movement resources and a
mixed executive than in states with a presidential executive.
The results across policy areas show that, contrary to expectations, states with a president
rather than a mixed executive have an increased probability of policy adoption. This finding was
consistent across all models of anti-discrimination and partnership recognition policies and in
three of the five models of military policy. The structure of the executive is statistically
significant as a direct effect with a mixed executive structure decreasing the probability of antidiscrimination policy adoption compared to a presidential system. Models incorporating mixed
electoral systems as an intervening effect on movement resources produced inconsistent and
insignificant results for the interaction term.
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Presidential systems generally use a national popular election to determine who will hold
the office of the presidency, thus presidents have a national electoral mandate but must also
appeal to majority. Because LGB persons have constituted a particularly unpopular minority
until recent developments in some states, it was anticipated that presidents would view support
of LGB rights as a political liability in courting the median voter. Nevertheless, the findings
show that presidential systems increase the probability of LGB rights policy adoption. This may
also be attributable to the electoral mandate that presidents command. The national electoral
mandate gives the office of the president a more powerful position and more opportunity to be a
strong leader. Prime ministers, in contrast, must maintain the coalition and pursue a policy
agenda accommodating multiple parties.57 Thus compromise is common and policy change may
be slower.
It is important here that a feature of the data set used here is that the majority of the states
in which a mixed executive exists are parliaments that have had coalition governments for most
or all of the time frame under analysis. Furthermore the possibility that this finding is spurious is
possible, especially in light of the small number of presidential systems in the data set.
Expansion of the dataset to include additional states may change the findings or the feasible
explanations for the positive relationship between presidential systems and the probability of
policy adoption. As the number of presidential systems included the analysis grows the
likelihood of spurious findings should decrease. Furthermore, it is also probable that expansions
in the dataset will decrease the predominance of coalition cabinets in parliamentary systems and
increase the number of states with majority cabinets.

57

It is important here that a feature of the data set used here is that the majority of the states in which a mixed
executive exists are parliaments that have had coalition governments for most or all of the time frame under
analysis. Furthermore the possibility that this finding is spurious is possible, especially in light of the small number
of presidential systems in the data set.
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The leadership capacity afforded a president by the electoral mandate not available to any
other elected official on the national level creates an opportunity for the president to incorporate
her or his ideological preferences into the policy agenda. A strong leader capable of reshaping
the policy agenda may be essential to the development of minority rights for unpopular groups
facing strong social norm opposition. Prime ministers are inherently less capable of functioning
as a strong leader in a similar fashion as attempts to undermine strong social norms could
threaten the stability of a coalition government.
H3: Policy adoption will occur more quickly in unitary states with more movement
resources than in federalist states.
For military personnel and partnership recognition policy, federalist states rather than
unitary states had a higher probability of policy adoption across all of the models. In each policy
area this finding was statistically significant for one of the models. The models for antidiscrimination policy find federalism to be statistically insignificant. Findings for federalism as a
filtering mechanism on social movement resources were mixed based with variance in the
direction of impact depending upon the policy and the operationalization of movement resources.
With regard to partnership recognition, increases in publications in federalist states produced a
higher probability of policy adoption and were statistically significant.
Federalism is statistically significant for military personnel policy adoption as well as
partnership recognition policy adoption, but in both cases the significance is only in one of five
models. The limited statistical significance is cause to be cautious in speculating on the
implications of these results and to reserve strong assertions until additional data can be
incorporated into the analysis, particularly expansion of the data to include a larger number of
federalist states.
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These findings further suggest that policy diffusion via emulation and the perceived
importance of policy harmonization within federalist democracies should be given greater
consideration in future modeling. It was beyond the scope of this research to examine preexisting
lower level policies prior to the adoption of national policy, but the results indicate that policy
diffusion via the policy laboratory model may be important. National governments may choose
to adopt LGB rights policy as an effort to harmonize policy across regions or cities that are
otherwise diverging into leaders and laggards within the state. It is also possible that states will
move to adopt national policy after policy entrepreneurs observe the benefits of expanding LGB
rights at the lower level of governance and thus advocate for national adoption.
H4: Policy adoption will occur more quickly in states with more movement resources
and that are members of the European Union.
The direct impact of European Union findings was not statistically significant for any of
the three policy areas. The results for the interaction terms between the European Union
movement and LGB movement resources are similarly insignificant in all three policy areas.
Given the EU’s focus on forming a common market with equal treatment of and free movement
for workers, one would expect the EU to have a significant influence on anti-discrimination
policy adoption. The weak implementation powers of the EU combined with noncompliance in
member states due to domestic politics and the lengthy process of pursuing policy change via the
European Court of Justice have resulted in large lags between EU policy adoption and member
state policy adoption in some cases. For example, in 2004 the European Commission began
infringement proceeding against Austria, Germany, Finland, Greece, and Luxembourg, all of
whom had failed to fully transpose the Equal Employment Directive 2000 into national law by
the 2003 deadline. In 2009 the Commission issued a reasoned opinion regarding Germany’s
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continued lack of complete compliance. Over time greater compliance will be achieved amongst
member states, thus it is likely that as the data set is expanded chronologically the European
Union will become significant.
H5: Policy adoption will occur more quickly in states with more movement resources
and that have signed the European Convention on Human Rights.
The findings for antidiscrimination policies confirm the hypothesis for the direct effect of
the ECHR consistently across the five formal institutions models and are statistically significant
in four. The findings for military personnel and partnership recognition policies do not support
the hypothesis, with four of the five models for military policy and three of the models for
partnership recognition showing a reduced probability of policy adoption for ECHR member
states. Conceptualizing the ECHR as a filter on movement resources via an interaction term
produces mixed results that lack statistical significance.
The influence of the ECHR, much like that for the EU, may be forthcoming due to the
lack of implementation power wielded by the European Court of Human Rights. Although
decisions in the European Court of Human Rights may compel states to adopt policy that will
bring the state into compliance with the ECHR, the duration until implementation of these
decisions is likely a function of the legal system in individual states. Additionally these decisions
may be a function of the particular policy addressed by the European Court of Human Rights.
For example, following Lustig-Prean and Beckett v United Kingdom 2000, military policy with
regard to LGB persons changed nearly immediately in the United Kingdom.
Additionally, there is wide variety in the duration between an initial filing with the
European Court of Human Rights and its eventual hearing. For example, Baczkowski and Other v
Poland 2007, a case regarding infringement upon LGB persons’ right to assemble via the
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banning of a Pride parade, was decided in merely a year. In contrast, it took the court five years
to hear Case of L. and V. v Austria 2003, a case regarding discrimination in the age of consent
and criminalization of homosexual acts between consenting adolescents. Because of the wide
variety in case duration, it may be that the content of the case and nuances of the court, rather
than whether or not it is subject to decisions of the court, is relevant.
The findings discussed above show that while formal institutions are important to
understanding when policy change occurs, they do not appear to be functioning as a filter on
social movement resources. The direct effects of formal institutions were statistically significant
and/or consistent in many of the models examined, while the interaction terms were not. The
only interactions between formal institutions and movement resources that were statistically
significant were those for proportional representation and federalism, both of which decreased
probability of partnership recognition policy adoption.
Direct effects are more important than intervening effects for formal institutions because
formal institutions are static. Formal institutions have an independent effect on the probability of
policy change, with states with similar institutions more likely to engage in policy learning from
one another but unlikely to be impacted by the size of the social movement. Institutional change
in the formal structures of government is rare and sluggish, so over time the impact of these
institutions does not vary with the changes in the strength of social movement.58 Of the findings
for formal institutions, the findings for the electoral system, because of their statistical
significance, and federalism, because of their consistency, provide the most interesting results.
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In contrast, changes in the ideological positions of those in power or changes in who hold power within these
institutions will vary over time. Additionally as these changes occur, access to the system for the LGB movement
changes and stronger movements will be in a better position to take advantage of such changes. This point will be
more fully specified in the subsequent discussion of informal institutions, particularly with regard to increases in the
number of women in parliament.
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The direct effects for electoral systems indicate differences across policy type as
proportional representation and mixed electoral systems were statistically significant and reduced
the probability of antidiscrimination policy adoption, but increased the probability of military
and partnership recognition policy adoption. Because proportional representation systems allow
electoral space for the development of labor parties, anti-discrimination legislation that may be
perceived as threatening to labor constituencies will be more difficult to pass. While LGB
organizations have found labor movements dominated by white collar workers to be allies, LGB
organizations seeking coalitions with labor unions and parties dominated by blue collar workers
may be less successful. Thus as post-industrial shifts continue in advanced democracies and
unions increasingly represent white rather than blue collar workers, we should expect labor
parties to forge alliances with the LGB movement as has been the case in Australia and Italy for
example.
Simultaneously, proportional representation systems are associated with larger welfare
states, which decreases the costs associated with expanding marriage rights. Thus a proportional
representation system increases the probability of partnership recognition whilst decreasing the
probability of anti-discrimination policy.
In Chapter Two it was explained that the multiparty system generated by proportional
representation electoral rules should benefit LGB rights as it would increase the probability that a
party would include LGB rights in their platform. Absent from this hypothesis is the relevance of
labor parties in the multiparty system and the resistance of labor parties to anti-discrimination
protections based on sexual orientation. Thus while the PR system may facilitate the rise of a
party amenable to inclusion of LGB interests in the platform, the PR system may also facilitate
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the rise of labor parties that oppose LGB rights. Furthermore the inclusion of conservative
parties in governing coalitions will further hamper the adoption of LGB rights policy.
Rayside (2007) notes that benefits accorded to informal cohabitants create an important
segue toward greater recognition of same-sex partners. As the benefits accorded exclusively to
marriage diminish, the likelihood of marriage equality seems to increase. Thus it should be
expected that where the welfare state provides more benefits unrelated to marital status,
partnership recognition is more probable. The left-labor parties of the PR system decrease the
probability of anti-discrimination policy, but are simultaneously related to a larger welfare state.
Unlike anti-discrimination polices that are perceived as threatening to labor, the extension of
partnership recognition through a series of gradual increases in cohabitation rights that apply to
both opposite and same-sex couples may be perceived as beneficial to labor’s constituency.59
Federalism was originally hypothesized to reduce the probability of national policy
adoption due to devolution and the divisions in LGB resources that are more likely to occur in
federalist systems. The findings suggest that rather than delay national policy adoption,
federalism improves the probability a state will adopt anti-discrimination, LGB-friendly military
personnel, and partnership recognition policy. This may indicate that policy diffusion via the
policy laboratories model rather than coercive diffusion via supranational institutions has greater
value for LGB rights policies.
This section has reviewed possible explanations for the findings on electoral-system and
federalism effects on LGB policy. The differences in statistical significance between the direct
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It is relevant that these are Social Democratic parties rather than Christian Democratic parties because Christian
Democratic parties are likely to be opposed to extension of benefits outside of marriage as well as marriage equality
and thus produce different results. Thus the previously discussed measure of party control of the executive was also
insufficiently nuanced and needs specification as to coalition composition.
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effects and the interaction effects increase the probability that the explanatory power of these
variables would improve with more parsimonious revisions to the model.
Informal Institutions Hypotheses
Informal institutions were modeled separately from formal institutions and provide a
distinct set of findings. Amongst the notable findings that distinguish informal from formal
institutions is the relevance of interaction terms to these models. Similar to the results for the
formal institutions models, the findings discussed briefly below indicate possibilities for
improving the model while gaining greater parsimony.
H6: Policy adoption will occur more quickly in states with more movement resources
and a higher percentage of females in the national legislature.
Across the models from each chapter, increases in the percentage of parliamentary seats
held by women improved the probability the state would adopt an anti-discrimination policy, an
LGB-friendly military personnel policy, and a partnership recognition policy. Furthermore, the
interaction terms examining LGB resources in the context of higher percentages of women in
parliament increased the probability of policy adoption in all three policy areas, though this
finding was only statistically significant for anti-discrimination laws and varied by
operationalization of movement resources for military policy.
One explanation for the importance of women in parliament is their relative liberalism
compared to the male counterparts in parliament (Norris and Lovenduski 1989). Because women
across parties tend to be more liberal than their male counterparts within the party, they are also
more likely to support LGB rights. Additionally, liberal parties are more likely to nominate
women for political office than conservative parties and liberal parties are more likely to be
amenable to LGB rights policies (Kenworth and Malami 1999; Reynolds 1999).
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Women in parliament may also be relevant in that this measure serves as a proxy measure
for changes in gender norms and increasing post-materialist values in a society. Particularly in
the context of a dataset constrained to advanced democracies, where differences in female
representation are less attributable to structural differences such as variation in fertility rates or
wage and literacy gaps for example, differences in the percentage of women in parliament are
attributable to differences in the cultural barriers to women serving as political leaders (Norris
and Inglehart 2001). Amongst these cultural barriers the two most notable are the dominance of
Catholicism or Islam (Kenworth and Malami 1999; Paxton 1997; Reynolds 1999) and traditional
attitudes toward gender roles (Norris and Inglehard 2001; Paxton and Kunovish 2003). Where
gender norms are more relaxed and gender egalitarianism is more prevalent, more women are
elected to political office (Paxton and Kunovish 2003) and support of LGB rights is higher
(Herek 1988). Because of the importance of these findings, I will return to discuss the
implications for both research and practical consequences for movement strategy subsequent to
the review of the remaining hypotheses.
H7: Policy adoption will occur more quickly in states with more movement resources
and an executive of a leftist party than where the executive is of a rightist or centrist party.
Rightist executives and centrist executives increased the probability of anti-discrimination
policy adoption compared to leftist executives in four of five models for each, though this
finding was not statistically significant. With regard to military personnel policy, the findings for
rightist executives were also statistically insignificant, as were the findings for centrist
executives. For partnership recognition policy a leftist executive is measured directly rather than
as a null category but these results are also not statistically significant. When examining the
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interaction between the party of the executive and LGB resources on the probability of policy
adoption, the results are not statistically significant.
The literature supports the importance of amenable public officials, thus one would expect
the party of the executive to be an important determinant of the duration until LGB rights policy
adoption. The null findings may indicate that it is the presence of amenable officials in the
parliament and, where applicable, the coalition composition that determines the duration until
policy adoption. While the party of a prime minister is closely related to the composition of the
coalition, it cannot provide a complete depiction of the power dynamic amongst the parties.
Where the coalition is comprised of a large number of parties, it is less likely that LGB rights
policy will be adopted regardless of the party of the prime minister. While these large coalitions
may pass legislation tailored to the needs of each party’s primary constituency, at the time of this
reading an LGB party has not formed in any of the countries nor is there party in which LGB
rights are primary to the party’s platform. Future research including a measure of the size of the
coalition would likely improve predictions of the probability of LGB policy adoption.
H8: Policy adoption will occur more quickly in states with more movement resources
and greater positive change in GDP per capita.
Increases in GDP per capita neither increased nor decreased the probability of policy
change for anti-discrimination, military personnel, or partnership recognition policies. Though
there is statistical significance for the direct effects of GDP in one model of partnership
recognition, this model indicates that changes in GDP result in an infinitesimal change in the
probability of partnership recognition policy adoption. Furthermore, this finding can only be
interpreted in the absence of LGB movement organizations or publications because of the
inclusion of interaction terms in the model.
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When the findings for the percentage of women in parliament are juxtaposed with the
findings for change in GDP and those for unemployment, which will be discussed below, these
results suggest that cultural norms are a greater determinant of policy adoption than economic
conditions. Perceptions of minority threat to the labor market in time of economic contraction
may only apply when the minority is highly visible based on ethnicity, for example the Roma, or
religion, for example Muslim women who wear the hijab. Because the LGB population is
“invisible,” expansion of anti-discrimination provision in employment does not engender
perceptions of labor market threat.
H9: Policy adoption will occur more quickly in states with more movement
resources and lower unemployment rates.
Higher unemployment rates are positively related to anti-discrimination policy and
statistically significant in three of the six models. The direct effects of unemployment on military
and partnership recognition policies are statistically insignificant. The interaction between
unemployment and LGB movement resources is statistically insignificant for all three policies.
Unemployment may be more relevant to anti-discrimination policies because anti-discrimination
policy is often framed as an economic equality issue
As mentioned previously with regard to changes in GDP per capita, economic conditions
are less important than cultural norms in part because booms in the economy do not necessarily
result in LGB rights policy adoption. The minority threat thesis may be more applicable to more
visible minorities whose entrance into the labor market is more obvious than an influx of LGB
persons into the labor force. Ultimately this leads to statistically insignificant results and the need
to reconsider the inclusion of economic measures in the model. An important caveat is that if one
were to include developing states in the analysis it is possible that economic variables would
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prove significant given greater variation. At the time of this writing such an expansion would
invalidate the assumption of transnational commonality in LGB movement goals.
H10: Policy adoption will occur more quickly in states with more movement
resources and greater urbanization.
Urbanization above the mean increases the probability of policy adoption in all of the
models for both military personnel and partnership recognition policies and is statistically
significant for all of the models examining military policy. Urbanization measured continuously
decreases the probability of anti-discrimination policy and is statistically significant in two of
five models. The results for urbanization acting as a filter on the impact of LGB resources are
mixed with the only statistically significant interaction term indicating that LGB resources in a
state with urbanization above the mean are less likely to lead to adopting LGB-friendly military
personnel policy.
As mentioned in Chapter Three, urbanization measured continuously may decrease the
probability of national anti-discrimination due to the propensity for urban areas to adopt antidiscrimination policies. Because LGB persons in urban areas that provide protections from
discrimination may be less likely to devote resources to pursuing national policy change, in
states with more urbanization, and thus more LGB persons in urban areas and protected from
discrimination, national anti-discrimination policy has a lower priority in the movement. In
Chapter Three I further speculated that this contrary finding would not hold for other policy
areas and that urbanization would increase the probability of military and partnership recognition
policy adoption. With regard to military policy this expectation is borne out but the findings for
partnership recognition are statistically insignificant. This is likely attributable to the relatively
small number of states that have adopted policies more closely approximating marriage equality.

242

Future expansion of the dataset will likely yield statistically significant results confirming these
hypotheses.
H11: Policy adoption will occur more quickly in states with more movement
resources and more ethnic fractionalization
Across the models for anti-discrimination policy, ethnic fractionalization increases the
probability of policy adoption and is statistically significant. When ethnic fractionalization
increases and there are a greater number of LGB organizations, the probability of antidiscrimination policy adoption declines, which is also statistically significant. Ethnic
fractionalization fails to be statistically significant in its direct and interaction effects on military
personnel policy adoption. The direct effect results for ethnic fractionalization are also
statistically insignificant.
Ethnic fractionalization may be more relevant to anti-discrimination policies because in
an ethnically diverse society multiple minorities are unlikely to be seeking access to military
service and are not excluded from marriage. While a diversity of organizations representing a
variety of oppressed groups may pursue adoption of anti-discrimination legislation, racial and
ethnic minorities have not been excluded from marriage or military service in the states and time
parameters of the dataset. Thus the state may respond to the variety of groups pursuing
protections from discrimination via a single policy with broad reach. Furthermore, some of these
minority groups may be represented by political parties whose demands must be given
consideration in the governing coalition, but an LGB party does exist at the time of this writing
in any of the countries investigated in this research.
The finding about increased LGB resources in ethnically diverse societies may indicate
that the LGB movement is more fractionalized in a state with a greater number of ethnic groups.
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As was the case within the women’s movement, ethnic minorities may experience the LGB
movement as dominated by the majority ethnic group and thus unreflective of the interests that
arise of intersecting minority identities. As a result the number of LGB organizations and/or
publications increases in an ethnically diverse state as a function of splintering rather than
growing strength. For example, in the United States lesbians of color responded to perceived
invisibility within the LGB movement by forming separatist groups such as Berkley’s Lesbians
of Color or United Lesbians of African Heritage. Because these separatist organizations often
form around a different set of goals than “mainstream” LGB organizations, the proliferation of
organizations may actually weaken the movement via diminishing the notion of a unified voice.
The most relevant findings to future examination are those for the importance of women
in parliament and the interaction between women in parliament and LGB movement resources.
The results for women in parliament support recent literature that has demonstrated interesting
and previously insufficiently explored policy development and changes related to increases in the
number of women in the legislature such as the work of Bolzendahl and Brooks (2007)
demonstrating the connection between women in parliament and welfare state spending. The
results here confirm findings that have suggested that women in parliament improve minority
rights policies. Increases in the number of women in the legislature not only directly improve the
probability of anti-discrimination, military personnel, and partnership recognition policies, they
also facilitate the impact of LGB movement resources.
Women in parliament are also closely associated with decreases in gender norming which
in turn increases gender fluidity and improves tolerance and acceptance of homosexuality.
Additionally, women in parliament may serve as a proxy for broader post-materialist values in
the public, which is associated with increased emphasis on rights and equality. Much like
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decreased gender norming, post-materialist values are positively related to tolerance and
acceptance of homosexuality and greater rights for LGB persons.
In addition to the implications for model specification, the findings for women in
parliament also suggest that LGB rights organizations would be well served to pursue strategies
aimed at changing social norms, particularly those regarding traditional gender roles, and
promoting increases in women’s political representation. Where the LGB movement is
successful in changing these norms it becomes more likely that women will be elected to office
and thus the probabilities of LGB rights policies will increase. This is important as LGB
organizations consider the most efficient and effective deployment of limited resources ,
recognizing that some LGB organizations would better serve the community if they pursued a
more cultural strategy. For example, ILGA-Europe’s Be Bothered campaign or litigation strategy
via the European Court of Justice may be a less effective use of resources compared to their
funding of start-up LGBTQ organizations in Eastern European countries and public information
campaigns. While the Be Bothered campaign has garnered support from 26% of the members of
the European Parliament, it is likely that the Step Up! Campaign in the Balkans and resource
support to the Campaign Against Homophobia organization in Poland for example will
ultimately yield greater returns with regard to policy change both within specific states as well as
at the European Union level. This seems particularly true in light of states such as Latvia where
national resistance to EU intervention in social policy related to LGB rights has been particularly
strong and 19% of members of parliament were women in 2010 (Inter-Parliamentary Union
2011).
Causal Mechanisms and Model Adjustments
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Democratic state governments must respond to pressures from the electorate to change
policy, thus the development and growth of a social movement applying such pressure should
result in policy change. The timing of success varies across democratic states even when the
demands of the social movement are essentially identical. This dissertation proposed that these
variations were a function of not only differences in the strength or resources available to the
movement across states, but also a function of the formal and informal institutions impeding or
encouraging policy responsiveness from the government. As noted above, the findings suggest a
reformulation of the proposed causal structure. Chapter Two provided a visual representation of
the model depicting formal and informal institutions as distinct filters intervening in the impact
of social movement resources. Two alternative model specifications are discussed and presented
in Figures I1 and J1 subsequently.
The results suggest that one possible reformulation of the model would continue to
formulate informal institutions as intervening in the relationship between LGB movement
resources and LGB rights policies while conceptualizing formal institutions as a set of
independent variables that make some systems more or less likely to change policy as depicted in
Figure J1 below. Because formal institutions are modeled distinctly from movement resources
and informal institutions, this formulation accommodates the role of influential leaders who
promote policy that is not aligned with social norms or a strong focus of the movement. When
then presidential candidate Bill Clinton incorporated LGB access to military employment into his
campaign, he elevated an issue that was minor to the LGB movement agenda and did not have
strong popular support. Thus the adoption of Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell would likely be more
accurately modeled with the importance of the presidential system and leadership ideology
separate from the role the movement and cultural values played in policy development.
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Furthermore, this model may allow for consideration to be given to the political background of
office holders that directly impact the policies pursues and yet are distinct from the broader
informal institutions of the state.

Figure I1

Duration until
Policy Change

Formal Institutions

Movement
Resources

Informal Institutions

The findings may alternatively be interpreted to suggest formal institutions should be
incorporated as a specifying variable impacting the effects of cultural change on public policy in
a stages-based model in which movement resources impact informal institutions which
subsequently affect policy change. As noted previously, the results indicate social movement
resources interact with changes in informal institutions to affect the probability of policy
adoption, but interaction terms with formal institutions fail to produce statistically significant
results. The direct effects of formal institutions indicate that there is an impact but that this could
be as a mechanism for increasing or decreasing political responsiveness to cultural change. In
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states such as Sweden changing views on gender norms and the related policy such changes
promote have been expedited by the proportional representation electoral system.

Figure J1
Formal
Institutions

Movement
Resources

Informal
Institutions

Duration
until policy
change

As social movement resources increase, the ability of the social movement to apply
pressure for policy change also increases. The findings from the models for both formal and
informal institutions support this contention when movement resources were measured as the
number of national organizations. When movement resources are operationalized as publications,
the findings fail to support the hypothesized relationship. The contrary findings for publications
likely reflect the lack of specificity in the measure. This research used a count of the number of
publications but ideally the ability to disseminate information would be measured via the
readership of LGB publications rather than the number of publications available. Furthermore,
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the measure of LGB publications would benefit from the inclusion of content analysis specifying
the proportion of particular publications devoted to political mobilizing versus apolitical content.
Both updated versions of the model take into account the most relevant finding for social
movement tactics: LGB movement resources are more effective in increasing the probability of
policy adoption when directed at changing cultural norms. Additionally both of the alternative
model specifications will accommodate the suggested changes to variables and
operationalization as previously described in the review of the hypotheses and above.
It is unsurprising that the results of this research indicate a need to revise the theory and
reconsider the best model for the relationship between LGB movement resources, formal and
informal institutions, and policy adoption. Given the limited cross national exploration of these
interactions as well as the continuously changing political landscape for LGB rights, frequent
revisions of the theory and the model should be expected as the movement and policies develop.
As with other minority social movements, the goals of the movement and the relationship
between the movement and the polity will change over time, the revisions to the model proposed
above are also intended to accommodate these changes.
Suggestions for Future Research
Comparative policy research examining the LGB social movement on this scale is new to
studies of comparative politics, public policy, and social movements, thus this research should be
understood as a step forward in an emerging area of study. Because a quantitative cross-national
comparative policy study examining the effects of the transnational LGB movement has not
previously been attempted, this research raises at least as many questions to pursue in future
research as it attempted to answer. While certainly not an exhaustive list, this section attempts to
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highlight some of the directions future research might take in light of the findings from this
dissertation.
Because this dissertation examines a movement in progress, the most obvious next step is
to extend the data chronologically. All research on current movement must choose cut points in
which the data collection stops and the analysis begins, but these cut points should be regularly
extended. In the case of the LGB rights movement much has happened between 2005 and 2012,
particularly with regard to partnership recognition policy. Given an increased number of events,
it is likely future research on partnership recognition policy adoption will be more likely to find
statistical significance for more variables, thus increasing the credibility of the results.
In addition to a chronological extension of the data, a geographical extension of the
dataset would likely improve the results of the analysis as well as provide a broader scope and
greater diversity in the determinants. In order to maintain the validity of the claim of consistent
goals across a transnational movement, the possibility of geographic extension is limited. As was
the case for the initial case selection, states would need to be above the minimum polity score
threshold as well as have a clearly advanced industrialized economy. To a great degree the
chronological extension of the data will necessarily include a geographic extension as more
states have moved toward a tertiary economy and away from an industrial and agricultural
economy. As more states are included in the analysis, the diversity in the formal and informal
institutions will also increase thus adding more dimension to our understanding of the
relationship between social movement resources and these institutions.
As mentioned above, future research should reconsider the role formal institutions play in
the policy process relative to social movements. Rather than an intervening variable, formal
institutions may serve as an antecedent variable, shaping the movement itself in terms of
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demands, structure, and tactics. Much as the aforementioned research differentiates between
cultural movement resources and political movement resources, a study examining how formal
institutions alter the shape of the movement requires continued case study research on the
movement organizations, publications, and other resources across states. For example, in the
United States the federalist structure has encouraged the development of many state-level
organizations and a few umbrella and national organizations that are highly professionalized. We
might then examine if the same movement structure exists in other federalist states and if
national rather than local organizations are more likely to occur in unitary states. The differences
in organizational structure to the movement would likely impact the duration until policy change
thus indicating that a stages model would better serve our understanding of policy change as a
function of the LGB movement. Relatedly, this research should also address concerns previously
expressed that a greater number of organizations indicated division of labor and
professionalization of the movement rather increases in strength. In such an instance the
overlapping membership in such organizations created to establish a division of labor may inflate
the anticipated impact of organizations. In the United States for example, the Task Force has
ceased its lobbying functions in favor of serving predominantly as a research institution,
devolving lobbying and political organizing to the HRC. Additionally, once the Palm Center was
established the Task Force focused on policy areas outside the scope of military personnel issues
because the Palm Center exclusively studies sexual minorities in the armed forces.
Finally a personal goal for future research is to extend the examination from the LGB
movement and policies to include transgender persons and thus represent the full LGBT
movement. This research goal is somewhere in between a distinctive new but related research
project and an extension of this dissertation. While there are overlaps in terms of the goals, it is
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often the case that extension of rights to the LGB community precede rights for transgender
persons. Nevertheless, transgender rights are often included as clauses to policy regarding LGB
rights and the two are often intertwined. Furthermore, the vast majority of the modern movement
has taken up the LGBT acronym and included policy issues that pertain to the full range of
LGBT persons. Thus while throughout this research I have spoken of LGB organizations and
publications, most of these organizations now self-define as LGBT(Q).
Conclusion
When and where rights are extended to LGB persons is a function of the social
movement and the formal and informal institutions in the state, though each of these factors may
not play exactly the role initially conceptualized. This dissertation serves as an initial attempt to
further incorporate studies of LGB politics into the broader comparative policy and social
movement literature. Studying a movement in progress provides a unique opportunity to make
predictions regarding future developments and subsequently review the accuracy of these
predictions. Thus this research serves as a first foray into making such predictions regarding the
states analyzed and will regularly need to be updates as policies are made and political and social
contexts change.
The most important finding for movement activists is the importance of women in
parliament. The LGB movement clearly benefits when women hold political office and this has
important implications for the future of the movement. If women in public office are vital to
policy gains, then it would seem that movement resources would be well spent on campaigns to
increase the number of women elected to public office. Furthermore, this more broadly implies a
relationship between LGB rights, women’s rights, and post-materialism.
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As this research continues it will incorporate a new understanding of the role of formal
institutions, a more nuanced understanding of how policy types within LGB rights impact the
determinants, and the need to increase the substantive character of cross-national data on the
LGB movement.
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Appendix A: Formal Institutions Coding
Case Table

Australia

Enter
Date60
1971

Electoral
System
Majoritarian

Austria
Belgium

1971
1971

PR
PR

Bulgaria
Canada

2000
1971

PR
Majoritarian

Cyprus
Czech
Republic
Denmark

1971
1990

PR
PR

1971

PR

Estonia
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Hungary
Iceland
Ireland
Israel
Italy
Japan

2000
1971
1971
1971
1986
1990
1971
1971
1971
1971
1971

PR
PR
Majoritarian
Mixed
PR
Mixed
PR
PR
PR
Mixed
Mixed

Lithuania
Luxembourg

1994
1971

Mixed
PR

Netherlands

1971

PR

New Zealand

1971

Mixed

Executive
Structure61
Parliamentary
Monarchy
Mixed Executive
Parliamentary
Monarchy
Mixed Executive
Parliamentary
Monarchy
Presidential
Mixed Executive

Federalism

EU62

ECHR63

Federalist

--

--

Unitary
Federalist

1995
1958

1956
1953

Unitary
Federalist

2007
--

1992
--

Unitary
Unitary

2004
2004

1961
1993

Parliamentary
Monarchy
Mixed Executive
Mixed Executive
Mixed Executive
Mixed Executive
Mixed Executive
Mixed Executive
Mixed Executive
Mixed Executive
Mixed Executive
Mixed Executive
Parliamentary
Monarchy
Mixed Executive
Parliamentary
Monarchy
Parliamentary
Monarchy
Parliamentary

Unitary

1973

1953

Unitary
Unitary
Unitary
Federalist
Unitary
Unitary
Unitary
Unitary
Unitary
Unitary
Unitary

2004
1995
1958
1958
1981
2004
-1973
-1958
--

1993
1989
1953
1953
1953
1990
1953
1953
-1953
--

Unitary
Unitary

2004
1958

1993
1953

Unitary--

1958

1953

Unitary

--

--

60

The entrance date for states is stable across all of the chapters but the exit data will vary by policy for each state
because a state exits the dataset when it has adopted the highest level of policy possible. States that do not adopt a
policy or adopt a policy, but only a lower level policy remain in the dataset until 2005, the final year of observation.
61
In the analysis parliamentary monarchies are coded as mixed executive states, but the original coding from the
Norris data set is as above.
62
Listed as the year the state joined the EU, which may be before the state enters the data set, during the analysis
time, or after the last entry of the data set. The data used for analysis ends at 2005, thus states with years after 2005
were coded as non-member states.
63
Listed as the year the state joined the Council of Europe or the date the treaty entered into force if the state was
member prior to the drafting of the European Convention on Human Rights, which may be before the state enters
the data set, during the analysis time, or after the last entry of the data set. The data used for analysis ends at 2005,
thus states with years after 2005 were coded as non-member states. Observer states are not included.
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Norway

1971

PR

Poland
Portugal
Romania
Slovakia
Slovenia
South Africa
Spain

1995
1979
1995
1998
1992
1994
1978

PR
PR
PR
PR
PR
PR
PR

Sweden

1971

PR

Switzerland
United
Kingdom
United States

1971
1971

PR
PR

1971

Majoritarian

Monarchy
Parliamentary
Monarchy
Mixed Executive
Mixed Executive
Mixed Executive
Mixed Executive
Mixed Executive
Presidential
Parliamentary
Monarchy
Parliamentary
Monarchy
Mixed Executive
Parliamentary
Monarchy
Presidential

270

Unitary

--

1953

Unitary
Unitary
Unitary
Unitary
Unitary
Unitary
Unitary

2004
1986
2007
2004
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-1986

1991
1976
1993
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-1977

Unitary

1995

1953

Federalist
Unitary

-1973

1963
1953

Federalist

--

--

Appendix B: Antidiscrimination Policy Adoption
Enter Date64
Australia
Austria
Belgium
Bulgaria
Canada
Cyprus
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Denmark
Estonia
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France
Germany
Greece
Hungary
Iceland
Ireland
Israel
Italy
Japan
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Luxembourg
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Poland
Portugal
Romania
Slovakia
Slovenia
South Africa
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
United Kingdom
United States

1971
1971
1971
2000
1971
1971
1990
1971
2000
1971
1971
1971
1986
1990
1971
1971
1971
1971
1971
1994
1971
1971
1971
1971
1995
1979
1995
1998
1992
1994
1978
1971
1971
1971
1971

General Discrimination
Prohibition

1993

1990
1995

1971
1971

1997

1978
1971

64

LGB Discrimination
Prohibition
1996
2004
2003
2003
1996
2004
2004
2004
2004
1995
1992
2001
2005
2003
1996
1993
1988
2003
-2002
1997
1992
1993
1998
2003
2003
2000
2004
1995
1996
1995
1987
1999
2003

The entrance date for states is stable across all of the chapters but the exit data will vary by policy for each state
because a state exits the dataset when it has adopted the highest level of policy possible. States that do not adopt a
policy or adopt a policy, but only a lower level policy remain in the dataset until 2005, the final year of observation.
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Appendix C: Military Personnel Policy Adoption

Australia
Austria
Belgium
Bulgaria
Canada
Cyprus
Czech Republic
Denmark
Estonia
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Hungary
Iceland
Ireland
Israel
Italy
Japan
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Poland
Portugal
Romania
Slovakia
Slovenia
South Africa
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
United Kingdom
United States

Enter Date65
1971
1971
1971
2000
1971
1971
1990
1971
2000
1971
1971
1971
1986
1990
1971
1971
1971
1971
1971
1994
1971
1971
1971
1971
1995
1979
1995
1998
1992
1994
1978
1971
1971
1971
1971

Allowed to serve with restrictions
----1988
-1999
1979
-1981, 1989
1982
1990
2002
2000
--1983
1985
--1974
1974
---1989
1996
----1984
-1992
1993

65

Allowed to openly serve
1992
2004
2003
2002
1992
-2001
1981
-1995
1992
2000
---1993
1993
---1997
1986
1993
1979
--2000
1996
-1996
1985
1987
1992
2000
--

The entrance date for states is stable across all of the chapters but the exit data will vary by policy for each state
because a state exits the dataset when it has adopted the highest level of policy possible. States that do not adopt a
policy or adopt a policy, but only a lower level policy remain in the dataset until 2005, the final year of observation.
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Appendix D: Partnership Recognition Policy

Australia
Austria
Belgium
Bulgaria
Canada
Cyprus
Czech Republic
Denmark
Estonia
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Hungary
Iceland
Ireland
Israel
Italy
Japan
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Poland
Portugal
Romania
Slovakia
Slovenia
South Africa
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
United Kingdom
United States

Enter
Date66
1971
1971
1971
2000
1971
1971
1990
1971
2000
1971
1971
1971
1986
1990
1971
1971
1971
1971
1971
1994
1971
1971
1971
1971
1995
1979
1995
1998
1992
1994
1978
1971
1971
1971
1971

Cohabitation
Recognition
2003

Registered
Partnership/Civil Union

Civil
Union/Marriage

1998

1999

2003

2000

2005

2001
1986

1989
2001
1999
2000

1997
1996

1996
1994

2004
1979
2000
1989, 1991

2001

1997, 2001
2005
1993

2001

2005
1999

2005
2005

1988

1994
2004

66

The entrance date for states is stable across all of the chapters but the exit data will vary by policy for each state
because a state exits the dataset when it has adopted the highest level of policy possible. States that do not adopt a
policy or adopt a policy, but only a lower level policy remain in the dataset until 2005, the final year of observation.
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